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Abstract 
Three Essays on the Dynamics of Industry Formation 
 
Robert Conan Ryan, PhD 
 
University of Pittsburgh, 2018 
 
 
 
 
This dissertation contributes to three sub-literatures in strategic management: strategic timing of 
exploration; incumbent-challenger dynamics for radical innovation; and, first-mover advantages. Each 
essay makes contributions to both theory and methodology.  
Essay One proposes a new theory of the strategic timing of within-industry exploration, Harmonic 
Oscillation Theory. Synthesizing decades of marketing and strategy research, this theory proposes that 
industry maturity is best understood as an oligarchy of firms who have found a harmonic fit – both to the 
overall industrial rhythm of exploration and to each other’s product initiatives. The essay presents a model 
of Four Generic Timing Strategies: 1) in-phase for durable goods; 2) anti-phase for cultural goods; 3) 
multi-phase layers of super-harmonic and sub-harmonic firm activities for any focal industry; and 4) 
managing chaos, in the case of risk mitigating, and/or exchange market-managing, firms. I provide 
exemplar cases for durable goods (Silicon Valley consumer hardware) and cultural goods (Hollywood 
theater releases). My extension of entrainment theory explains how to model technical timing waves 
(zeitgeber) and demand timing waves (zeitmacher) to arrive at a theoretically optimal timing pattern. 
Essay Two examines patterns of radical exaptation in new industry formation. I show that, in 
contrast to the “wholly new” technologies responsible for disruptive/moonshot innovations, radical 
exaptation involves “partially new” innovation trees that trigger stand-alone industries. I resort the 
strategies of incumbent-challenger dynamics into Four Radical Innovation Strategies: 1) Moonshots 2) 
Disruptive Innovations; 3) Rebel Alliances; and 4) Blue Oceans. The essay examines 12 qualitative cases 
of radical exaptation to confirm ten Rebel Alliance and Blue Ocean scenarios.  
Essay Three is a deep dive into the emergence of market leadership cohorts. I theorize that 
proofpoints are an excellent predictor of market leadership. This is the first study using Crisp-Set 
 v 
Qualitative Comparative Analysis to predict emerging market leadership cohorts. The essay focuses on the 
Rebel Alliance Strategy – the radical exaptation of a technology by enterprising, cooperative lead users of 
the incumbent technology. I model automobile, microcomputer, and 3D desktop printer leadership cohorts. 
I confirm a new Rebel Alliance Model of six Promethean proofpoints for pioneering commercialization and 
six Mercurian proofpoints for firm takeoff.  
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Preface 
This document evolved from a series of studies conducted from 2013-2018. Each of the 
three essays started as a simple query: a single, abstract idea independent of the popular literature. 
At every turn, I did my best to reduce my intuitions to extremely modest empirical studies of clear 
and simple strategic mechanisms, as is befitting of a doctoral student. But no matter how simple I 
tried to make the study, the refined version eventually turned into a complex “big idea”.  
Essay One began as a very simple conjecture: that a strategic group of firms would tend to 
seek a “smooth distance” from each others’ strategic initiatives, all else aside. As I kept refining 
this idea, it became apparent to me that “smooth distance” varies by industry, and specification 
would require deep research into the causes and consequences of typical industrial patterns of 
strategic timing. Thus, a simple idea became a multi-year dive into literally hundreds of papers.  
Essay Two started as a question as to why all Schumpeter Mark I creative destruction 
scenarios are assumed to be well-covered by the theory of disruptive innovation – it seemed to me 
that many radical innovation scenarios were systematically excluded by that theory. I noticed that 
lead users sometimes collectively invented the new architecture to serve alternative functions: 
whatever they wanted to do with it. This observation led to a typology of radical innovation types.  
Essay Three began as a recognition that pioneering firms in microcomputers embraced 
radical ideals. I wondered if the visionary ideals that motivate product pioneers (Prometheans) 
might limit their ability to subsequently scale up, whereas Mercurians could easily do the job.   
Starting with a repertoire of such difficult questions, I stumbled through and across a wide 
variety of literature, seeking deep insights. Due to my tendency to foray completely into the 
unknown and touch every possibly pertinent literature, it was quite difficult to identify a chair who 
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was willing and able to steer my mind towards practical studies. When shopping around my “very 
rough drafts”, I received many irritable questions from early reviewers, such as:  
“Essay One: Why is a doctoral student attempting to write a major view of the firm when there are 
only about six successful attempts in 100 years?... If these timing patterns existed, people would assume 
such a phenomenon would have been discovered by some senior scholar by now…. You’ve got your work 
cut out for you.” 
 
“Essay Two: Why do you think you can pull off a paper about a “Schumpeter Mark III” matrix of 
radical innovation, when the strategy literature still doesn’t have broad agreement on strategizing the 
Schumpeter Mark I/II dichotomy?... You might want to try dramatically narrowing your idea.” 
 
“Essay Three: a Promethean/Mercurian dichotomy is intriguing, but microcomputers and 3D 
desktop printers is not enough evidence to build a theory…. I don’t buy that this pattern happens in other 
major industries – like, say, automobiles.”  
 
Fighting the clock and facing a difficult job market, I decided there was no time to turn 
back and do a safe database study on well-established constructs. Instead, my best course of action 
was to use appropriate case studies to demonstrate these “big ideas” are already well fleshed out 
in prior literature, but somehow systematically overlooked. And indeed, I believe this essay 
achieves that goal.  
I look forward to follow-up studies to examine the implications of these three essays. My 
goal was to start lines of new inquiry. Essay one was intended to stimulate complex timing studies 
that consider how super- and sub- harmonic patterns emerge when industries are interlinked. Essay 
two was intended to spur studies that get us over the hump of excessive generalization about 
industry emergence. Patterns of innovation should be studied as “opening moves”, similar to how 
chess players study dominant opening lines of chess play. Essay three fleshes out the first such 
opening sequence, and implies future work on the other four major sequences, as well as a host of 
minor (niche) strategic sequences for peripheral players in new industries.  
I would like to acknowledge the amazing support of my family, especially: John, Connie, 
Sean, Megan Ryan; Stephanie and Scott Lindell; and Ron and Nancy Proesel. My father, John, 
 xii 
was a generous proofreader. I would like to acknowledge my committee and the Katz doctoral 
program, with special thanks to Carrie Woods for supporting me on a personal level.  I originally 
developed the conjecture behind essay one for Dr. Fritz Pil’s seminar – although he found it 
interesting, he sternly reminded me that it was “not what he asked for”! I want to thank Roger 
Williams University and Oakland University for providing me visiting professorships while I 
finished the dissertation.  I want to thank the city of Pittsburgh for being my home away from 
home.  I want to thank my daughter, Isabella Ryan, for being the driving force that kept me going, 
even when I passed through deep emotional hardship and reached the depths of despair. And last, 
I want to thank Dr. Barry Mitnick for rescuing what was otherwise a broken plan. Rarely is a 
faculty member called to be the chair of a dissertation outside of their own field of study; especially 
for a dissertation that re-conceptualizes some of the core constructs for a field. It takes a genius 
and a saint to pull that off, and those two words seem quite fitting for him. 
 
With gratitude,  
Robert Conan Ryan 
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1.0 Harmonic Oscillation Theory: A Temporal View of the Strategically Entrained Firm 
Since the late 1990s, Organization Science has enjoyed an increasing interest in literature on the nuances 
of strategic timing (i.e., Slawinski and Bansal, 2015; Gulati and Puranam, 2009; Raisch et al., 2009; 
Katila and Chen, 2008; Nickerson and Zenger, 2002; Orlikowski and Yates, 2002; Huy, 2001; and 
others). The classic question of strategic timing involves understanding what moment is best for taking a 
new strategic initiative within an established market (Pettis et al., 2017; Liao and Seifert, 2015; George 
and Jones, 2000; Fine, 1998; Burgelman, 1983). Firms must master exploratory timing of substantial 
product/process redesign initiatives. Indeed, strategy practitioners are largely responsible for the periodic 
(re) construction of market categories (Cattani, Porac, and Thomas, 2017). How often should, say, an 
automobile company or media company commit resources to explore a major category redesign?  
Initiatives, not entry/exit. The reader is here cautioned that this timing question should not be confused 
with two related, but separate, questions of timing. 
First, the initial decision to enter or exit an industry, and the associated patterns of firm performance vis a 
vis order of entry, is covered in Incumbent-Challenger Dynamics (Ansari and Krop, 2012; Agarwal and 
Bayus, 2004). This essay’s research question assumes the firm already has made such decisions to 
participate, has already launched an initial product, and now is deciding on the timing of its next within-
industry activities, on a marginal analysis of the industry’s clockspeed (Fine, 1998). It must repeatedly 
make such decisions all along the industry lifecycle. For example, Apple entered the microcomputer 
business in 1976, but by 1977, it faced the dilemma of exploiting its initial Apple I product design, or 
shifting all efforts towards the Apple II. They chose to switch (Veit, 1993), to take advantage of a color 
capability, at a time when all its competitors were also exploring distinguishing features suitable for a 
dominant design. Next, they incrementally extended (exploited) the original Apple II design for several 
years, adding annual upgrades. By 1981, in anticipation of the IBM PC and a 16-bit generation, they were 
making bold redesigns: the Lisa and the Macintosh: and new timing dilemmas followed. This essay 
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addresses such dilemmas as Apple’s choice of timing of exploratory redesign initiatives as the personal 
computer lifecycle matures. Rhythm may be essential to oligopolistic (Stigler, 1964) competition.   
Second, this essay does not concern timing with regards to truly competence-destroying, industry-
replacing discontinuities (Anderson and Tuchman, 1986) – only generational technical improvements. For 
a clarifying example: consider Mazda’s launch of its category-defining model, the 2016 CX-3. To create 
the CX-3, Mazda hybridized its Mazda 2 platform with the features typically found in the “luxury all-
wheel drive subcompact” category (Audi Q3, BMW X1, etc.). While the Mazda 2 was among the lowest 
price cars in the world, the CX-3 became a mid-priced alternative to luxury brands. Such an initiative 
does not create a new industry or destroy incumbent’s technical competences. However, their aggressive 
category redesign appealed to shifting trends and repositioned their strategy toward the midpoint of the 
subcompact crossover market. The CX-3 employed new capabilities but destroyed none.  
Achieving Timing Mastery. “Temporal change does not necessarily involve the “what” of the change, 
but the “when.”’ (Perez-Nordvedt et al. 2008, p. 6). The basic variable of concern here is timing of 
strategic vacillation (Nickerson and Zenger, 2002) between initiatives: when to explore new sources of 
profit, and when to exploit existing knowledge. March’s (1991) dilemma of exploration/exploitation has 
been heavily extended by scholars to nearly every unit of analysis possible (Gupta, Smith, and Shalley, 
2006). But we still lack a theoretical understanding of how firms must balance timing of these alternative 
initiatives on two different levels: 1) with respect to the pace of industry lifecycle changes in technology 
and demand and 2) with respect to the marginal, seasonal timing of product launches of rival firms. Profit 
maximizers must correctly time strategic initiatives from start to finish, not just the final product launch 
dates (Calantone and di Benedetto, 2007; Eisenhardt and Brown, 1998). Projects can benefit from such 
mechanisms as knowledge spillovers, or suffer such setbacks as bidding for co-specialized resources.  
Limitations to the classic innovation-diffusion model. There is a widespread awareness that prevailing 
theory on mature competition is based on consumer durables: a special case model driven by dominant 
designs (Windrum and Birchenhall, 1998) and the dynamics of Bass/Roger’s S-Curve/Diffusion Model 
(Bass, 1969; Rogers, 2010). There is a need for an approach to modeling of exploration and exploitation 
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timing that can handle other forms of goods, especially for industries with strong “demand side” effects 
on value creation (Priem, Li, and Carr, 2012).  
Consumer Durables are only 1/10th of GDP. According to the Federal Reserves’ free database, FRED, 
average sectoral shares of GDP have been stable over the past few decades. Consumer categories of 
goods and services account for roughly 70 percent of GDP. Durable goods consumption, such as 
automobiles and kitchen appliances, comprises merely 10 percent of GDP. Services/software account for 
40 percent – four times the expenditures! [the other 20 percent is nondurables]. Obviously, many 
industries are not going to conform to the durables model. Herein I frequently refer to “durables” or 
“durable firms”, dropping the “goods”.   
Cultural Goods. The greatest chunk of consumer activity are intangibles and services: entertainment and 
personal services, media, cultural reproductions of art/nature, luxuries, and popular software, otherwise 
collectively known as cultural goods (Throsby, 1999). As before with durables, in this paper, I will often 
refer to “cultural firms” and “culturals”, dropping the “goods”." Culturals’ utility derives from 
consumers’ collective/individual learning, not by some durable (reliable) product functions (Lampel, 
Lant, and Shamsie, 2000). Cultural entrepreneurs (Gehman, and Soubliere, 2017) are those responsible 
for exploratory cultural innovations. Eisenhardt and Brown (1998) referred to continuously changing 
competitive landscapes – most especially software markets – as “markets that won’t stand still” (title of 
paper). More discussion on cultural timing can be found later in this essay.  
Blockbusters and genres. Whereas durables are stabilized by dominant designs for years at a time 
(Anderson and Tushman, 1990) – consider that the I-Phone is entering its 7th generation of incremental 
change – culturals evolve much more rapidly, as categories are redesigned frequently. For example, 
consumers learn to appreciate Hollywood films within a fast-changing, networked, yet increasingly 
localized cultural context (Scott, 2004). Firms in personal services are dedicated to make their clients look 
fashionable or extend their cultural knowledge. Cultural collectibles like sports memorabilia and the 
infamous Beanie Babies capture iconic historical moments: gold rushes of the hot moment. Most profits 
to the creator are made from initial releases, such when a Hollywood film like Black Panther tastefully 
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capitalized on extremely timely facts, fads, and issues. But, a curatorial process [Mitnick and Ryan, 
2015] makes meanings new-to-audience and captures residual value beyond the technical creative 
process. Hirsch (1972, p. 32) referred to curators as “surrogate consumers”.  Replication and 
reinterpretation are relentless cultural processes (Toeffler, 1964). Profits are highest from a high impact 
blockbuster theme – also known as a subgenre, hit, series, icon, franchise, and so forth.  
 The S- Curve or the Λ-Curve? Research exists to show that Hollywood films have their own classic 
product curve – declining exponential sales, what I call the Sawtooth or Lambda(Λ-) curve, based on the 
sharp downward slope of sales from product debut. The Λ-curve is subject to brief, repeating re-releases 
of related products with the same shape – creating a much different competitive dynamic than the low, 
slow, unfolding of sales of the S-curve, for durables (Krider and Weinberg, 1998; Simonoff and Sparrow, 
2000). Similar declining monotonic sales have been observed in music, novels, and most other culturals 
(Beck, 2007). The Λ-curve has potential as a culturals exemplar. Furthermore, as the field shifts its 
attention toward platform-based competition, there is need to consider the other extremes: temporally 
chaotic environments and super-/sub-harmonic platform patterns (Rochet and Tirole, 2003; Gawer and 
Cusumano, 2008). A general timing-diffusion model would permit complex waveform analyses.  
Harmonic Oscillation Theory. This paper updates and synthesizes the strategic literature on the timing 
of organizational initiatives, and arrives at a new model of Four Generic Timing Strategies: 1) in-phase 
durables; 2) anti-phase culturals; 3) multi-phase layers of super-harmonic and sub-harmonic firm 
activities for any focal industry; and 4) managing chaos, in the case of risk mitigating, and/or exchange 
market-managing, firms. In the 21st century, industry convergence and increasing technical complexity 
forces most major industries to employ blends of durable and cultural layers of technology; thus, most 
complex industries are 3) multi-phasic, and also likely to involve 4) management of some chaos. Still, 
scholars cannot analyze these complexities until we first establish the analytical basis point for the 
simplest expressions for 1) in-phase and 2) anti-phase industrial timing. Therefore, this paper will tackle 
in-phase and anti-phase strategies, and leave the other two for future work.  
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I shall revisit the literature for patterns of mature competition to construct a general lifecycle theory 
rooted in the industrial timing patterns of firm initiatives. I refer to this view of firm timing as Harmonic 
Oscillation Theory (or HOT). Indeed, from the perspective of the general manager, entrainment must 
always be a problem of finding harmonic fit. This term is selected to distinguish this essay’s argument 
from the more generic term of temporal fit (Shi and Prescott, 2012; Jansen and Kristof-Brown, 2005). 
Firms find harmonic fit to their changing strategic environment by entrainment (Ancona and Chong, 
1996) to environmental drivers of change. Under some industrial conditions of mature competition, 
oligarchs tightly imitate the timing of firms in their strategic group (Reger and Huff, 1993). In other 
mature conditions, firms will tend to leapfrog each other, seeking to optimize distance between each 
other’s initiatives. Leading durables firms take explore/exploit initiatives in-phase – i.e., redesigning 
product categories at the same time. On the other hand, oligarchic cultural firms tend toward anti-phase 
explore/exploit actions - i.e., “when one firm zigs, the other(s) zag(s)”.    
Essay outline. This essay presents HOT in the following sections. First, I touch on lifecycle history and 
challenge the four prevailing assumptions in lifecycle theory. Second, I provide a restatement of the 
industry lifecycle in terms of exploration/exploitation timing. Third, I discuss the next level of analysis 
down: initiatives launched with respect to competitor firms. I use examples of categorical explorations for  
personal computing devices and film releases. Fourth, I specify the theory of four Generic Timing 
Strategies: in-phase, anti-phase, multi-phase, and managed chaos. I also address details of how 
organizations move in or out of phase, or overclock their competitors. Fifth, the paper briefly revisits the 
literature supporting the organizational advantages gained from accurate in-phase and anti-phase timing. 
This section revisits four theories: vacillation, co-specialization, intertemporal ambidexterity, and 
leapfrog spillovers. Section six concludes with the usual discussion of limitations and research directions. 
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1.1 Loosening the Four Historical Assumptions of Lifecycle Theory 
Strategy scholars need to overcome four key assumptions driven by historic dependency on reliable S-
curve adoption for durable features (Abernathy and Utterback, 1978; Clark, 1985; Henderson and Clark, 
1990): the assumption of objective measures of performance; technical dominance; steadily incremental 
mature innovation; and, a strictly in-phase strategic alignment of firms to the lifecycle, rather than to each 
other’s anti-phase actions. But first, let us summarize the history of the scholarly focus on durable goods. 
The historical product lifecycle. Scholars started describing industrial “product cycles” (Rink and Swan, 
1979; Anderson and Zeithaml, 1984) as a feature of capitalist mass production. Industry lifecycle models 
are known as proceeding in four stages: emergence, growth, maturity, and decline – although the labeling 
of stages varies. Scholars currently focus their attention on deeper dives into industry emergence and 
growth (Agarwal, Moeen, and Shah, 2017; Suarez, Grodal, and Gotsopoulos, 2015). The lifecycle view of 
technological and industrial change is a widely known and used collection of theories concerning cyclical 
technological change patterns (Clark, 1985; Dosi, 1982; Kaplan and Tripsas, 2008; Klepper, 1996; etc.). 
But industrial patterns of innovation are more than a study of firm entry and exit: they have widespread 
implications for within-industry strategic and organizational timing (Gort and Klepper, 1982; Abernathy 
and Utterback, 1978). Most scholars have extended from Abernathy and Utterback’s (A-U) consumer 
durables model (1978).  
Classic lifecycle studies began with modeling the historical evolution of automobiles and similar 
durables produced on assembly lines, and then cross-industry comparisons on broad factors, such as rate 
of firm entry/exit, and firm size (Gort and Klepper, 1982; Klepper, 1996; Agarwal and Bayus, 2004). 
Scholars focused on assembly lines themselves as the standard mythology for what a mature industry is 
and does. It is because of mass production that firms compete in a sequence for sales takeoff, dominant 
designs, and other early locked-in advantages (Agarwal and Bayus, 2002; Chandler, 1992). Firms develop 
capabilities in a progression from early exploration to later exploitation, ending in a creative destruction 
process that supplants old forms (Schumpeter, 1934; Clark, 1985; Dosi, Malerba, and Orsinigo, 1994). In 
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emergence and growth, frequent upgrades to designs occur, and it is hard for a firm to rely on incremental 
extension, until a dominant design emerges. By maturity, it is assumed that firms settle into routine 
generational upgrades. Mature firms compete on bundling features at price points, because of high 
standardization: processes, product categories, parts, organizational structures, etc. In industries such as 
personal computers, firms race to establish dominant form factors (Bell, 2008), and then ride out 
incremental innovation until technological advances enable new form factors. Firms can anticipate 
planned obsolescence, measured by the number of years until industry-wide technical updates (Fishman, 
Gandal, and Shy, 1993). Industry renewal is driven by a radical, discontinuous technology (Tuchman and 
Anderson, 1986; Helfat and Peteraf, 2003).  
The Abernathy Utterback (A-U) Model. The A-U Model explicitly approaches “industry” in terms of 
the manufacturing of durable goods. It describes the “specific pattern”, also known as a “locked-in” 
(Lieberman and Montgomery, 1998) oligarchy: cost-driven competition, standardized products, 
incremental process innovation, and high automation. Thereafter, the field also accepted Klepper’s (1996; 
also, Gort and Klepper, 1982) well-known lifecycle model of firm entry and exit rates, driven endogenous 
by a cycle of product/process R&D expenditures. Scholars also continued with the A-U Models’ 
dominant design perspective (Anderson and Tushman, 1990; Suarez and Utterback, 1995), whereby the 
bulk of the growing/mature industry is stabilized by convergence on one design, until disrupted by a 
technical discontinuity, trigging a consequential renewed search for a dominant design, etc.  
Extending the durables model. The field then looked for more variables, levels, and units of analysis. 
Scholars sought multilevel analysis of sociotechnical systems (Murmann and Frenken, 2006). Lifecycle 
analysis includes such literatures as: product platforms (Robertson and Ulrich, 1998), firm capabilities 
(Helfat and Peteraf, 2003; Fortune and Mitchell, 2012), product categories/waves (Ghodal, Gotsopoulos, 
and Suarez, 2015; Golder and Tellis, 2004), strategic organization design (Sirmon, et al. 2011; Jawahar 
and McLaughlin, 2001), and even alliance networks and industry clusters (Chao, 2011; Hwang and Park, 
2007). Some of these strands of literature are theoretically divergent, but that issue is beyond this essay. 
Let us turn to developing a general model of explore/exploit initiatives. 
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Breaking Assumption #1: functional value. Culturals are driven by qualitative perceptions, consumer 
knowledge, and fashionable status more than price/performance ratio. Primary resources for producing 
such goods are “cultural capital” (Throsby, 1999; Bourdieu, 2011). Cultural capital includes 
individual/firm/industry institutional statuses, cultural knowledge, and artistic design training. There is no 
universal “functional” expectation that all consumers eventually adopt a given cultural good: demand for 
these goods are culture-specific. Most consumers view them as a leisure expense, and the only expected 
adopters are those of a predetermined cultural audience of an approximate size.   
All cultural goods share four common tendencies. First, they are experience goods that are hard to 
evaluate prior to the situation of consumption (Reinstein and Snyder, 2005). Experience goods are 
therefore affected by a performativity of value within an embedded, time-specific context (Garud, 
Gehman, and Guiliani, 2014). Second, aside from niche collectible markets, the average consumer 
willingness to pay for culturals is tied to specific moments representative of, and embedded in, cultural 
history (Gehman, and Soubliere, 2017). Not just individual consumers’ long run utility function. Firms 
must control networks for the timely “mainstreaming” of the moment (Patriotta and Hirsch, 2016). Third, 
they are positional goods (Solnich and Hemenway, 2005), meaning that the value of the good for a focal 
consumer is at least somewhat tied to the perceived utility that others assign to them; thereby, timely 
consumption/possession imparts some relative status within the pertinent audience, albeit imparts no 
status effect outside that audience. Fourth, consumers evaluate culturals on interpretive meaning more 
than on functional performance. This fact applies not just to artistic productions, but also most software 
and organizational innovations (Orlikowski and Yates, 2002). As socially constructed forms of value 
(Berger and Luckmann, 1966; Bourdieu, 2011), culturals are reproductions of cultural capital resources 
(Toeffler, 1964; Throsby, 1999, Bourdieu, 2013). These include: a live performance, a copy of 
performance/text, an aesthetic experience, collectible art, symbolic work, A.I. services, a media 
product/service distribution, and any primary service interaction, even if by service robots. 
Breaking assumption #2: technical dominance. Durables focus on a supply side trajectory (Dosi, 
1982), and how new technologies and niches disrupt the prevailing technical order (Christiansen, 1997). 
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In durables, each product category becomes associated with a standard architecture – leading to mutli-
level coopetive strategic challenges (Gnyawali and Park, 2009; Murmann and Frenken, 2006). The idea 
that dominant designs typically define the rules for categories of demand appears in dynamic capabilities 
work (Teece, 2007).  
Mature durables launch in concert with industry-wide technical generational rollouts, and this entire 
sequence fits with the traditional S-curve of innovation diffusion (Mahajan, Muller, and Bass, 1991; 
Rogers, 2010). Thus, durables firms would be wise to align to a sequence of activities of increasing 
exploitation until an industry-wide update. This also entails that firms initially focus heavily on product 
design capabilities, especially those who understand lead users (von Hippel, 2005); but later, firms need 
to focus on process design and the late adopter profile – therefore, firms seek capabilities that follow this 
progression, planning accordingly.   
Research on Hollywood (Rosen, 1993; Simonoff and Sparrow, 2000) indicates that firms must partially 
redesign categories of demand frequently, and the concept of a dominant design does not apply. 
Standardizing culture is more difficult than standardizing technology. Firms do not face an S-curve of 
adopters, but rather face mainstream markets and niche markets, with a jagged landscape of brief Lambda 
curve-shaped releases of projects that take over a year to plan and execute. Hollywood firms must decide 
how frequently to conduct an expensive search for new aesthetic features, and how much new to mix with 
the old; and, how much to reuse old design elements across similar, genre-based reproductions. 
Blockbuster designs only temporarily stabilize a wave of imitator products (Hirsh, 2000). A selection of 
fashionable design elements across the avant garde landscape end up in new blockbusters. Cultural firms 
must also perpetually balance continuity and radicality internally (Lampel, Lant, and Shamsie, 2000).      
Breaking assumption #3: incremental maturity. Chamberlin (1949) defined the general dynamics of 
maturity (paraphrased here): monopolistic competition among an oligarchy of firms who have reached an 
equilibrium state where reciprocal, collusive actions are the natural competitive response. This definition 
does not require incremental innovation to be the consistently prevailing strategy. Caves and Porter 
(1978) defined the quintessential measure for attainment of maturity: market share stability. Product 
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design contests are classically considered to be connected to the instability of the exploration-dominant 
emergence stage, while exploitative process innovation among oligarchs has little impact on market share. 
Thus, durables firms are expected to reduce the rate of exploratory initiatives as the industry matures. 
However, this assumption does not apply to meanings. Sociocultural phemonena – including software, 
organizational culture, business models, media, and cultural capital – are not constrained by physical 
laws, and so have the potential to evolve continuously (Orlikowski and Yates, 2002; Garud et al, 2014). 
Thus, when it comes to cultural meanings, market share stability must be achieved by an oligarchic 
stabilization of the meaning-making process (Mitnick and Ryan, 2015; Gehman and Soubliere, 2017).    
 Breaking assumption #4: Stabilizing without dominant designs. For all goods, we can describe timing 
for the sociotechnical system (STS) for a given industry (Geels, 2002; 2004) in terms of the appropriate 
explore/exploit strategies prior to, and during, periods of institutional stability. The industry’s STS is a 
cluster of firms and institutions entrained to common technical and demand cycles. We usually assume 
the industry explodes in growth during a battle for a dominant design. An industry with dominant designs 
has stable demand and progresses via exploitative technical innovation (Adner and Kapoor, 2010), but a 
cultural industry with “lenient categories” (Pontikes and Barnett, 2015) allows for widespread 
disagreement on the boundaries of categories, on the part of firms as well as on the part of consumers. For 
such industries – especially entertainment and software – firms frequently redraw categorical boundaries.  
How cultural firms stabilize the industry. Top firms establish an oligarchy at the top of the cultural 
design hierarchy by controlling the elite talent pooling and selection process, and the process for bidding 
on projects (Hirsch, 2000). So, the leaders control the institutions through which ideas flow and the 
contracts are made. They hire “hot talent”, and harvest emerging popular trends, fads from elite design 
shows, additional market research, and often draw on horizonal institutional ties for tips. But since 
culturals don’t have a dominant design, maturity is instead a period of dominant institutions for design.  
Shared knowledge makes possible the harmonic timing of strategic initiatives among oligarchs. Firms 
focus on exploring laterally to find design ideas emerging in allied industries and institutions, an approach 
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known as design driven innovation (Verganti, 2009; see also Patriotti and Hirsh, 2016). Firms aren’t 
expected to reduce the rate of exploration in maturity, but the timing of exploration should stabilize.   
 
Figure 1: The HOT Lifecycle Model 
 
1.1 The HOT Lifecycle Model 
This general HOT lifecycle model covers both consumer durables and cultural patterns of exploration and 
exploitation. A firm accumulates stocks in total expenditures, E, via marginal expenditures in exploration 
r, or exploitation, k. See Figure 1 for a graphical depiction of how these variables relate to each other. 
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Figure 1 illustrates two separate patterns of maturity for the industry lifecycle, each in terms of budgets 
committed to exploration and exploitation. Then, I contrast maturity patterns to emergence patterns. 
In-phase competition focuses firm alignment with durable goods’ prolonged technical trajectories, with 
demand stabilized by dominant designs. As the lifecycle progresses towards decline, exploratory research 
budgets grow at a decreasing rate: see Figure 1.  
Anti-phase competition features an oligarchy of leapfrogging firms, rapid cycling in their strategic 
oscillation. In Figure 1, the dotted line depicts a focal firms’ strategic oscillations in r and k investments; 
but each firm tries to align their behavior such that the sum of all oscillations equals zero. When in 
harmonic fit, the sum of explorations and exploitations are evenly split across all firms, while each 
individual firm is specializing its efforts one at a time. Akin to r selection in organizational ecology 
(Pianka, 1970), the approach is to produce high variation, and then select only a few projects for large 
budget commitments.  
Defining exploration and exploitation. Some confusion still exists over March’s terminology for 
exploration/exploitation. A recent attempt to clarify terms comes from Lavie, Settner, and Tushman 
(2010) (pg. 114): “As long as the organization persists within an existing technological trajectory and 
leverages its existing skills and capabilities, its operations are geared toward exploitation”. However, I 
raise the critical, classic caveat from Henderson and Clark (1990): a major architectural redesign, 
although not truly competence-destroying in terms of the underlying technical language employed in the 
firm, is still exploratory in terms of knowledge on the demand side – a new architecture involves a 
substantial shift in end user-facing knowledge. Herein we focus on architectural/categorical design 
innovation that is not competence-destroying. Note: Business model innovation timing is not covered.   
Locked-in advantage via harmonic fit. Maturity is herein alternatively defined as a period of locked-in 
harmonic fit, where firms tend to stay in the same temporal pattern of initiatives. Periods pre-/post- 
maturity are movements towards/away from that harmonic fit, and tend to cause “turbulence” 
(Chakravarthy, 1997). The lock-out of challenger firms is a simultaneous consequence of locked-in 
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oligarchy, and harmonic fit is the key mechanism of how an industry can produce abnormal returns 
(Burgelman, 2002; Schilling, 1998).  
Understanding March’s Model. Although March’s seminal (1991) paper is widely cited, rarely have 
scholars used his key conclusion about what he called “left-tailed versus right-tailed” competition. Note: 
his terminology is confusing because it refers to the specific graph he used to illustrate the phenomena – I 
only use his terms here to remain consistent for the moment. March’s paper concluded with a description 
of two types of competitive environments. The first kind is the one typically described as “mature”; where 
firms seek to reduce average error and incrementally increase average performance across all its 
activities. This focus on efficiency is caused by an exploitation-dominant environment. The second 
environment, however, involves a brutal contest that permits only a few relative winners, such that 
relative rank order of a firms’ best few offerings matters more than improving average performance 
(1991, pg. 84-85):  
“If relative position matters, as the number of competitors increases, strategies for increasing the mean [of 
a focal firm’s short term performance] through increased effort or greater knowledge become less 
attractive relative to strategies for increasing variability. In the more general situation, suppose 
organizations face competition from numerous competitors who vary in their average capabilities but who 
can choose their variances. If payoffs and preferences are such that finishing near the top matters a great 
deal, those organizations with performance distributions characterized by comparatively low means will 
(if they can) be willing to sacrifice average performance in order to augment the right-hand tails of their 
performance distributions. In this way, they improve their chances of winning, thus force their more 
talented competitors to do likewise, and thereby convert the competition into a right-hand tail "race" in 
which average performance (due to ability and effort) becomes irrelevant.”  
 
“Right-tailed and left-tailed” emergence and growth. In the classic model, industry emergence and 
growth favors the most successful of exploring firms: just a few elite “first movers” (Lieberman and 
Montgomery, 1998) competing for rank order. Maturity, in contrast, favors efficient, incremental 
exploitation by already-established oligarchs. Thus, the industry gradually progresses from a winner-take-
all contest towards a “leveling out” of profits across product portfolios. But in an industry that never 
settles down, profits continue to be based on rank order competitive dynamics. Indeed, most cultural 
goods industries are “two-tailed”, meaning that firms must continually produce a balance of blockbusters 
and incremental (genre imitation) innovations to maximize market share across all channels and 
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audiences.  Of course, in the real world, industries are not either/or, but exist on a continuum in terms of 
the skewness. For simplicity’s sake, durables and culturals are modeled with extreme assumptions.  
Emergence and growth in durables. For example, in automobiles, emergence ran roughly from 1893 
until 1909. Once the top few leaders were established around 1909, the general nature of industry 
competition was to follow a dominant design (Geels, 2005), sustaining exploitative improvements to 
efficiency. Every few decades, the industry was remade by sweeping radical changes, but in general, 
firms try to maximize the average performance of their portfolio of car models. Recall that the variable k 
denotes exploitation, akin to k-selection – or, capital intensive investments – in organizational ecological 
strategy (Hurst and Zimmerman, 1994).  
Emergence and growth in culturals. In Hollywood, emergence and growth was also a competition to 
establish first mover advantages (Miller and Shamsie, 1996). Emergence saw the arrival of a rapid series 
of technical categories of film (silent movies, cartoons, “talkies”, etc.), and multiple levels of genre rules 
(comedy/drama/history, or shorts/features/epics). But the “Golden Era” growth period was stabilized by 
institutional stability more than by dominant designs: the establishment of an aristocratic treatment of A-
list actors, awards organizations, advertising standards, consolidated major studios, talent management, 
and of course, major theater distribution chains. Firms focused on locking in supply networks, scouting 
elite, emerging talent and locking them into long, low-paying contracts – a common pattern occurring 
across other culturals, such as modern music (Negus, 1992) and sports industries (Heylar, 2011). 
1.2 Seasonal Timing of Durables and Culturals 
In this section, I will address the second level of timing: seasonal timing. The industry level provided a 
basic picture of how durable firms launch initiatives across the lifecycle, but cultural goods timing is 
indeterminate on the industry level; so, we must dig deeper. I address a series of differences between the  
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Table 1: Variables for the HOT Lifecycle Model 
 Mature  
in-phase competition 
Mature anti-phase competition Emerging or 
renewing  
Mean/Variance 
source of 
profits 
High Average Performance 
Leaders seek high mean product 
performance, economies of scale and 
complementary assets. The trend for k 
investments increases over time 
High Variance Performance 
High variance in product performance, 
economies of scope and network 
centrality (platforming) 
 
High variance in 
designs and the 
search for new 
economies 
Product Timing Delayed launches face earlier 
obsolescence, and thus lower lifetime 
revenues. So, firms make Head-to-head 
releases in annual cycles during 
incremental competition.  
A products’ total lifetime revenue has a 
high correlation with choice of launch 
date. Staggered releases; generations are 
fuzzy because innovations roll out at 
staggered release dates, spread across 
blockbusters 
Uncertain 
Industry 
stabilization 
method 
Dominant Designs for main categories Dominant institutions for design (an 
oligarchy of design institutions) 
First mover 
advantages 
Product Type Durable goods  
 
Blockbuster product architectures and 
low cost/niche alternatives 
Cultural goods/services 
 
Blockbuster hits and genre-based 
replications (series, franchises, niches) 
Any 
Diffusion and 
sales pattern 
Classic S-curve variants approximately 
follow a sine function in HOT.  
Exponential decline in sales follows a 
sawtooth pattern: lambda Λ-curve 
S-curve for 
durables, Λ-
curve for 
cultural 
Example 
Industries  
  
High Tech durables: 
Telecommunication networks: 
currently 4G,  ~10 years 
Computer industries: CPU, Moore’s 
Law, ~2 years, or about 4 years for 
lower end product architectures 
LED industries, such as televisions, 
lightbulbs, etc. Haitz’s Law, ~3 years 
 
[Lower tech durables evolve in slower 
intervals, but still have “generations”] 
Fast evolving cultural goods:  
Cross-platform video games 
Hollywood movies 
Television series 
Broadway plays 
Festivals  
Wedding/event services 
Collectibles 
Fashion goods and services  
Performance athletic wear 
Other personal (seasonal) services 
Any 
Strategic Bias Inertia from exploitation 
r << k  
Explore/exploit cycle 
r ~ k 
Exploration 
r >> k  
Length of 
mature period 
The length of the mature period is 
determined by ZM, the length of the 
technology generation. The entire 
industry lifecycle is equivalent to one 
technology generation. Since the 
industry is renewed rather than 
destroyed, technology generations are 
often competence-sustaining, but each 
new generation causes massive 
obsolescence.  
Indefinite. Industry maturity persists as 
long as firms can capture value from 
genre fare. The industry enters decline if 
firms lose the ability to capitalize on 
anything but blockbusters, as happened 
with music. Renewal is the construction 
of new business models for capturing 
value from cultural capital. 
N/A 
Zeitmacher 
(Demand) 
Seasonal market cycles; product 
replacement for the majority market 
focuses around an annual product 
update- early/late updates are costly. 
This function often peaks more than once 
a year; thus, timing for product launches 
must be evenly distributed across peaks. 
Uncertain 
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 Mature competition,  
in-phase competition 
Mature competition, anti-
phase competition 
Emerging or 
renewing 
industry 
Zeitgeber 
(Technical 
Standards) 
Rate of radical product innovation is 
determined by the generational 
renewal rate of the industry. The 
renewal rate is a stable trajectory, 
usually in 2-10 year intervals. 
Rate of radical design innovation 
determined by competitive dynamics 
involved with juggling reverse salients 
against demand windows; each 
blockbuster tends to include technical 
upgrades, spreading them over time. 
Randomly 
distributed 
breakthrough 
events 
Amplitude of 
Vacillation 
Amplitude, A, determines how skewed 
the industry is towards exploitation. 
The amplitude is as function of the 
lifecycle stage, as given by the industry. 
As the industry matures, the amplitude 
of exploration expenditures dampens 
relative to the overall exploitation 
budget of a firm.   
 
Culturals split budgets between r and k 
(∆r = -∆k). Amplitude, A, is the intensity of 
periodic budget swings between new r 
and k expenditures. k is based on success 
rate: the more evenly distributed that 
profits can be, the more exploitation a 
firm will attempt. Thus, amplitude 
increases when average profits from k 
declines, and when co-specialized 
resources can be rapidly outsourced 
 
Fast radical 
changes, No 
stable trajectory  
Spillovers from 
following 
Low spillovers during maturity, as all 
firms already have the design 
knowledge to create new feature 
bundles for incremental products  
High spillovers for fast-acting followers, 
but sharply declining over time, as all 
cultural concepts are anchored to an ideal 
time in history. Innovations in 
blockbusters provide design elements for 
multiple genre products/services, and for 
cross-industry brand spillovers. 
Moderate 
spillovers, but 
timing is 
difficult 
Vacillation rate The rate of vacillation s determined by 
the industry’s fastest evolving technical 
trajectory. Firms vacillate by 
diversification efforts. Minor 
vacillations might exist at subsystem 
levels of product and process design.  
The rate of vacillation is determined by 
that particular industry’s pattern of peaks 
and troughs of seasonal demand. 
 
Somewhat 
chaotic 
vacillation 
 
Diffusion rate Somewhat slow diffusion of new 
categories, but very high adoption rate 
of new features over the long run 
Fast, but innovation diffusion is limited to 
target audiences 
Erratic changes 
in technology 
standards cause 
limited diffusion 
Co-specialized 
resource cycles 
(i.e., the 
temporal 
behavior of 
partner firms) 
High velocity vendors are subharmonic 
B2B services that change faster than 
the focal industry; co-specialized, fast 
changing technologies leads to a higher 
average r for the industry  
 
Low velocity industries are simple 
organizations that provide 
superharmonic B2B industrial services 
and tools for many industries across 
long economic cycles. Superharmonics 
causes lower average r for the industry 
 
Ambidextrous organizations with high 
levels of dependency on co-specialized 
resources external to the firm (talent, 
specialist vendors, locations, etc.)  
 
Exploration requires cross-functional 
product teams and custom work from 
vendors. Many resources are used on a 
per-project basis, but some are retained 
for follow-up work. 
 Exploitation requires making a series of 
goods/services with the same capital. 
Chaotic timing 
of co-specialized 
innovations 
causes a 
“temporary 
chaos” in 
emerging 
industries  
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timing of durables and culturals. I contrast consumer electronic devices based on Silicon Valley’s 
semiconductors to theater releases of major Hollywood films. Table 1 presents the variables described. 
The paradox of simultaneous search. Obviously, heavy use of strategic imitation leads to competitive 
parity – the question is if firms are accepting parity via collusion as the best outcome. Strategy researchers 
assume the goal of the field is to describe sustainable competitive advantage, not parity. But, the classic 
description of mature competition is to create parity (Chamberlin, 1949). In game-theoretic terms, it is a 
much tougher challenge to preserve a profit-maximizing, advantageous position without collusion. Katila 
and Chen (2008) concluded that firms who search early are more innovative, but firms who follow will 
launch more products in a cost-oriented tradition; either choice would be superior to simultaneous 
exploration initiatives. But, their findings came from a highly fragmented industry in a long growth 
period with no firmly established oligarchy: a sample of 124 firms in diverse industrial robotics 
categories, from 1984-1998. Such an industry has many strategic groups, thereby permitting firms to seek 
complex timing patterns – a phenomena for which they did not test. During mature oligarchy, on the other 
hand, most consumer industries are highly concentrated, and leading firms prefer to explore or exploit 
simultaneously. Katila and Chen (2008) used the example of video game consoles (hardware) to illustrate 
how most industries eventually converge on synchronous initiatives. Van den Ven (2005) also explains 
that knowledge intensive industries produce strong incentives to “run in packs”. 
All cyclical demand is collusive. Economists have previously demonstrated that firms’ ability to tacitly 
collude depends on the timing of a demand cycle more than the technology cycle (Rotemburg and 
Soloner, 1986; Haltiwanger and Harrington, 1991). If current industry demand is weak but technical 
opportunities persist, evidence suggests that firms tend to invest in product innovation to rejuvenate 
lifecycles (Berchicci, Tucci, and Zazzara, 2013); on the other hand, if demand is currently strong, firms 
temporarily focus on squeezing the most profit out of proven techniques. Therefore, to understand 
strategic timing, seasonality of demand is essential. Most durable firms make annual decisions to either 
explore new categories or exploit. Cultural firms plan a more complex landscape of initiatives.  
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Technical Generations. The Silicon Valley steady state is one where disruptive technical innovation 
interrupts the entire industry’s exploitation focus. Highly stable exploitation happens for a few years, and 
then the entire industry explores and radically upgrades periodically. Disruption periods come at regular 
intervals. Other examples: telecom networks upgrade every 10 years, and Haitz’s law means LEDs 
exponentially improve every 3 years. Following Geels (2002) and Christiansen (1997), niches inevitably 
produce radical new architectures that capitalize on such exponential leaps. Early and late launches are 
costly (Bayus, Jain, and Rao, 1997). There is little incentive to launch a major new television until the 
new LED generation, just as firms gain very little from skipping an entire technical generation. 
Surrendering a whole generation of consumers to competitors is extremely risky. Therefore, within these 
stable trajectories, durables firms focus on exploratory initiatives during generational updates.  
Seasonal timing of durable goods: electronics. Consumer durables industries are single-peaked in 
seasonal timing, with respect to the introduction of innovative products, but sometimes have multiple 
discount sales events throughout the year. Most annual innovations are introduced at the Consumer 
Electronics Show in Las Vegas. At other peak sales points of the year, firms unload discount merchandise 
based on aging technology. With a very predictable calendar, firms take exploratory actions in-phase with 
the entire industry, and therefore can synchronize initiatives easily. For example, Silicon Valley’s 
electronic hardware is dominated by the trajectory (Dosi 1982) of generational upgrades in upstream 
process technology (Moore’s Law). Major new designs are announced for each category at the Consumer 
Electronics Show (CES) in the Spring, with most debuts planned for December, when 30-50% of all 
category sales occur. There is no economic benefit to seeking alternative launch windows: early and late 
launches happen, but nearly always involve loss of revenue (Souza, Bayus, and Wagner, 2004). Cost-
focused consumers buy end-of-year products at Cyber Monday. The value chain is synchronized to these 
peak points of demand, while technological innovation peaks around CES. Firms who fall out of sync 
lose millions in sales to rivals. Note: It is poorly understood why, but television sales are a rare consumer 
durable without concern for a sales peak: sales are distributed very evenly. 
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Timing for culturals: films. Cultural firms’ timing is determined by the complex mediation of upstream 
technological change and a multi-peaked downstream landscape, with frequent redesigns to capture value 
from recent consumer preference discontinuities. Typically, each of the calendar seasons contains at least 
one, or multiple, peak product launch events, corresponding to the major holidays and festivals, when 
consumers most intensely consume. Off-holiday sales are focused on highly loyal, genre-based audiences 
that consume niche offerings at a much higher rate than the average. Hollywood studios capture fickle 
downstream audiences with intermittent, exploratory blockbusters, and endure a “long” statistical tail of 
weakly performing, exploitation-driven genre fare (Radas and Shugen, 1998; Simonoff and Sparrow, 
2000). But even when much of the genre fare sells at a loss, the firms benefit highly from market 
information garnered about how audiences shift in response to genre fare; studios incorporate that 
knowledge into future designs, to make blockbusters even more profitable. Hollywood formulaic content 
occasionally results in an unexpected “sleeper hit”, earning outsized profits at unusual release times 
(Eliashberg, Elberse, and Leenders, 2006). But most major studios accurately predict success by 
employing the industry’s most elite talent: hitmakers like Quentin Tarantino or Steven Spielberg 
frequently succeed. 
Seasonal Demand Windows. Hollywood new releases face about six seasonal demand windows (Radas 
and Shugen, 1998; Eanov, 2007), and a similar number of key technical/design conversations occur 
around multiple annual events, including the Oscars, Golden Globes, Cannes, and others. Hollywood 
firms, thus, stagger attention on many supply/demand events per year. They have high incentive to 
collude to ensure product releases are evenly distributed to avoid “zero sum” contests over short term 
demand windows. They face frequent disequilibrium pressures from mistiming: too many extravagant 
films at once, and everyone splits the market at a loss. The industry can only bear a very short list of 
blockbusters in a given year, and only about 10 or so per peak season. Firms who announce the biggest 
film launches promptly “get the ideal time slot”, while competing films must be moved to avoid 
simultaneous release. Studios evenly disperse their blockbusters across each peak season (especially 
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Memorial Day weekend, July 4 week, or the weeks before/after Christmas), and do the same for low 
budget genre fare releases throughout slow seasons.  
Hollywood must reproduce films, genres, stars, and brands. Major movies typically don’t fit the S-
curve model, and instead have a monotonically decreasing pattern of sales, with sales peaking during the 
“opening weekend” (Krider and Weinberg, 1998). Each subsequent market reproduction is an attempt to 
capture more value from the original brand — studios must decide how much aftermarket effort to exert. 
The hope of capturing lucky aftermarket value, or even a sleeper hit, drives the industry to support a large 
field of imitation products. A single sleeper that grossly outperforms its budget can pay for the small 
losses incurred in 10 or more flops. An ongoing hunt for blockbusters continues unabated– firm must 
make a lot of weakly performing films, with only 3 out of 10 breaking even (Radas and Shugan, 1998).  
Capturing Residual Value. Some design elements end up as uncaptured “memes” (Shifman, 2014), 
whereas others become well-captured Brand Platforms (Kapferer, 2012). As Mel Brooks famously said in 
the movie, Spaceballs: “merchandising, where the real money from the movie is made! We put the 
movie’s name on everything!”. Strategy depends on acting to not only create, but capture, the brand 
value. Sometimes the reverse happens, and a movie is made to capture an existing brand. For example, 
Rio Games’s Angry Birds is a huge franchise that began as a video game, but was reproduced across 
many formats. But optimum difference from the past design is key, because very innovative cultural 
reproductions often perform poorly (Alvarez et al., 2005; Garud, Gehman, and Guiliani, 2014).  
Demand-driven obsolescence. In Hollywood, demand shifts by a combination of endogenous creative 
efforts by studios, and exogenous shocks to consumer’s cultural knowledge (Lampel, Lant, and Shamsie, 
2000). Of course, technical innovation is relevant. The switch from film to digital was a big change for 
the industry; however, scant few studios suffered or failed because of digitization. Unlike the product-
dominant predictions of disruption theory (Bower and Christensen, 1995), the major studios were 
virtually unscathed. Studios typically source their technology from shared suppliers (Miller and Shamsie, 
1996). Big cultural shocks affecting change included the Production Code Era (about 1934-1962) and the 
World Wide Web (1994).     
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Preference discontinuities and bandwagon effects. Trispas (2008) discusses how customer preference 
discontinuities took slow effect in the industrial printing (typesetting) industry; but cultural preference 
shocks are frequent. Categories displace each other, reflecting psychological issues (Janssen and Jager, 
2001) such as shifting identities, values, politics, and institutions.  
Pre-release announcements help turn spillovers into captured value. Consumers of culture, especially in 
mature categories of goods like film, can anticipate sales of blockbusters. Pre-announcements trigger 
bandwagon cascades (Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, and Welch, 1992; Rosen 1993). An example is the 
Super Bowl halftime performance. Fans react to announcement of the elite pop artist, giving early signals 
as to which ads might perform well. By the time the performance takes place, advertisers have a pretty 
good estimate of the hype for the current year.  
Managing the timing of Hollywood production. Interestingly, film studios know that head-to-head 
blockbuster releases are damaging to industry profits, so they overtly collaborate on setting seasonal 
schedules (Rosen, 1993). Studio executives intentionally pre-announce release dates so all studios are 
aware of each others’ potential blockbusters, and then alter the actual release dates based on a fair and 
objective assessment of top grossers. Collusion via legal pre-announcements is essential to efficient 
timing (Krider and Weinberg, 1998; Simonoff and Sparrow, 2000).  
Anti-phase competition and niche displacement. However, Hollywood does not have such an extreme 
industry-wide lifecycle, and is characterized by a saturation of attention. To draw more viewers, a product 
must displace the attention a consumer would give another product, or a substitute form of entertainment. 
Thus, a blockbuster temporarily displaces other blockbusters, and a new genre or series is “one in, one 
out” in terms of number of competitive film fitting in the annual rank order. In durable goods, a 
challenger firm attempts to disrupt the timing of the entire industry STS from a niche (Christiansen, 
1997). In culturals, a challenger firm only needs to displace one leading firm in the rankings. For 
example, in the 2000’s tiny, fledgling Marvel Studios’ first movie, Iron Man, was a blockbuster 
production (Kim, Mauborgne, and Olenick, 2011) – Marvel quickly turned a $200 million venture into a 
multi-billion dollar studio, rapidly moving into the top 10.  
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The length of stability. There is no path for a film studio to create enduring dominant designs. No one 
technology or product design can ever be responsible for, say, 50% of annual sales for multi-year 
intervals – blockbusters only dominate sales for about 3-10 weeks, and re-releases must compete with the 
entire back catalog of all other re-releases. Genre films, however, can imitate technical and design 
elements popularized by blockbusters for a few years, saving search costs. For example, The Matrix was a 
film that impacted sci-fi action design. Followers used “genre repetitive” action sequences and film 
editing styles to delight audiences.  
Perpetual maturity? Despite many technical and cultural shocks, the American film industry has been in 
oligarchy since the 1940s (Miller and Shamsie, 1996). Interestingly, since the 1940s, most cultural 
industries like Hollywood legally lost the ability to vertically integrate, for the risk of propaganda 
machines being installed, and instead have diversified (Miller and Shamsie, 1996). Firms have been price 
takers for almost a century (Rosen, 1993).  
1.3 Four Generic Timing Strategies 
This section shall examine how firms may be entrained to four different kinds of timing environments. To 
arrive at these strategies, I extend theory on organizational entrainment (McGrath and Kelly, 1986; 
Ancona and Chong, 1992; 1996; Klarner and Raisch, 2013; Pérez-Nordtvedt, et al., 2008). Social cycles 
at various organizational levels tend to naturally entrain, or synchronize, to a dominant cycle. Firms that 
invest out of sync suffer diminishing returns. Being too early, too late, or erratic in timing are all more 
costly than finding a rhythm for orchestrating activities across the value chain, and in seasonal cycles. 
From this “view of the entrained firm”, maturity is defined as the achievement of a stable, harmonically 
fit rhythm (Shi and Prescott, 2012). 
Entrainment theory is a still emerging approach for strategy; that is, the mechanisms/constructs for a 
strategic model of entrainment are not fully stated. The Social Entrainment Model (McGrath and Kelly, 
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1986) defines entrainment [here paraphrased] as the phenomenon whereby a cyclical process is captured 
by, made synchronous with, and set to oscillate in rhythm with, another process by means of a pacer or 
dominant cycle. The pacer is referred to as a zeitgeber, German for “timekeeper”. Since then, authors 
have elaborated on the notions of tempo and phase in organizational rhythms, both internal to (Gulati and 
Puranam, 2009) and external to (Klarner and Raisch, 2013; Shi and Prescott, 2012) the firm. Durables are 
technology-dominant, as explained above, and thus can be simplified to a one-pacer timing model.  
Exploration only occurs when new technical generations are anticipated. However, I propose the new 
term zeitmacher (time shaper) for industries that must also align to a multi-peaked downstream market 
cycle. The zeitmacher is always there, but largely hidden form the action because its role is so boring in 
durable goods- it aligns in a single annual peak. But for culturals, these two cycles are complex enough to 
make analysis of both necessary. Each firm attempts to align its initiatives to match the peak periods of 
opportunity for exploration (zeitgeber) and exploitation (zeitmacher). Temporal patterns of firm activities 
thus stems from harmonic oscillations between zeitmachers and zeitgebers. Harmonic fit can be easily 
modeled abstractly as a system of waves that cancel out in an equilibrium condition of zero interference.  
A competitively entrained firm is defined as a harmonically fit “synthesizer” that aggregates and 
integrates capabilities and resources into a pattern of action to sustain profitable parity in oligarchic 
leadership, rather than a competitive advantage. Quoting Casson (2005, pg. 337): “If different 
synthesizers plan to use the same resources in different ways then they must compete.” Competitive 
entrainment helps them to use resources in similar ways, profitably.  Like ripples on a pond, competitive 
interference represents movements away from equilibrium – deadweight losses. Mistimed firm strategies 
are the cause of such ripples. Citing Ancona and Chong (1992, p. 168): “When entrainment occurs energy 
flows more effortlessly, and performances are enhanced. If an individual, group, or organization, is 
changing more frequently than the entraining zeitgeber, it is expending energy with no reward.”  
Strategy #1: In-phase competition. For in-phase competition, the industry eventually entrains to a 
dominant technical clockspeed, and is relatively stable on the demand side. Therefore, all firms share 
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some mutual industry-level technical dependencies, such as how personal computing devices must 
maintain compatibility with Intel processors of the current generation. With stable trajectories in a 
platform ecosystem, firms exploit firm-specific product/price bundling choices (Fine, 1998). Highest level 
standards are often collectively created and widely shared, while firms compete aggressively on 
secondary level features, components, etc. Explorations fall into synchronicity with the fastest pertinent 
generational cycle (Brown and Eisenhardt, 1997; Eisenhardt and Brown, 1998). At a secondary level of 
innovation, firms might experience a complex landscape of minor technical bottlenecks: reverse salients 
(Hughes, 1987) limitations to feasible design. These sublevels evolve based on outside firms’ 
breakthroughs in technical design. A durables firm has leeway to strategize freely on the pace of some 
subsystem innovations, in order to practice a low cost or differentiation strategy.  
Strategy #2: Anti-phase competition.  Anti-phase rhythm, however, is an emergent process. Firms must 
endogenously produce an evenly distributed landscape of initiatives that synchronizes the zeitgeber and 
zeitmacher: Firms entrain to each other to create a stable rhythm across technology and demand cycles. 
The baseline assumption is that each new cultural good incorporates at least one substantive technical 
advance within a timely cultural design innovation. The timing process is greatly aided by the legality of 
pre-announcements, or other such collusive mechanisms. Each firm attempts to stagger Λ-curve products 
so that its exploration peaks when the zeitgeber is at a local maximum (peak R&D opportunity), and 
exploitation when the zeitmacher is at a local maximum (peak demand).  
Firms can immediately sanction troublemakers in clever ways. For example, in the music event promotion 
business, sometimes rival A will attempt to seize a promotional weekend from rival B’s usual timing slot 
by booking a bigger, more costly talent. Rival B retaliates by giving away free tickets, thereby 
neutralizing the threat at a loss, but causing more severe financial losses to Rival A.  Therefore, cultural 
firms do their best to evenly distribute new product project cycles.   
Juggling reverse salients: surviving technical change in hardware. Culturals often must interface with 
hardware, such as how video games interface with game consoles. How can cultural firms manage waves 
of hardware technical innovation, without disturbing the cultural leapfrogging pattern? By avoiding any 
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long-term commitment to innovating toward one dominant hardware feature, firms can take turns 
debuting forays into emerging features. Recent work on the PC gaming industry (Mäkinen and Dedehayir, 
2014) has shown firms to be impacted by multiple “reverse salients” (Hughes, 1987). For example, CPU 
and GPU technologies are but a few of the many limiting factors in video game design. However, the 
most salient of the season is socially constructed, and not objectively tech-driven. It ultimately depends 
on the technology in vogue. Mäkinen and Dedehayir (2014) show a series of four graphs of intermittent 
bursts of innovation for computer subsystems, four “reverse salient” technologies that present persistent 
bottlenecks to game design – however, since they progress at inconsistent rates, they aren’t all equally as 
constricting each year. Their graphs demonstrated that the PC video game industry has an emergent 
“ecosystem clockspeed” (Fine, 1998) that appears to be a smooth curve, but when plotted against each 
subsystem, game design innovations oscillate in timing with respect to each of four subsystems, taking 
turns acting as a reverse salient.  
Optimal mutual distance. Firms must find a game theoretic solution whereby the total industry lifecycle 
is an emergent outcome based on dynamic steady states. Anti-phase firms seek an optimal distance in 
timing initiatives, consistent with imitation deterrence theory (Polidoro and Toh, 2011; Liao and Seifert, 
2015). Since content is always differentiated, strategic groups (Reger and Huff, 1993) will imitate each 
others’ practices instead. Firms must invest in a costly vigilance of each other to a much higher degree 
than is required in a single pacer industry.  
Strategy #3: Multi-phase entrainment. Some firms provide b2b value chain activities: components, 
peripherals, professional support services, and so forth. Such firms are acting at super- or sub-levels of 
innovation (Murmann and Frenken, 2006), with respect to a focal consumer product industry. An example 
of sub-harmonics would be to examine the relationship between the typical rate of exploration in 
Playstation console video games – third party software – relative to the rate of exploration for the 
Playstation console platform itself. An example of super-harmonics would be the rate of machine tool 
innovation relative to the rate of innovation in multiple manufacturing industries. Indeed, research on 
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super-/sub harmonic patterns complete treatments of in-phase and anti-phase dynamics. Due to space 
constraint, multi-phase strategies must be explored in future analysis.   
Strategy #4: Managing Chaos. If firms were completely asynchronous, it would be a sign of no 
entrainment: inherent market instability from an industry facing punctuated equilibrium. Some industries 
have initiatives that are best characterized by exploitative responses to random events, followed by 
exploratory learning in preparation for the next shocks. The question of timing is thus inverse to normal: 
firms only exploit when called to action, but typically explore otherwise. These include: private financial 
markets (New York Stock Exchange); public environmental disaster response (USA’s FEMA-coordinated 
business activities); and, basic research activities (i.e., W.L. Gore and Associates commercializes a 
technology when it finds a “Hit” among its patent research projects). Thus, the triggering of exploitation 
events is affected by a “random walk” (Spitzer, 2013), although future research may show that 
exploration flows according to a rhythm. Currently, not enough research exists to make claims as to the 
exploratory rhythms for this quadrant, and more work is needed to resolve this issue.   
1.4 Incorporating Four Additional Timing Literatures  
Now that I have spelled out the fundamental differences between in-phase and anti-phase patterns of 
mature strategic initiatives, it is necessary to synthesize the timing literature, to create a sufficient general 
model. Let us consider how four additional theories justify the economic value of optimal timing: 
vacillation, co-specialization, intertemporal ambidexterity, and leapfrog spillovers. In addition, I will 
address how entering or exiting entrainment affects a firm.  
Vacillation theory: why cultural firms are internally efficient when in anti-phase. Vacillation Theory 
(Nickerson and Zenger, 2002) proposes that firms alternate kinds of organizational reforms, such that 
every few years they tend to alternate between polar initiatives. From a learning perspective, firm 
capabilities benefit from a regularly rotating focus on exploration and exploitation initiatives. This is how  
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Table 2: Four Generic Timing Strategies 
 Standardized product designs Nonstandard product designs 
Weak follower 
spillover effects 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Demand Pattern 
 
 
 
 
Firm Type 
In-phase strategy 
Durables with a Dominant technology: Exploit 
with increasing fervor until periodic, industry-
wide technical updates; explore to renew 
incumbent advantages. Minor updates to 
singular features, and coping with reverse 
salient of component technology, are 
exploitations, as they don’t require an 
extensive category redesign.  
 
 
 
 
Single-peaked seasonal demand cycle, Single-
peaked exploration wave 
 
 
 
Most durable goods creator firms  
“Managing chaos” strategy 
Market and infrastructure providers, 
both public and private, are tasked with 
reaction to, and management of, 
technical and demand shock (McGuire 
and Schneck, 2010). Such firms reduce 
rate/size of risks and shocks (Miron, 
1986). Exploration of market redesign is 
triggered by unpredictable technical, 
regulatory, or social discontinuities; also, 
basic research labs can improve on 
erratic innovation search rates (Bers et 
al., 2009) 
 
Volatile speculations and random shocks. 
Note: Some temporary chaos will occur 
at the onset of most emerging industries. 
 
Market-creating firms (i.e. financial, 
insurance, shipping schedule, energy, 
etc.); Crisis mitigating work; 
Commodities; Basic research firms  
Rhythmic leader-
follower spillover 
effects 
 
Demand Pattern 
 
Firm Type 
 
Demand Pattern 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Firm Type 
Multi-phase strategy 
Super-/sub-system level firms  
1) Subharmonic innovation patterns 
providing components to or services as an 
extension of a focal industry, but changing at 
a faster pace – such as fast changing software 
services to an automobile assembly company  
B2B transactions, especially software 
2) Superharmonic innovation patterns  
Firms who entrain to “bearish” economic 
swings: firm exploration with long cycles, as 
often modeled by economists (Bernard et al., 
2014; Pavitt, 1984). Providing services across 
industries, acting procyclical with 
socioeconomic long cycles, with long term 
project horizons. 
 
 
Retail; Construction; heavy industry 
Anti-phase strategy 
Leapfrogging rivals: Firms explore and 
exploit in a continuous cycle of new 
projects; Adapt to hardware advances by 
“juggling reverse salients”. Firms try to 
find mutual optimum distance form each 
other as they continue to leapfrog each 
other in exploration and exploitation.  
 
 
 
 
Multi-peaked demand cycle and a multi-
peaked technical change in “reverse 
salients”. 
 
 
 
Most cultural goods creator firms 
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internal fit (Miller, 1992) reinforces the external environment. A firm seeking maximum internal 
efficiency must endogenously switch between r and k investments, because of diminishing returns to 
stagnant routines. Firms at the top of the design hierarchy are indeed knowledge-based (Grant, 1996) and 
constantly alter their organizational behaviors/structures to maintain adequate organizational learning 
(Starbuck, 1992; Gulati and Puranam, 2009). 
Classifying industries by lifecycle type. Peltoniemi (2011) conducted an extensive review of the 
literature on exceptions to the classic lifecycle pattern (see also Pavitt, 1984).  Although she was not 
specifically investigating temporal dynamics, her research is of note here. She did not find counter-
examples to the classic lifecycle model among consumer durables. Instead, she found exceptions in 
business services, cultural industries, and what she called “complex products and systems”. In Table 2, I 
sort her exceptions, making just a slight change to her categorization scheme so to fit a strategic timing 
analysis. See Katila and Chen (2008) and Pérez-Nordtvedt et al (2008) for additional compatible 
typologies for external and internal timing; their typologies are not sorted by industry type. 
Co-specialization and vacillation. In-phase oligarchs align themselves to generational step functions for 
technical trajectories, and vacillate together, whereas anti-phase oligarchs take turns vacillating with the 
external aid of co-specialized (r or k -oriented) business partners.   
In mature competition, firms may not need to own all the assets it uses for exploration and exploitation 
initiatives (Amit and Schoemaker 1993), since firms can rely on alliance and supplier networks to provide 
co-specialized assets (Stettner and Lavie, 2014). If firms jealously guard resources for sustainable 
competitive advantage, then they face a cyclical demand problem when they are “stuck” with the costs of 
maintaining those resources during periods of low demand but those specialized partners could easily 
provide those services continuously throughout the year to most, or all, of the major studios. One famous 
example is Industrial Light and Magic, the firm that George Lucas used to provide cutting edge special 
effects throughout Hollywood in the 1980s (Smith, 1986). Hollywood studios depend on many such elite 
supporting firms to widely provide talent, technology, post-production, market research, and so on. The 
major studios will bring in only what elements it needs for a project. This strategy has been labeled 
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design-driven innovation (Verganti, 2009). Thus, a strategic factor market for elite vendors often causes 
studios to defer alliance projects rather than to pursue a bidding process.  
Another classic example of co-specialization is the intermittent release of stop-animation films – a highly 
technical subgenre of film that is responsible for only a few blockbusters per decade. Claymation is a 
stop-motion method of animation: painstaking, and specialized work, with production time often triple 
that of average films. According to the Director commentary on the DVD release of The Nightmare 
Before Christmas, Tim Burton temporarily tied up the services of all the best Claymation talent in the 
world for several years, so competitors had to wait it out.  
Intertemporal ambidexterity. Vacillation can improve organizational learning (O’Reilly and Tuchman, 
2008; Raisch, et al. 2009) by achieving organizational ambidexterity (Duncan, 1976; Gibson and 
Birkenshaw, 2004; Tushman, et al. 2010) sequentially across time, and the anticipation of frequent 
initiatives can help. Ambidexterity is greatly enhanced by interorganizational linkages (Taylor and Helfat, 
2009). A vacillating firm becomes more organizationally efficient than one aiming in too many strategic 
directions at once (Baumgarden, et al. 2012; Klarner and Raisch, 2013).  
Leapfrog Spillovers. The fourth contributing theory is that of leader-follower spillover effects (Griliches, 
1992; Vandekerckhove, and De Bondt, 2007). Simultaneous selections of rival strategies are the chief 
cause of uncertainty in the value of strategic assets (Robinson, 1953; Cohen and Harcourt, 2003). The 
classic leapfrogging studies focused on countries, but the same principles apply to firms (Brezis, 
Krugman, and Tsiddon, 1993; Schilling, 2003). Hollywood profits are heavily based on spillovers within 
and across industries (Huang, Markovitch, and Strijnev, 2015). Leapfrogging powerfully lowers costs and 
raises benefits (Pacheco De Almeida, and Zemsky, 2008; (Lieberman and Asaba, 2006). Firms that 
release blockbuster films early or late, or on the same weekend as a stronger film, suffer diminishing 
spillovers and diminishing returns. They also suffer from brand erosion, due to excessive following 
(Alpert and Kamins, 1995). Thus, oligarchic cultural firms find a “rotating equilibrium” of leadership.  
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1.5 Harmonic Oscillation Patterns of Duopolistic Competition 
Demonstrating antiphase is easiest when visualized as a duopoly. Using two cultural firms of equal size, 
the figures provided assume they have no material advantage. Both firms attempt to maximize long run 
profits by alternating (vacillating) 3rd party exploratory alliance/vending partnerships. 
Constructive/destructive interference. Summing two waves with positive values results in an additive 
wave intensity (constructive interference), whereas summing opposing waves cancels each other out 
(destructive interference). Any value other than zero represents deadweight losses – suboptimal profit and 
revenue – for both the individual firms affected and the industry as a whole.  
Figure 2 depicts harmonic vacillation as a theoretical equilibrium pattern of action, where firm A 
emphasizes exploratory resources in the industry value chain at the same time that firm B capitalizes on 
exploitative resources in the industry value chain- thereby minimizing competitive technical/market 
pressures. As the waves cancel to zero, firms attain a local equilibrium, and the industry as a whole 
operates at peak efficiency. The two firms equally split profits.  
Harmonic Vacillation: 2 Firm Industry
= Time
= Firm 1
=Firm 2
Exploration Focus 
Exploitation Focus
A one firm increases exploration, and seeks appropriate resources, the other seeks more 
complimentary exploitative resources, thus smoothing out the average cost of such resources, 
minimizing rivalry,  and standardizing rates of return to factors of production. Firms can benefit 
from each others’ spillovers. The marginal demand for  opposite kinds of resources  always 
move in opposite directions for the two firms.
 
Figure 2: Harmonic Vacillation 
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Figure 3 Shows disharmonic vacillation for a duopoly. Summing the waves reveals constructive 
interference, representing deadweight economic losses for both firms, and for the industry. Both firms 
suffer in terms of competition over scarce resources, which drives costs up for both firms as they overbid 
for resources, and at other times leave resources underutilized. On the other hand, both firms also suffer 
for making simultaneous bids for scarce customers, while leaving customers underserved at other times of 
the cycle. Such a market is in disequilibrium.   
 
Disharmonic Vacillation: 2 Firm Industry
= Time
= Firm 1
=Firm 2
Exploration Focus 
Exploitation Focus
There are substantial periods of disharmonic vacillation when demand for  a kind of resources 
moves in the same direction for both firms in a two-firm market.  There will be times when some 
specialized resources have very little phase-specific demand, and others when they have high 
demand. This inefficient allocation of resources causes competitive pressures  to reduce profits, 
and firms have long periods of uncertainty over which factor recipes the other will use to 
maximize profits.  Industries will face structural  resource boom/busts. More firms will create 
tighter, yet more chaotic fluctuations in factor values, and smaller, riskier spillover advantages. 
 
Figure 3: Disharmonic Vacillation 
Overclocking. So far, this paper has stressed that mature firms gravitate towards a sustainable 
competitive parity due to entrainment. However, some readers may be wondering how a mature firm 
might seek sustainable competitive advantage via good timing. Overclocking is when a first-moving firm 
manages to leap an entire temporal cycle ahead of competitors. An overclocking firm commits its 
resources and capabilities towards monopolizing a new/updated category. While overclocking seems very 
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tempting, it has two major risks. First, a firm could fail to overclock, and contribute to a Red Queen 
Effect, discussed below. In game theoretic terms, this is represented as two firms simultaneously 
defecting instead of colluding, and both losing profits for it. Second, a firm could successfully overclock 
to such an extent that it loses technical and/or historical compatibility – also discussed below.  
Racing to the Red Queen Effect. Entrainment is also a mechanism to prevent the Red Queen effect: 
running faster and faster to the point that profits disappear. If resources specialized for restructuring are 
available, both firms will be pressured into making use of them, but neither will get “ahead” (Derfus, et 
al. 2008; Kauffman, 1995; Robson, 1993). The switching costs from any resource-based activity to its 
alternative configuration sets the tempo of vacillation. In-phase and anti-phase industries might feel time 
pressure to keep pace with accelerating technical change, but anti-phase industries feel great pressure 
when there is an acceleration in demand for novelty.  
Losing Technical Compatibility: Steve Jobs’ NeXT. Price (1993) told the infamous story of how Steve 
Jobs invented the greatest PC architecture of its time. After being fired from Apple, he formed a new 
company, NeXT. When he released the NeXT workstation in 1988, it was the most technically impressive 
model on the high end market. The NeXT prototyped many new, category-defining features. Jobs 
intended to redefine the high end of computing, and he largely succeeded in that respect. However, the 
project was a financial failure. The main problem was incompatibility. Its powerful software and coding 
environment used features that were incompatible with the rest of the booming industry. For example, 
Tim-Berners Lee, the designer of the World Wide Web (Berners-Lee and Bischetti, 2001) wrote his 
original version of the server code on the NeXT. Berners-Lee spent over a year downgrading and porting 
code to a more standard language for the common user’s convenience. Jobs also added the world’s first 
optical disk drive; but, due to excessive overclocking, there were no optical storage disks yet on the 
market! Instead of juggling reverse salients, he spent lavishly on technology too far ahead of the industry 
to be useful.  
Losing Historical Compatibility. There are multiple ways in which a film can be “Ahead of its time”. It 
could portray ideas beyond the audience’s understanding – a common risk of ambitious creators. For now, 
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let us consider a classic example of being overly controversial to institutional authorities. Citizen Kane 
(1941) is one of the most universally celebrated films by critics (Mulvey, 2017). Despite being nominated 
for nine Academy Awards, it only won Best Screenplay, and lost money on its lavish budget and limited 
theater release. The predominant reason? Orson Welles’s masterpiece loosely critiqued the life of William 
Randolph Hearst – the richest and most powerful media mogul of the time. Hearst did everything in his 
power to block distribution, advertising, and screening, and was partially successful. Had the same script 
appeared in the 1950s – after Hearsts’ death in 1951 – it would have been profitable. While nobody 
questioned Welles’ artistic and technical innovations, the industry resisted the obvious personal digs.  
1.6 Limitations and Future Research 
This section addresses next important steps for extending and refining Harmonic Oscillation Theory. 
Industry-specific conditions: everything from specific solution landscapes to institutional histories and 
regulations can separate one industry from another (Porter, 1998). Thus, error and shock will make 
entrainment elusive – many exogenous variables could distort the landscape. Structural factors complicate 
the dynamics: firm size, barriers to entry, alliances, and strategic groups (e.g., niche categories).  
Super-harmonics: Diversification across multiple industries. Complementarities across multiple 
industries will require finding superharmonics for ambidextrous timing (O'Reilly III and Tushman, 2013; 
Gibson and Birkinshaw, 2004; He and Wong, 2004). There will be times when multiple business units are 
exploring at once, and synergies can be found to lower costs; at other times, temporal synergies can be 
found with related diversification across similarly timed, exploiting business units. At the corporate level 
of analysis, diversifying firms vacillate internally to maximize use of co-specialized assets (Teece, 1986). 
The focal firm’s costs of holding or acquiring resources best suited for exploration or exploitation 
activities are mitigated by temporal economies of scope from convenient sequencing of related activities.  
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Sub-harmonics: Integrating value chain subsystems. A deeper examination of industrial trajectories 
must consider that timing of subsystems (Murmann and Frenken, 2006) happens within complex value 
networks. Little “local temporal realities” emerge like eddies in water. Vendors have a tradeoff between 
innovativeness and ability to capitalize (Patriotta and Hirsch, 2015). Each industry finds its own internal 
tempo of innovation to achieve harmonic fit, balancing interfirm efforts between exploring and exploiting 
technology (new/existing capabilities) (Gupta, Smith, and Shalley, 2006). Some architectural activities 
move on a slow cycle, whereas some component activities cycle at a proportional factor (say, twice as 
fast). Upstream/downstream innovations can differ across industries in terms of power asymmetries 
(Adner and Kapoor, 2010), including temporal power asymmetries. 
Multiple firms will lead to multiple equilibria. Of course, most real-world industries have more than 
two firms taking actions in more than one category of goods at once. The simple graphics herein 
presumes two equal-sized firms dominating an industry with a single product category: a scenario for 
minimal incentive for firms to attack each other aggressively (Chen, 1996). Firms who can generate niche 
categories – as Marvel Studios did (Kim, Mauborgne, and Olenick, 2016) are likely to seek Blue Oceans 
as soon as possible! The theory presented here is an analytical basis point: three or more firms, or 
asymmetrically powerful firms, will create multiple equilibria. Some firms might have capabilities to play 
out equifinal strategic alternatives – creating complex timing patterns for managing low cost (follower), 
differentiation (leader), or focus niche (market-splitting) timing patterns.   
Making and breaking lock-in. Future work should examine in detail how firms can lock-in (mutually 
entrain) and lock-out (prevent rival entry). Shocks – unexpected entrant and exit events – could disrupt 
short run timing equilibria, causing turbulence in a STS (Geels, 2002).  
Specifying empirical models in future research. It is not difficult to incorporate cyclical timing effects 
into a variety of methodologies and research contexts. Product replacement rates, technology trajectories 
(Dosi, 1982) and seasonal demand cycles (Johnson, 2001; Krider and Weinberg, 1998) powerfully 
constrain patterns of industrial competition, but we still teach students one-size-fits-all models. This essay 
provides general concepts for developing a wide variety of industry-specific models of timing, with 
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model parameters – such as k, r, amplitude, zeitgeber/zeitmacher periodicity, shape of spillover benefits, 
super-/sub-harmonics, and so on. HOT provides a new temporal view of the firm; still, HOT uses widely 
accepted constructs. Thus, it remains compatible with the fields’ most-used “views”: resources (Peteraf, 
1993), knowledge (Grant, 1996), attention (Ocasio, 1997), and dynamic capabilities (Teece, 2007).  
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2.0 Radical Exaptation and Incumbent-Challenger Dynamics 
 
“Invention occurs in three patterns not two, which are conventionally summarized as demand-pull and 
supply-push. These two are augmented by exaptation, in which invention flows from the emergence of 
new functions for old forms. Owing to its pivotal role as a third force in invention, exaptation may kick-
start the founding of new market niches, thereby producing novel (and largely unplanned) elements 
within the market process.” (Garud, et al., 2016) 
 
Ever Since Joseph Schumpeter (1934) popularized the concept of creative destruction, scholars 
have studied whether challengers or incumbents have the advantage for radical innovation (landmark 
reviews include: Dewar and Dutton, 1986; Henderson and Clark, 1990; Garcia and Calantone, 2002; Hill 
and Rothaermel, 2003; Ansari and Krop, 2012; Norman and Verganti, 2014). Older literature referred to 2 
main scenarios to encompass all radical challenge scenarios – Schumpeter Mark 1 and Mark 2. This sorting 
needs updating, to take into consideration the dominant contemporary strategies that firms practice to win 
challenge scenarios. There remains much confusion over how to sort new industry formation events 
according to innovation type.  
Schumpeter Mark 1. The classic assumption is that challengers have the advantage. In Schumpeter Mark 
1, an incumbent defends its current technology and current user base against a challenging entrepreneur 
who is attacking with a discontinuous technology (Schumpeter, 1934; Henderson, 1993; Arrow, 1962; 
Ansari and Krop, 2012). The contemporary strategy literature tends to follow Clay Christiansen’s (1997) 
theory of Disruptive Innovation for an explanation of how firms accomplish this. The challenging 
entrepreneur starts with a niche but discontinuous technology, but rapidly that niche technology overtakes 
and replaces the prior industry.  
Schumpeter Mark 2. But sometimes, incumbents have the advantage by going on the attack. Incumbents 
already have technology that can be adapted to new architectures, and in rare occasions, to new 
architectures that cannibalize its own user base (Chandy and Tellis, 1998; Chandy and Tellis, 2000; 
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Christensen and Rosenbloom, 1995). The most popular approach to Mark 2 strategy is Kim and 
Mauborgne’s (2014) Blue Ocean Strategy. They argue that incumbents should focus energies on reusing 
their technology to spawn niches in new, “uncontested” spaces, thereby finding new uses for existing 
technology. Alternatively, scholars have referred to construction of a niche via existing technology as 
radical exaptation (Andriani and Carignani, 2014), market breakthrough (Chandy and Tellis, 1998), or 
architectural innovation (Henderson and Clark, 1990; Henderson, 1993). We focus here on extending 
recent theory on radical exaptation, as the other terms do not provide a mechanism for change.  
Defining Radical Exaptation. Gould and Vrba (1982) coined the term, exaptation, to refer to a 
biological structure that evolved for a debut function yet emerged as suitable for another. Their classic 
example is bird’s feather. Feathers evolved for cooling but became useful for flight. In technology, 
incremental exaptation only creates a new product feature set, usually by way of varying use of minor 
components. For example, Kimberly-Clark created “Easy to carry” packaging for their toilet paper by 
imitating the handles on heavier products. However, some exaptations are radical enough to found 
entirely new industries – such as personal computers and microwaves. Andriani and Carignani (2014) 
provided a typology of exaptation types, and identified radical exaptation to be industry-defining 
exaptations. They discussed how microwave ovens use magnetrons as their central heating element –a 
technology exapted from military radars. Even though the underlying technology was quite similar, the 
new use constituted a new industry.  
Incomplete Sorting of Challenge Types. The reader will note that the innovation mechanisms for Mark 
1 (discontinuous technology, rival to the incumbent user base) and Mark 2 (radical exaptation technology, 
nonrival to the incumbent user base) are not an analytically complete set. Axis one is radicality of 
innovation: radical exaptation vs. discontinuity. Axis two is radicality of user base i.e., whether the new 
technology creates a directly rival user base (creative destruction) or a nonrival user base (creation of 
markets with minimal impact on existing markets). To date, this complete sorting has not been explained. 
See Table 3 for the fully expressed 2x2 matrix (pg. 41).   
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Discontinuous innovation quadrants. Discontinuous innovation has been given heavy attention for 
decades. Challengers have the clear advantage for rival, Disruptive Innovations, unless the incumbent can 
leverage its locked in control of the pertinent research/market channels (Christiansen and Rosenbloom, 
1995), so as to force an acquisition of a key challenger. But national innovation systems are dominated by 
organizations that are charged with seeking, classifying, and institutionalizing technical breakthroughs 
(Baba and Walsh, 2010). These cases are non-destructive discontinuous innovations, herein called 
Moonshots. National innovation systems enable both new and old firms to be winners through selected 
consortia. For Moonshots, the national innovation system prioritizes its desired goals, and “pulls” 
demand, inviting all pertinent parties. Thus, push comes from rivalry, and pull comes from nonrivalry.  
Radical exaptation quadrants. Radical exaptation situations have barely been addressed in the 
literature, and this essay focuses on clearing up these two quadrants. An argument will be advanced that 
challengers tend to have the advantage when radical exaptations challenge rival incumbent user bases. 
Upstart challengers must cooperate to establish the technology standards for the rival value chain, 
resulting in what is labeled a Rebel Alliance Strategy. Challengers target lead users by organizing a niche 
for their unmet demands (Von Hippel, 2005). Demand pull requires coordinated effort on the part of 
challengers to create alternative infrastructures for highly related, yet territorially challenging, 
technologies. In contrast, incumbents, rich in knowledge, have the attacker’s advantage for creating 
radical Blue Oceans. Blue Ocean Strategy (Kim and Mauborgne, 2014) involves radically exapting 
technology, but into a nonrival space. This approach of leveraging existing capabilities puts large 
incumbents at the advantage.  
Essay Outline. This essay shall examine which factors tend to facilitate or impede radical exaptation 
strategy for challengers/incumbents. Extending previous work on the Exaptation-Adaptation Cycle 
(Andriani and Carignani, 2014), this essay introduces the concepts of insight lag, bottleneck lag, and 
regulatory lag as an explanatory logic of why some firms strategically underperform at radical exaptation. 
Innovation proceeds over rather lengthy time intervals, and thus good policy and strategy might accelerate 
these lags, closing the lead that incumbents or challengers possess. Furthermore, it is shown that 
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exaptation lags align neatly with Agarwal and Bayus (2002)’s “commercialization” and “sales takeoff” 
product launch windows, and therefore integrates into much industry lifecycle research. This essay 
proceeds in six more sections, to sculpt the basis of a general taxonomy for new industry formation.  
First, I theorize the four Innovation Challenge Types as briefly discussed. Second, I focus attention on 
classifying the most likely respective outcomes for Rival Exaptations (Rebel Alliance Strategy) and 
Nonrival Exaptations (Blue Ocean Strategy), based on closer examination. I extend Andriani and 
Carignani’s (2014) Exaptation-Adaptation Model to sort victory scenarios according to our identified 
exaptation lag types: insight, bottleneck, and regulatory. Third, I review the literature to propose five 
scenarios for Rebel Alliances, and five scenarios for Blue Oceans. In section four, I present a qualitative 
case method for confirming the empirical validity of the ten radical exaptation scenarios. In section five, I 
offer tables of the confirmatory case study, covering twelve industry formation cases across a variety of 
sectors. In section six, I discuss implications, limitations of this study, and future directions.  
2.1 Theoretical Background: Categorizing the Four Challenge Types 
“…commercialization strategy for start-up innovators often presents a tradeoff between establishing a 
novel value chain and competing against established firms versus leveraging an existing value chain and 
earning returns through the market for ideas.” (Gans and Stern, 2003, pg. 335).  
 
In the classic view, it is assumed that all radical innovations are technological discontinuities 
threatening incumbent firms’ user base (Tushman and Anderson, 1986; Kaplan and Tripsas, 2008). 
Incumbents are faced with the dramatic replacement of the entire technical system (Hughes, 1987), and a 
completely different set of capabilities is necessary for future competition (Helfat and Pateraf, 2003). 
However, these classic disruptive innovations (Christiansen, 1997), with a radical pattern of creative 
destruction, (Schumpeter, 1934) may be much less common than once believed. Indeed, scholars 
increasingly focus on several alternative situations: Moonshots, where discontinuities create new industries 
without destruction; Blue Oceans, where incumbents create new industries with capabilities it already 
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possesses; or, Rebel Alliances, where a wave of small firms create a spinoff industry, splitting the 
incumbent market.  
 
Figure 4: Reproduction of Ansari And Krop's (2012) ICD Model 
 
 
Sorting Four Challenge Types. Figure 4 is a reprint of Ansari and Krop’s ICD Model (2012). They 
presented a review of the literature, but did not sort their propositions by challenge type – implying no clear 
difference for incumbent advantages for, say, Blue Oceans as opposed to Disruptive Innovations. This essay 
extends and clarifies their ICD Model by presenting a 2x2 matrix of challenges. Precedent also comes from 
Hill and Rothaermel (2003, pg. 258):  
“An incremental innovation builds squarely on the established knowledge base used by incumbent firms, 
and it steadily improves the methods or materials used to achieving the firm’s objective of profitably 
satisfying customer needs. In contrast, a radical innovation involved methods and materials novel to 
incumbents. These novel methods and materials are derived from either an entirely different knowledge 
base or from the recombination of parts of the incumbents’ established knowledge base with a new stream 
of knowledge”. 
 
Radical exaptation or discontinuity? Radical innovations stem from two types of knowledge: 1) entirely 
new knowledge bases, known as discontinuities; and, 2) partially new ones, radical exaptations. 
Discontinuities are competence destroying shifts in paradigmatic knowledge, as one technical domain and 
language directly supplants the other (Anderson and Tushman, 1986). Radical exaptation is the repurposing 
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Table 3: Four Types of Radical Innovation 
 EXAPTED TECHNOLOGY  
New architecture, derived technology 
DISCONTINUOUS TECHNOLOGY  
Competence-destroying technology 
RIVAL 
RADICAL 
USER BASE 
  
Rivalrous use – 
competes with 
market 
incumbents’ 
installed base 
ecosystem 
RIVAL RADICAL EXAPTATION 
Rebel Alliance Strategy  
Challengers Favored  
 
 Incumbent Advantages: 
• H10: Continuous innovation (de-
radicalization) 
 
Challenger Advantages:  
• H2: Disruptive Foresight 
• H4: Lucky pre-adaptation 
• H6: Incumbent blown lead 
• H7: Double exaptation 
• H8: Institutional entrepreneurship 
 
Policy mechanism: Emerging exaptation 
pools/forums 
 
Examples: automobiles, motorcycles, 
personal computers, 3D desktop printers, 
social media, one-way radio, small modular 
reactors, cryptocurrency 
RIVAL DISCONTINUITY 
Disruptive Innovation Strategy 
Challengers Favored 
  
Incumbent advantages:  
• Acquisition of smaller challengers 
• Control of key downstream 
commercialization capabilities  
 
Challenger advantages:  
• Unique technical capabilities 
• Understanding new users 
 
 
 Policy Mechanism: Tech Push innovation 
 
 
Examples: Digital film, typesetting, cellphones 
NON-RIVAL 
RADICAL 
USER BASE 
  
Non-Rivalrous 
use competes 
with non-
consumption 
NONRIVAL RADICAL EXAPTATION 
Blue Ocean Strategy 
Incumbents Favored 
 
Incumbent Advantages: 
• H1: Lucky discovery 
• H3: Dynamic capabilities 
• H9: Institutional defense 
(temporary advantage) 
 
Challenger advantages: 
• H5: Alertness (overlooked uses) 
• H7: Double exaptation  
 
Policy mechanism: Incumbent exaptation 
pools/forums  
 
Examples: microwave ovens, LEDs, 
phonograph jukeboxes, medical marijuana  
NONRIVAL DISCONTINUITY 
Moonshot Strategy 
Public-Private Consortia Favored 
 
To commercialize high tech industries with a 
national innovation system, governments and 
universities work with firms to coordinate the 
long-term rollout of a high risk, high reward 
technology. Both challengers and incumbents 
might be invited to participate.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Policy Mechanism: Demand Pull Innovation 
 
Examples: DARPA’s internet, the Apollo 
program, Sun Microsystem’s Javascript 
consortium, Japanese service robots 
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 of a technology to a new use, as additional features of that technology suddenly become apparent (Dew et 
al, 2004; Dew, 2007; Garud et al, 2016). Thus, discontinuous innovation concerns the challenger’s 
advantage for introducing a new knowledge base to create a new technical market, whereas radical 
exaptation concerns the ability to draw on an older knowledge base to create a new technical market. In 
both cases, firms must transition to new technical standards and new product architectures.   
Rival or nonrival user bases. For the second axis of Challenge Type, we must distinguish between new 
user bases that are rivalrous with incumbent user bases, versus new user bases that are nonrival (Henderson, 
1993; Arrow, 1962). A rivalrous technology is a direct substitute, sometimes referred to as a drastic 
innovation (Arrow, 1962; Henderson, 1993) that rapidly makes the prior technology obsolete. A nonrival 
technology has only trivial impacts on users in existing industries (Cornes and Sandler, 1996; Romer, 1990). 
For example, automobiles were exapted from locomotives/carriages, and are a direct substitute to 
locomotive travel; on the other hand, microwave oven technology was exapted from radar technology, but 
the use of microwaves obviously did not displace any users of radar (Voss, 1988; Cummings and Doh, 
2000). Thus, we can sort innovation challenge types by both technology radicality, and user base radicality 
– prior scholars usually focus on one or the other viewpoint of incumbency. 1 
Synonyms for Exaptation. But we must also clear up the proliferation of synonyms for radical exaptation. 
Chandy and Tellis (1998) referred to market breakthroughs, when a technology is partially similar, but has 
a big impact on an existing market’s value proposition. The same conditions are described by Amit and 
Zott (2012) as business model innovations; by Verganti (2008) as design driven innovations; and, by 
                                                 
1 Scholars used to describe an incremental innovation as the only competence sustaining type of innovation 
(Tushman and Anderson, 1986). Indeed, incremental innovations will extend the incumbent knowledge base and user 
base. But radical innovations are not always competence destroying. Discontinuities can, in fact, be either competence 
sustaining (nonrival) or competence destroying (rival) for incumbents; and, radical exaptations are always competence 
sustaining, even when displacing rival user bases. Thus, the only major type of innovation that is competence 
destroying is a Disruptive Innovation. Henderson (1993) explored Arrow’s interest in drastic innovations that destroy 
competences (1962); but little work has since clarified this issue. Further clarification is of high importance to work 
on multi-sided software platforms (Suarez and Kirtley, 2012).  
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Henderson (1993) as architectural innovations2. A commonly mentioned example for all three terms above 
is the iPod. The mp3 portable technology already existed, but Apple acted as a challenger to the incumbent 
music industry music formats, and winning the insight battle over more complicated and expensive mp3 
players. Apple conducted the exaptation by launching iTunes to create a rival user base to dying music 
formats, whereas music incumbents failed to launch competitive mp3 marketplaces. To repeat: exaptation 
will be the preferred term in this essay.  
Challenge One: Disruptive Innovation. The incumbent defender is disadvantaged, and must win control 
of channels to survive a Disruptive Innovation. Incumbents have a head start because of deep familiarity of 
existing markets (Teece, 2007; Sood and Tellis, 2005), but act slow to transition to emerging technologies. 
The niche challengers ride a new technology s-curve. The initially weaker niche technology rapidly 
overtakes the broader market.  
A popular prototypical example is Kodak’s failed defense of film against digital film (Wu et al, 2004). 
Despite some very pleasing features of classic film, digital film rose to take over nearly all the camera 
market. Due to overly conservative projections of the rate that the new technology was disrupting the old 
(Wu, Wan, and Levinthal, 2014), Kodak fell into a competency trap (Levitt and March, 1988). Another 
classic case is typesetting (Tripsas, 1997). Most typesetter incumbents failed. This industry underwent 
waves of discontinuous innovation, dating back to Gutenberg’s original press, and has experienced rapid s-
curves of disruption from dot matrix, inkjet, and laser technology. Incumbent failures are high when facing 
discontinuous technologies, except for those who dominate downstream markets and successfully transition 
those channels to the new technology (Rothaermel, 2001). So, for example, pharmaceutical incumbents, 
the dominant controllers of the drug trial process, survived by absorbing biotechnology startups into the 
                                                 
2 Additional relevant observations were made by Rothaermel, 2001; Katila and Ahuja, 2002; King and Tucci, 
2002; Markides, 2006; Christensen, 2001; however, they did not use any of the terms discussed in this paragraph. In 
addition, Taalbi (2017) recently proposed an alternative matrix of inducements to innovation: institutional, market 
opportunity, technical opportunity, and problematic; but, while it is empirically useful, this is a passive “inducement” 
approach to innovation, which assumes new markets and technologies happen “out there” before the firm reacts to it, 
when in fact the firms use innovation processes to create these opportunities. The passive inducement approach to 
innovation obscures both the incumbent-challenger rivalries and the innovation processes responsible for it.   
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same trial process. Big pharma simply acquired many biotech startups. Thus, the typical story is that 
incumbents can only survive discontinuous innovation by enticing smaller challengers to sell themselves 
to incumbents and give up on establishing a rival platform (Gans and Stern, 2003). For most challengers, 
this is the lowest risk strategy to accept.  
Challenge Two: Moonshots. Discontinuous and nonrival, Moonshots are uncontested markets driven by 
large scale, risky investments. An example is the Apollo space program, which had no true user or 
technology precedent, and did not displace any incumbent user base. The Apollo program necessitated the 
creation of a host of new technologies. Other common examples include breakthrough medical devices, 
such as artificial hearts; and, research and diagnostic equipment, such as new categories of scientific 
instruments like particle accelerators. There is little reason to distinguish between incumbents or 
challengers in such a space: whether the participating firm is new or old, it gains immense advantage by 
participating in the earliest consortia of projects. Survival depends on inclusion in the consortium. Cases 
such as Javascript software, Bell Labs’ telecommunications monopoly, and more recently, Japanese service 
robots (Kattel and Mazzucato, 2018; Lechevalier, Nishimura, and Storz, 2014) demonstrate the power of 
consortia to create radical technologies and markets, conjointly.3  
Challenge Three: Blue Oceans. In this essay, sustaining innovations that create new product subcategories 
are not treated as radical enough to be a technical exaptation. For example, Kim and Mauborgne’s (2014) 
website talks about how Kimberly-Clark used Blue Ocean strategic methodology to make one brands’ toilet 
paper packages easier to carry and store. But such designs, although valuable, have a very short competitive 
advantage – the technology protections on alternative toilet paper packaging are, unfortunately, easy to 
work around rapidly. Radically exapted technologies – such as microwave ovens, light emitting diodes 
(LEDs), and phonograph jukeboxes – established new markets nonrival to existing technology user bases, 
                                                 
3 Earlier research used the term “greenfield competition” (Gans and Stern, 2003) when incumbents have no 
capability advantages for commercialization; however, it is unclear if they really meant to refer to Moonshots, or were 
talking about Blue Oceans.   
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but also provide sustained advantages to first movers. The respective incumbent technologies for those 
three technologies aforementioned – radars, semiconductor diodes, and dictation phonographs – were 
virtually undisturbed by the new markets. Sometimes powerful incumbents, such as high tech software 
giants, have such a wide technology platform that they can repeatedly innovate nonrival technologies that 
serve the same platform ecosystem. 
The incumbent has advantages for three approaches: 1) lucky early discovery leading to technical 
protections (Cattani, 2005) and superior component knowledge, such as in the case of microwaves; 2) 
dynamic capability advantages in starting new markets repeatedly (Teece, 2007; Gawer and Cusumano, 
2002) 3) institutional advantages, especially leveraging of first-to-market brand power (Farquhar, 1989; 
Kerin et al, 1992; D’Aveni, 2002). The challenger can still win if the incumbent fails to treat the new market 
as “serious”, and due to biases, passes up lucrative opportunities on purpose (Basalla, 1988). The classic 
example of such an attention failure: Thomas Edison lost out on the phonograph jukebox market because 
of his preoccupation with a “more important” phonograph dictation machine. 
Challenge Four: Rebel alliances. Here we come to the underexplained quadrant in the literature. Because 
this quadrant of innovation is not mentioned in prior literature, it is herein logically derived by contrasting 
it to the other three quadrants. The label itself is a play on words, derive from the D’Aveni (2002) essay on 
incumbent advantages, entitled “The Empire Strikes Back”. Rebel alliances arise when lead users are 
desperate to get their hands on an incumbent technology, and so they rise up together as challengers to 
create a new form factor and infrastructure for them. Demand is thus pulled by lead users, not powerful 
institutions.   
First, let us contrast Rebel Alliances to Blue Oceans. Exaptations are driven by the frustrated demands of 
lead users (von Hippel, 2005), or preference discontinuities (Tripsas, 2008) when downstream customers 
of a technology have an immense shift in wants. Such technologies are repurposed into alternative form 
factors that slowly draw users away from its parent technology form factor, but they leave some incumbent 
activity intact for a long time. Automobiles, motorcycles, personal computers, 3D desktop printers, and 
small modular nuclear reactors are all examples of exapted technology that directly competed with installed 
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user bases. This pattern of market creation is obviously inverse of a blue ocean, where incumbents are 
favored and no market exists; and yet, both blue oceans and rebel alliances are fashioned from radically 
exapted incumbent technology.    
Second, let us compare Rebel Alliances versus Moonshots. Market development is a mirror image of 
Moonshots: based on a wave of new entrants that must create an industry that stands on different 
institutional grounds – technology standards, trade associations, value chains, etc. – which requires the 
collective, cooperative effort of challengers, with very little institutional help from existing authorities in 
society. Moonshots are intended to orchestrate large technical systems across public and private interests. 
For example, Henry Ford had to leave his senior engineering post at Edison Labs to pursue combustion-
based automobiles, as Edison would rather see electric trains and busses have their heyday. Edison fought 
for centralized moonshot projects with the government to jointly, massively electrify urban America.  
Third, consider Rebel Alliances versus Disruption. A Rebel Alliance merely destroys incumbents’ sunk 
investments into a value chain, whereas Disruptive Innovation is truly competence-destroying. Disruptive 
technical discontinuities cause abrupt technical obsolescence of incumbents past a certain inflection point 
(Adner, 2002), but Rebel Alliances can only rely on better understanding of user wants as the technology 
evolves. Therefore, incumbents might eventually catch up as “fast followers” (Sanchez, 1995).  Rebel 
Alliance challengers cannot rely on technical obsolescence, and so must create institutional arrangements 
that favor the new industry. For example, automobile firms did not overtake locomotive firms by the 
destruction of technical competences; rather, challengers invested in roads, gas stations, and aftermarket 
mechanics as an alternative infrastructure to railroads, train stations, and central planning. These scenarios 
usually favor challengers, as incumbents typically oppose the very existence of an alternative form factor 
or infrastructure. The incumbents often grossly underestimate the ability for challengers to rapidly displace 
incumbent technical systems (Christensen, 2013). Exaptation challengers reinterpret the existing 
technologies with new narratives, business models, architectures, and design motifs (Garud et al, 2016; 
Christensen and Rosenbloom, 1995).  
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Can Incumbents substantially delay failure? Yes, the incumbent can use regulation so that the “Empire 
Strikes Back” (D’Aveni, 2002), while preparing to enter the new market themselves. But this tends to be a 
very short-lived solution in internationally open markets. The incumbents often understand the exapted 
technology, but typically do not understand the perspective of the new market users (Christensen and 
Rosenbloom, 1995; Kogut and Zander, 1992). 
The Rebel Alliance challenger has five advantages, whereas the incumbent has one.  First, the challenger 
could win by foresight into the enormity of the untapped market, commercializing an early insight based 
on what McCray (2013) calls visioneers: inventors exploring science fiction descriptions of user wants 
(Turner, 2005). Second, the challenger could win by a lucky pre-adaptation to the new user base – both in 
terms of pre-existing relationships and resources, and in terms of know-how to complete the innovation for 
sales takeoff (Cattani, 2005). Third, the challenger can practice double exaptation and instantly deploy an 
insightful new product category – rapidly repurposing two incumbent exaptations into a different form 
factor. A prominent example is the simultaneous inventions of automobiles and safety bicycles, double-
exapted in nearly the same year to become motorcycles.  Fourth, challengers can win via institutional 
entrepreneurship and challenge the incumbent-friendly regime. A pure example of institutional challenger 
victory is the rapid deployment of medical marijuana. Fifth and finally, an alert challenger can still win if 
the incumbent somehow takes all the right initiatives to win but fails to launch a would-be blockbuster 
product (Hiltzik, 2000).  An incumbent must overcome all challenger conditions to win, while defeating 
their former selves: a rare feat. However, companies that innovate early – and identify as creators – can win 
later market battles too. Cases exist where continuous innovation by the incumbent was able to de-radicalize 
the challenge (Ries, 2011; Verona and Ravasi, 2003; Wood and Brown, 1998).  
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2.2 Tech-Push and Demand-Pull Policies  
Tech-push and demand-pull were the earliest mechanisms discussed in the literature on discontinuous 
innovation. Several recent studies have reviewed these policy perspectives (Di Stefano, Gambardella, and 
Verona, 2012). These policies are useful for discontinuous innovation, but not for radical exaptation.   
Tech-push is a theory that top-down basic research programs enable new means of innovation. 
According to tech-push, science expenditures in a national innovation system would accelerate 
technological breakthroughs (Mowery and Rosenberg, 1979; Dosi, 1982; Cohen and Levin, 1989). 
Planners can reduce incumbent inertia, increasing likelihood of Disruptive Innovations; or can create 
policy incentives to help incumbents generate Blue Oceans.   
Demand-pull. Alternatively, consider how a demand-pull dynamic characterizes Moonshots 
(Kleinknecht and Verspagen, 1990; Schmookler, 1966; Di Stefano, et al, 2012; Baumol and Strom, 2007). 
In radical demand-pull situations, policy makers or lead users fund innovation of unmet ends (Agarwal, 
Moeen, and Shah, 2017). Once new ends are identified, basic research can hone in on a technology 
roadmap toward those ends. Planners use incentives to guide entrepreneurs toward new ends. Moonshots 
benefit from government procurement in the national interest, or basic research budgeting. Rebel 
Alliances are aided by small firm incubation policy.    
Policies to pursue exaptations. To date, scholars have said little about how radical exaptation strategy 
fits into ICD or policy literature, so this essay focuses on that investigation.4 An entrepreneurs’ creation of 
an opportunity (Shane, 2003; Dyer, Gregersen, and Christensen, 2008).  The individual-opportunity nexus 
is where the entrepreneur constructs variants of existing technology for a new mean-ends model (Eckhardt 
and Shane, 2003; Shane and Venkataraman, 2000). While prior researchers have explored how 
                                                 
4 This section does not rely on the work for Kim and Mauborgne, as their methods and approaches do not 
focus on radical exaptation only; indeed, their approach does not distinguish between the type of technical innovations 
employed in the creation of new markets. Yet, there is theoretical reason to believe that radically exapted new markets 
are different than sustaining innovations, especially in terms of sustainable advantage.   
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entrepreneurial personality impacts missed opportunities (Arora, Haynie and Laurence, 2013; Baron, 
1998), there are no empirical studies on how to make entrepreneurs more effective at creating new 
markets. But, there is new theory to that purpose. It is well known that firms tend to “Farm out” related 
patent classes (Jaffe, 2000), to stake claim to all intellectual property; but innovation is a bit different. 
Innovation requires the ability to make and market the product – and a full commitment.  
Exaptation pools and forums. Garud, Gehman, and Guiliani (2016;2018) have argued that exaptation 
can be accelerated by crafting “pools” of technology that have been underapplied, and “forums” where 
new applications are discussed, looking ahead of existing prototypes. Corporate venture capital is such a 
pooling approach – incumbents willing to fund employee entrepreneurship are more likely to form new 
markets (Drover, et al., 2017). Industry conferences and business incubators provide places of discussion 
for startup challengers to congeal into emerging clusters for future applications. For example, several 
microcomputer trade shows took place in the inaugural year of the category: 1976 (Veit, 1993). At shows, 
challenger firms collaborated on value chains, alliances, and innovation roadmaps for the fledgling 
industry.  
2.3 Extending the Exaptation-Adaptation Model: Exaptation Lags 
This section provides a deeper explanation of the two radical exaptation quadrants, by fitting it to the 
recent literature on radical exaptation. Exaptation opportunities are subject to substantial time lags. These 
lags provide the possibility for any one focal firm to improve their innovation strategy enough to 
overcome the “Typical” outcome for such a scenario; or, for policymakers to improve the economy. 
Exaptation is boundedly rational (Garud et al, 2014; Cattani, 2005), so lag times always exist between a 
technical possibility and its implementation. For example, the first microwave prototype appeared in 
1947, but technology bottlenecks slowed the development of a viable commercial hit, a commercially 
complete set of features, for twenty more years. Exaptation markets are thus inefficient search landscapes, 
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and benefit from explicit policies intended to link technological means to new ends (Garud, et al, 2016; 
Villani et al, 2007). Consider the following observation: “The production of an exaptation requires linking 
an existing body of knowledge to its possible new application. The emergence of this link requires a close 
interaction between producer and user of that knowledge.“ (Ganzaroli and Pilotti, 2011, pg. 4). 
Lead users need to experiment extensively with the technology, develop the new user culture, and 
iteratively improve components to the satisfaction of future users (Sedita, 2012; Bonifati and Villani, 
2013). For example, insight into microwave oven technology began in 1946, but a suitable adaptation for 
home users took 21 additional years to develop.  The lags are derived from Adriani and Cannani (2014)’s 
Exaptation-Adaptation Cycle.  
The Gradual Exaptation-Adaptation Cycle, and Exaptation Lags. The most thorough definition of the 
technology exaptation process, to date, is the Exaptation-Adaptation Cycle (Dew et al, 2004; Andriani 
and Carignani, 2014). They identify three basic steps: First, functionality emergence, when the exaptation 
possibility is discovered, often accidentally, by taking note of features emergent from improvements to an 
existing technology; Second, deliberate selection of a new use for the features, whereby prototypes of 
new uses are made; and Third, secondary adaptation – a synonym for the term, technology bottleneck – is 
the step whereby prototypes are improved on secondary characteristics to be fully viable commercially. 
These improvements do not require dramatic breakthroughs. Instead, technology bottlenecks are solved 
with repeated trials with lead users, and the subsequent identification of a scalable manufacturing process. 
Drawing on this theory, I posit three major time lags that can be reduced by policy effort: insight, 
bottleneck, and regulatory lag.5  
                                                 
5 There exists a fourth lag, prior to the time of first feature emergence. But the fourth lag, “pre-adaptation” 
(Cattani, 2005; Dew, 2007) during pre-emergence, cannot be deliberately managed by the very definition of 
exaptation. Firms cannot influence the ex ante luckiness of feature emergence (Cattani, 2005; Andriani and Carignani, 
2014). Past stage one, future success depends on insight and secondary technology innovations (Cattani, 2005; Dew 
et al, 2004) which can indeed be deliberately managed.  
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Stage Two: Deliberate Selection is vulnerable to insight lag. Insight is how the entrepreneurship 
literature explains the cognitive search for opportunities. Entrepreneurs typically stumble upon insight of 
a means-ends model (Shane and Venkataraman, 2000; Eckhardt and Shane, 2003). By deliberately 
investing in the search for new uses of a technology, insight lag can be reduced.  
Stage Three: Secondary Adaptation is vulnerable to bottleneck lag. After insight, the entrepreneur still 
must commit time and resources to additional innovation steps. The proof of concept must be fashioned 
into a viable state – such as the lag between the first proof of the primary functions of microwave ovens 
(1946) versus the first commercially successful microwave oven, which had a number of added features 
(1967). The microwave required more than a useful heating element: it required a safe, reliable 
architecture, which required further development of new features (Henderson and Clark, 1990; Levinthal, 
1999). To convert the original commercial launch into a sales takeoff success (Agarwal and Bayus, 2002), 
the entrepreneur must come to understand the minimum viable product (Ries, 2011) for each scalar 
increase in sales. For example, the new users of microwaves were highly concerned about the safety of 
the device; it needed adequate new controls, a turntable for even heating, and recommended settings for a 
wide variety of food items.  
Regulations Post-Insight. Once the exaptation has been prototyped, regulations can be interpreted to 
favor or oppose it. Some new uses of technologies are discouraged by regulatory lag. Specific regulations 
tend to favor investment and innovation for incumbent uses, delaying and discouraging investment and 
innovation for new uses (Malerba et al, 2008; Jacobides, Knudsen and Augier, 2006). Research policy 
must take consideration of how to reduce legal lags to clear the space for new markets6 – for example, 
                                                 
6 The Exaptation-Adaption Model aligns well with other literature on the industry lifecycle timing of 
innovation, which connects it firmly to related literatures on innovation and research policy. For example, it roughly 
corresponds to Saviotti and Metcalfe’s (1984) model of main services: the emergent feature provides the main services, 
or functions, of the new use category; but, the secondary adaptation step cannot be completed until bottlenecks are 
resolved, to amply provide secondary services for commercial success. It also aligns with the research on the stages 
of industry emergence. Stage two aligns with the “commercialization phase” identified by Agarwal and Bayus (2002), 
and stage three aligns with the “firm takeoff”.  
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many states chose to overlook existing taxi laws to clear space for the ridesharing firms, Lyft and Über. 
But most industries experience more difficult regulatory hurdles. Society would have benefitted from 
accelerating the development of automobile laws and regulations, but the train companies - and the 
stakeholders which promoted train technology - resisted the alternative infrastructure with legal 
roadblocks (D’Aveni, 2002; Jones, 2001). Incumbents have lobbied or exerted influence to shape industry 
rules, in favor of the debut use of the technology (Ansari and Krop, 2012; Lawrence, 1999). 
For example, Agarwal and Bayus (2004) posited that creator firms who commercialized the first version 
of a new technology have been found to have, on average, the longest survival horizon. Challengers or 
incumbents who invent early (stage two) can survive product innovation battles and can extend that 
advantage to victory with the funds to scale up (Echambadi, Bayus, and Agarwal, 2008). But some 
challengers can enter during firm takeoff (stage three) –known as “first followers”, these firms who can 
completely bypass short-lived first generations of product markets, and can aim to produce a value chain 
with true staying power (Querbes and Frenken, 2017). Thus, this model maintains backwards 
compatibility with research on emergent strategy. 
2.4 Lag Measurement and Scenario Hypotheses.   
“Yet it is diffusion rather than invention or innovation that ultimately determines the pace of economic 
growth and the rate of change of productivity. Until many users adopt a new technology, it may 
contribute little to our well-being. As Nathan Rosenberg said in 1972, ‘in the history of diffusion of many 
innovations, one cannot help being struck by two characteristics of the diffusion process: its apparent 
overall slowness on the one hand, and the wide variations in the rates of acceptance of different 
inventions, on the other.’” (Hall and Kahn, 2003) 
 
Measuring Insight, Bottleneck, and Regulatory Lag. So how do we measure an exaptation 
opportunity? We follow Agarwal and Bayus (2002), and look for time intervals for waves of new product 
introductions. Insight lag is measured as the time between feature emergence and the “commercialization 
wave”. There may be several near-simultaneous firsts, so it is best to aim for accuracy rather than 
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precision; this essay uses the year of first saleable products. Bottleneck lag is measured as gap between 
commercialization and “sales takeoff”– a stable growth trajectory (Dosi, 1982; Agarwal and Bayus, 
2002). For regulatory lag, we can measure the first year of a legal change or major government 
procurement action to facilitate the new industry. 
Ten Hypotheses of Radical Exaptation Lag Scenarios.  Below is a list of ten lag-based hypotheses, 
based on a review of the literature most relevant to radical exaptation challenges. Most Rebel Alliance 
advantages favor challengers, and most Blue Ocean advantages favor incumbents: however, some 
incumbents choose to act “like a challenger”, and vice versa, therefore overcoming substantial hurdles. 
But this essay goes further than just leaving these in a list format; instead, I provide a theoretical mapping 
to show that the hypotheses are collectively exhaustive. In other words, I first rule out all “null 
hypotheses” for lags that would be merely irrational for the respective Challenge Types.  See Table 4 for 
the alignment of hypotheses with phases.   
Null conditions.  Null 1 is regulation prior to insight lag period. Such regulation doesn’t impact the 
challenge outcomes. Null 2 is a situation where feature emergence is sufficient for producing exaptation. 
By definition, such exaptations are not radical. Null 3 is the absence of incumbent participation, and 
doesn’t add any additional impact to outcomes. Null 4 is a nonrival incumbent practicing double 
exaptation. On closer examination, two lucky exaptation discoveries arriving at once are still limited by 
the insight lag period of the first exapted use, and thus this hypothesis is the same as two simultaneous H1 
hypotheses in the same firm. Null 5 is a contradictory situation. Skipping bottleneck lag is a privilege 
only challengers can have, by alertly noticing an incumbents’ missed opportunity: H3. It is not possible 
that an incumbent would overlook its own exaptation use and still take advantage of its own bottleneck 
technology. Null 6 is an incumbent committing regulatory suicide, by blocking its own innovation. This 
cannot happen, since incumbents never intentionally develop regulations against itself; at least, assuming 
no extraordinary societal concerns emerge that could challenge incumbent viability if left 
uncommunicated (e.g. Freon, where regulations favored any incumbent with a suitable replacement).  
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Table 4: Lags for 12 Cases of Radical Exaptation 
EXAPTATION CATEGORY 
HYPOTHESES FOR ADAPTATION-
EXAPTATION LIFECYCLE  
CONFIRMED CASES 
(challenger win in 
italics) 
INSIGHT 
 LAG   
BOTTLENECK 
LAG 
REGULATORY  
LAG 
HYPOTHESIS ONE: FIRST TO INSIGHT 
NONRIVAL 
 INCUMBENT SECOND STAGE ADVANTAGE 
CAUSED BY A LUCKY DISCOVERY 
LEDS 
MICROWAVE OVEN 
PHONOGRAPH JUKEBOX 
CRYPTOCURRENCY 
1927-1951 (24) 
1940-1947 (7) 
1877-1890 (13) 
1982-1988 (6) 
  
HYPOTHESIS TWO: FIRST TO INSIGHT 
 RIVAL  
NEW ENTRANT SECOND STAGE ADVANTAGE 
FROM FORESIGHT: INNOVATIVE USERS 
SEEKING TO DISRUPT THE DEBUT USE  
AUTOMOBILES 
PERSONAL COMPUTERS 
3D DESKTOP PRINTING 
SOCIAL MEDIA 
ONE-WAY RADIO  
MODULAR REACTORS 
1789-1885 (96) 
1945-1968 (23) 
1984-2005 (21) 
1984-1997 (13) 
1888-1894 (6) 
1942-1974 (23) 
  
HYPOTHESIS THREE: DYNAMIC CAPABILTIES 
NONRIVAL 
FINAL WAVE INCUMBENT ADVANTAGE 
BASED ON DYNAMIC CAPABILITIES  
LEDS 
MICROWAVE OVEN 
 
1951-1963 (12) 
1947-1967 (20)  
 
HYPOTHESIS FOUR: PRE-ADAPTATION 
RIVAL  
THIRD STAGE NEW ENTRANT ADVANTAGE, IF 
NEW ENTRANT HAS THE COMPLEMENTARY 
TECHNOLOGY   
AUTOMOBILES 
 MOTORCYCLES 
3D DESKTOP PRINTING 
SOCIAL MEDIA 
ONE-WAY RADIO  
MODULAR REACTORS 
 
1885-1901 (16) 
1884-1902 (18) 
2005-2009 (4) 
1997-2003 (6) 
1894-1920 (26)  
1974-2017 (43) 
 
HYPOTHESIS FIVE: ATTENTION 
NONRIVAL 
INCUMBENT ATTENTION FAILURE FOR 
WRONG UNDERSTANDING OF EXAPTATION  
INISGHT LAG BUT NO BOTTLENECK LAG – 
CHALLENGERS’ KIRZNERIAN ADVANTAGE  
CRYPTOCURRENCY 
PHONOGRAPH JUKEBOX 
1988-2009 (21) 
1877-1897 (20) 
2009 (0) 
1897 (0) 
 
HYPOTHESIS SIX: FAILURE TO LAUNCH 
RIVAL 
INCUMBENT BIAS (INERTIA) 
INSIGHT AND BOTTLENECK INCUMBENT 
ADVANTAGE BLOWN 
PERSONAL COMPUTERS 1945-1968 (23) 1968- 1976 (8)  
HYPOTHESIS SEVEN: DOUBLE EXAPTATION, 
RIVAL  
CHALLENGER  DEVELOPS A SECOND MARKET 
DIRECTION FOR  A BOTTLENECK 
TECHNOLOGY, WITH NO INSIGHT LAG 
MOTORCYCLES 1884 (0) 1884-1902 (18)  
HYPOTHESIS EIGHT: INSTITUTIONAL 
ENTREPRENER WINS JUSTICE 
RIVAL  
CHALLENGER PIONEERING ADVANTAGE 
MEDICAL MARIJUANA   California is first 
state allowing 
medical use 
(1996).  
HYPOTHESIS NINE:  REGULATORY DEFENSE 
RIVAL 
REGULATORY LAG BEYOND FEATURE 
EMERGENCE: INCUMBENTS LOSE 
ADVANTAGE WHEN REGULATION EXPIRES 
ONE-WAY RADIO  
AUTOMOBILES 
MODULAR REACTORS 
  
1914-1918 (4) 
1860-1890 (30) 
1951-2017 (66) 
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H1: Lucky absorption, insight, incumbent wins. The lucky incumbent inherits the exaptation in their 
own research settings. By observing Stage One Feature Emergence, they developed the Stage Two Insight 
secretly. Sometimes multiple incumbents discover simultaneously, and race each other; but for now, we 
can simply approximate the first deliberate prototype in a year-wide interval. Incumbent second stage  
advantage caused by a lucky stage one advantage: incumbents have more R&D budget and are more likely 
to first hit an experimental discovery of emergent features (Schumpeter, 1934). They can also lean  
on their large absorptive capacity (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990). A typical example is the development of 
Light Emitting Diodes (LEDs). In the 1950s, incumbents working on semiconductors stumbled onto 
technologies that were structurally similar to electronic diodes (used in computer chips) but were efficiently 
electroluminescent Zheludev, 2007), and which became very popular in the form of small lasers in various 
colors. These were exapted to make infrared indicators and calculator displays, which did not previously 
exist- a nonrival user base (Schubert, Gessmann, and Kim, 2005). Let us not get confused by the fact that 
LEDs were used as discontinuous innovations in the 2000s: Illumination sources and LED TVs displaced 
some of the largest incumbents, including GE and Phillips, as a disruptive innovation. The same technical 
trajectory can sometimes be exapted or a discontinuity.  
Another H1 example is the radar magnetron, which became suddenly relevant for microwave. The focal 
firm’s to-date knowledge and possession of magnetrons confers a first-mover advantage (Kerin, 
Varadarajan, and Peterson, 1992). The incumbent repeats use of its capabilities in a familiar market 
(Christensen and Rosenbloom, 1995). For example, the first microwave oven, the Radarange, was launched 
in a familiar market for Raytheon: nuclear submarines. This was a commercialization advantage but not 
enough to provide the incumbent the means for a subsequent, sales takeoff to achieve leadership in the more 
lucrative user base.   
H2:  Foresight insight, challenger wins. When uses are rivalrous, a technological head start may not 
always be enough incentive for pursuing exapted uses. Sometimes incumbents sink resources into 
developing the debut use, with little left to expend on rival uses. This is observed especially when the radical 
innovation requires an asset specific investment but has no established market yet (Ansari and Krop, 2012; 
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Riordan and Williamson, 1985). Whereas incumbents think in terms of conserving profit streams, 
challengers dream of science futures (Turner, 2010). Challengers notice the radical nature of a technology 
more readily than incumbents. Thus, we expect stage two challengers to create the first insight, and for 
them to gain advantage in the race for a sales takeoff hit.  Examples include personal computers and 3D 
desktop printing, both of which started from radical open source movements. Certainly, if entrepreneurs 
had earlier insight into form factors, innovation could have proceeded with less hesitation, but uncertainty 
slowed development (Dimov, 2007; Busenitz, 1996). 
H3: Dynamic capabilities, bottleneck, incumbent wins. Nonrivial technology appears in this case within 
a firm having the oldest experience with the technology. Firms with dynamic capabilities (Teece, Pisano, 
and Shuen, 1997; Helfat and Peteraf, 2003) can bridge across capability lifecycles and renew competitive 
advantage. For instance, the user base of a microwave oven doesn’t compete with radar, so all relatedness 
is on the supply side. Incumbents tend to act as a related diversifying firm to sustain their supply side 
advantage in such cases when the new user base is not cannibalistic.  Thus, the incumbent will try to 
leverage its dynamic capabilities to gain economies of scope (Teece, 2007) – alternatively described as 
absorptive capacity (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990), transformative capabilities (Garud and Nayyar, 1994), or 
combinative capability (Zogut and Zander, 1992). Such incumbents have often launched a series of hit 
products and leading technologies, excelling with radical innovation. They are frequently first movers to 
commit to commercial growth (Eisenmann et al, 2006; Liberman and Montgomery, 1988) and to the 
breaching of bottlenecks (Langlois, 2002) at the third stage of the Exaptation-Adaptation Cycle. Once an 
insight is presented, they can race to push the original prototype through costly bottlenecks well before 
challengers (Tripsas, 1997). In the classic example of the microwave, a Raytheon engineer discovered that 
radar magnetrons could also make a microwave oven and made a successful stage two prototype. 
Capitalizing on their dynamic capabilities, Raytheon bought Amana in 1965 to successfully commercialize 
the stage three microwave in 1967.     
H4: Lucky pre-adaptation, bottleneck, challenger wins: Some challengers just happen to have the 
secondary capabilities for the final exaptation stage. The challenger’s possession of bottleneck know-how 
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is a lucky pre-adaptation. They aren’t skilled at radical innovation in general, but they are fortuitously 
skilled in the right stuff to adapt that technology to a commercially successful form (Cattani, 2005; Dew, 
2007; Dew et al, 2004). These lucky experiences seem to come from individuals working within the debut 
industry, who then leave incumbent firms to focus on adapting the exapted use. For example, the original 
automobile engine makers, such as Gottlieb Daimler and Wilhelm Maybach, learned their skills while 
working for industrial engine makers in previous engine categories, like locomotives and steamships. They 
were pre-adapted, possessing complementary capabilities (Moorman and Slotegraaf, 1999).  
H5: Alert to missed opportunities, Kirznerian bottleneck, challenger wins. Incumbents sometimes have 
many commitments and cannot properly assess each new opportunity (Macher and Richman, 2004). They 
might also fail to capitalize on exaptation insights owing to technical or personal prejudice, like Thomas 
Edison’s failure to launch the phonographic jukebox because, even though he had the insight of that use, 
he was embarrassed by jukeboxes as “non-serious”. After years of inaction, rivals picked up on the idea 
and beat him to market.  For exaptation, an emerging opportunity sometimes predates a winning new 
combination by a large interval (Levinthal, 1998). The Kirznerian entrepreneur (1973; 1999) could be 
watching and waiting for the moment to strike. For exaptation, the critical step is, from a Kirznerian 
perspective, alertness: to be the first to notice emergent features in an existing technology (Andriani and 
Carignani, 2014; Dew et al, 2004). However, alert incumbents might also survive a pioneering phase of 
entry, presenting a mixed result (Chandy and Tellis, 2000).  
H6: Failure to launch from inertia, blown bottleneck lead, challenger wins. Chesbrough and 
Rosenbloom (2002) imply that new business models favor challengers because incumbents don’t 
understand them yet.  Inertia can bring any incumbent down, clutching defeat from the jaws of victory 
(Tripsas and Gavetti, 2000).  The most famous blown lead is Xerox PARC’s failure to launch the first 
personal computer, the Xerox Alto (Hiltzik, 2000). The PARC program produced a whole suite of radical 
innovations. Most of its leadership came from the Advanced Research Projects Agency that developed the 
internet (Isaacson, 2014). Extremely eager inventive lead users took raw components, mostly for 
calculators, and repurposed them for “microcomputers”. Incumbents could have done this even better but 
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didn’t consider the market “serious”. This allowed companies like Apple to initiate the industry: they used 
some spillovers from Xerox’s PARC technology. Incumbents like Xerox were more committed to 
centralized mainframe computing, with masses of office users. Yet, the exapted home technology evolved 
faster than imagined, and the Xerox Palo Alto Research Center (PARC) failed to commercialize its already 
invented and functional personal computer technology. With the failure of PARC, incumbents like IBM 
and Texas Instruments to scrambled to the defense of the user base, but only after giving up critical market 
share to pioneering challengers like Apple, Tandy, and Commodore. Personal computers enabled a new 
value chain with a rival ecosystem: decentralized routing and personal networks. Incumbents are often 
unlikely to resist the fear of cannibalizing products (Hill and Rothaermel, 2003; Ansari and Krop, 2012). 
H7: Schumpeterian double-exaptation, without insight lag, rapid prototype, challenger wins. A Blue 
Ocean/Rebel Alliance Hybrid is possible; by fragmenting the Rebel Alliance into multiple form factors, 
multiple markets are created. Most of the research cites the Schumpeterian theory of economic development 
(1934). The Schumpeterian entrepreneur uses creativity and is responsible for a new combination (and 
bottleneck solution) of production means or product. Kogut and Zander (1992) explain how capabilities 
arise to make new combinations, and how sometimes complementary features emerge in two separate 
industries and can still be recombined instantly. Motorcycles involved the repurposing of both emerging 
car engines and emerging bicycles. This double exaptation makes Stage One and Stage Two virtually 
simultaneous. The motorcycle industry is a case of a challenging firm creating a new industry out of 
convenience, and a wave of challengers hunting for their first big commercial success. 
H8: Institutional entrepreneurship, regulation-only gap, challenger wins. Removing a regulation could 
potentially cause a near-instant exaptation with very large social impact. A rival situation may present a 
regulation-only gap, which is one that acts on something that has long since been available but is illegal in 
exapted form. One instance is recreational marijuana, which has long been illegal, but which regulations 
also made the medical exapted uses illegal (Dioun, 2014; Wicks, 2016). Pharmaceutical and medical 
incumbents are conditioned to avoid medical marijuana, which presents substantial risks during the 
awkward transitionary phases. Incumbents also will resist marijuana being used to replace existing 
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medications, such as analgesics and opiates. Only unusually aggressive incumbents will catch up to the 
rebels, due to risk aversion (Levy and Scully, 2007; Suddaby and Greenwood, 2005).  
H9: Defensive regulatory lag, extends past insight lag, challenger wins. Incumbent Survival 
Advantage for Rivalry. A debut use for a technology can, under some conditions, be powerful enough to 
hinder the arrival of rival exaptation uses, thereby creating systemic delays in such innovation throughout 
society. These systemic delays grant incumbents a longer tenure without adopting the new use (Klepper 
and Simmons, 2000), but also increase the odds that new entrants after that extended tenure will eventually 
thrive, especially when the technology is complex (Rosenbloom, 2000; Ansari and Krop, 2012; Querbes 
and Frenken, 2017). In this rival situation, regulations go into place after the earliest prototype experiments. 
The cause of regulation is defensive, and in the interests of the incumbents who want to protect the debut 
use (Mitnick, 1980). The railroad barons were not fans of the automotive industry and lobbied for a number 
of “Red flag” laws- automobiles required attendants in front of the vehicle, waving a red flag.  Incumbents 
may even commit market manipulations defensively, such as in the case of railroads employing a host of 
anticompetitive practices (Mitnick, 1980).  
England had many powerful interests that were opposed to automobiles or road locomotives. Incumbent 
investors, often aristocratic or politically connected, pressured Parliament to favor horse-based 
transportation and railways. In the Act of 1865, locomotives were restricted to 10m mph country, 5 mph 
city, with strict rules about tolls. These rules were tightened – and partially implemented in the USA as well 
-  with no relief until the 1890s. Thus, these regulations held up the investments into automobile exaptation.   
H10: Incumbent continuous innovation (challenge de-escalated to incremental type).   De-escalating 
the radical challenge into continuous challenges can sometimes work, if incumbents have the right strategies 
(Anand et al, 2009). De-escalation is the key to successful cannibal products (Conner, 1989; Foster, 1985), 
as the willing cannibal can plan transitionary steps to the new technology, whereas the unwilling cannibal 
resists until it is forced to make a quantum leap.  An example from Verona and Ravasi (2003)’s study of 
continuous innovation: an incumbent analog hearing aid company survived the transition to digital hearing 
aids, by thinking ahead and splitting the would-be radical innovation transition into several continuous 
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product steps. They commercialized the minimum viable product (Ries, 2011) for each digital feature, 
spreading out the transition on a component level. Thus, incumbents might survive with sufficient foresight 
to “de-radicalize” the transition (Benner and Tushman, 2003).  
2.5 Qualitative Methods for Case Analysis 
 In this essay, the goal is to confirm lag phenomena as qualitatively useful categories for use in future 
causal modeling and deeper case analysis. If some of the theorized historical cases do not exist, then no 
generalization can be made about that kind of exaptation. Therefore, it is important for each theorized 
exaptation condition to exist in at least some major cases (Eisenhardt, 1989), and so constitute an 
analytically interesting subfield of study. Thus, this essay will examine case studies as evidence that the 
phenomena in question have occurred in some historical pattern; and, this procedure shall confirm the 
presence of the theorized outcomes. Confirmatory studies are a first step towards empirical validity 
(Tsoukas, 1989; Perry, 1998). Methodologically, we follow the recommendation of Miles and Huberman 
(1994), and target 12 cases: no more cases than necessary for theoretical saturation but enough for 
confirmation of some common scenarios.  
Case Representativeness. This paper uses a convenience sample of popularly researched and well known 
radical exaptations, and targets typical, “classic” cases, not outliers. Studies on radical innovation can be 
reliable, but cannot be representative. I follow Agarwal and Gort (2001, pg. 167) on how to handle the  
representativeness problem: 
“Indeed, since the population of all product innovations has never been defined (let alone measured by 
anyone), there is no method available for drawing a representative sample. Our sample of innovations, 
however, does encompass a broad spectrum of important innovations in the past century.” 
Sample Selection. The cases reviewed here are chosen for their popular use in the ICD and exaptation 
literature to create theoretical continuity with the literature, and are conveniently selected for the general 
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reader’s knowledge. Theoretical saturation (Bowen, 2008) of the sample was reached on confirming that 
each category has multiple cases, and each category has unique membership. I drew twenty of the most 
cited cases from the innovation literature, and randomly sampled twelve of the twenty for full illustration, 
due to journal space limitations. I did not need to redraw the sample, as the twelve cases were sufficient to 
empirically confirm each of the ten hypotheses.  
Table 5: Table of 12 Confirmed Cases of Radical Exaptation 
HISTORICAL 
CASES 
FEATURE 
EMERGENCE 
SELECTION (INSIGHT) POST-ADAPTATION 
(BOTTLENECK) 
MECHANISMS 
(HYPOTHESES) 
AUTOMOBILES  
from locomotives, 
rivals all personal 
and industrial 
transportation 
methods  
French steam wagon, 
commissioned by the 
army for hauling 
cannons. Concept 
worked, but wasn’t 
cost effective for 
military use (1789) 
Daimler and Maybach 
(1885) and Karl Benz 
(1885) both develop the 
first automobiles: 
lightweight, small, and 
quick form factors for the 
Berlin market. 
The Oldsmobile Curved Dash 
becomes the first successful, 
mass-production car – the first 
to employ a reliable, scalable 
process, and also satisfy most 
users. Several competitors 
followed. (1901) 
REBEL ALLIANCE 
Challenger: 
foresight (H2) 
Challenger: pre-
adaptation (H4) 
Challenger: 
regulatory lag(H9) 
CRYPTOCURRENCY 
MINING 
From online 
payments, creates 
a nonrival market 
In 1982, David Chaum 
exapted crypto-
graphic algorithms: 
“blind payments” for 
existing bank 
transactions. 
Anonymous “Wallets” 
compete with banks.  
In 1988, Chaum launches 
Digicash: a system for 
anonymous bank account 
and bank transactions 
through the internet. 
Major banks and software 
companies fail to launch.  
In 2008, an anonymous hacker, 
“Satoshi Nakamoto”, launches 
an open source blockchain 
system for implementing a 
cryptocurrency. Several rebels 
for coin exchanges online; some 
also mine coin on a p2p network.  
REBEL ALLIANCE 
Incumbent: 
discovery (H1) 
Challenger: 
alertness (H5) 
LIGHT EMITTING 
DIODES (LEDs) 
From 
semiconductor 
diodes, creates a 
nonrival lighting 
technology   
In 1907, Henry Round 
was working for 
Marconi Labs- the 
leading Radio 
communication firm. 
He discovered that 
radio crystal diodes 
emit light.  
By roughly 1952, nearly all 
major incumbent firms in 
the semiconductor 
industry re-discovered the 
properties of light emitting 
semiconductor diodes, and 
began development of 
process technologies.   
Texas Instruments becomes the 
first company to sell LEDs as 
indicator lights. Subsequently, a 
host of other incumbents enter 
the business.  
BLUE OCEAN 
Incumbent: 
discovery (H1) 
Incumbent: 
dynamic 
capabilities (H3) 
MEDICAL 
MARIJUANA 
From recreational 
marijuana, rivals 
traditional 
medicine 
Folk medicine 
employed weak 
strains of natural 
cannabis for a very 
long time. Prohibitions 
began in the 20th 
century. 
No insight lag – 
recreational users were 
already “self medicating”.  
No insight lag – as prohibition 
continued, recreational users 
were already developing greatly 
enhanced strains with medicinal 
qualities. By the 1970s, California 
activists distributed “brownies” 
for terminal patients.  
REBEL ALLIANCE 
Challenger: 
Regulatory only 
(H8) 
MICROWAVE 
OVEN 
From radar, 
creates a nonrival 
cooking 
technology  
Invention of the Radar 
Magnetron John 
Randall and Harry 
Boot (1940). Raytheon 
becomes the first 
leading manufacturer. 
Discovery by Percy Spencer 
at the military contractor, 
Raytheon. While 
experimenting with the 
magnetron, he noticed it 
melted a candy bar in his 
pocket. He developed the 
Radarange (1956) 
After years of very slow launches 
in commercial kitchens, 
Raytheon finally acquires Amana 
in 1965, to help commercialize 
its microwave oven. The first 
Amana oven is a big hit (1967), 
but does not displace traditional 
cooking technologies.  
BLUE OCEAN 
Incumbent: 
discovery (H1) 
Incumbent: 
dynamic 
capabilities (H3)  
MOTORCYCLES 
From automobiles 
and bicycles, rivals 
all personal 
 “Safety” bicycles, 
automobiles, and 
motorcycles appear 
nearly simultaneously, 
Edward Butler produced 
the Butler Petrol cycle in 
England. It had many 
technological 
Two English bicycle startups 
pivoted (1902) to rally other 
firms and create the motorcycle 
industry’s mass production 
BLUE 
OCEAN/REBEL 
ALLIANCE HYBRID 
Challenger:  
 62 
transportation 
methods 
but motorcycles take 
the longest to sell.  
advancements that helped 
define the industry, but no 
sales(1884). 
designs and methods: Triumph 
and Indian Motorcycle 
Manufacturing Co.  
Pre-adaptation 
(H4); double 
exaptation (H7) 
ONE-WAY RADIO 
From laboratory 
electronic test 
equipment, rivals 
wired telegraphs 
and telephones 
Radio is often 
conceived of as a 
discontinuity, but 
radio emitter features 
emerged from Hertz’s 
electromagnetic 
sensors (1888).  
Marconi starts a company 
to commercialize one-way 
radio communications, in 
1897. After years of 
prototyping, he develops 
emitters and invents radio 
receivers for mass use.  
Radio stations are the final 
technology bottleneck. The 
United States bans civilian radio 
during World War I. After the 
war, commercial radio stations 
are established (1920), and sell 
advertising to fund programs.   
REBEL ALLIANCE 
Challenger: 
foresight (H2) 
Challenger: pre-
adaptation (H4) 
Challenger: 
regulatory lag(H9) 
HISTORICAL 
CASES 
FEATURE 
EMERGENCE 
SELECTION (INSIGHT) POST-ADAPTATION 
(BOTTLENECK) 
MECHANISMS 
(HYPOTHESES) 
PERSONAL 
COMPUTERS 
From mainframe 
computers and 
personal 
calculators, rivals 
all computing 
devices 
First description of a 
device adapted for 
personal management 
called a Memex. 
Vannevar Bush, As We 
May Think (1945) 
The Mother of All Demos: 
The first simulated demo 
of a Personal Computer, 
including the invention of 
e-mail, the mouse, and the 
contemporary keyboard 
and screen combination – 
Doug Englebart, Stanford 
Research Institute (1968)  
Bob Taylor assembled an elite 
team of researchers for Xerox 
Palo Alto Research Center 
(PARC). PARC invented many 
commercial standards for 
personal computing, but could 
not convince their bosses to 
launch. PARC eventually reveals 
prototypes to Steve Jobs for the 
Apple II (1976) 
REBEL ALLIANCE  
Exapted from 
Mainframe 
Computing 
Challenger: 
foresight (H2) 
Challenger: pre-
adaptation (H4) 
  
PHONOGRAPH 
JUKEBOX 
From phonograph, 
creates a nonrival  
music device for 
public spaces 
Thomas Edison 
develops the first 
phonograph in 1877 
while looking for a 
way to record speech. 
His patent notes 10 
uses for it, including to 
record and play music.  
Edison spends years 
developing dictation 
machines, even selling 600 
units to the United States 
Congress. He continually 
refuses to develop music 
devices, claiming they 
aren’t “serious” 
technology.  
Edison’s challenger competition 
makes two minor adaptations: 
improving the quality of the 
recording media, and adding a 
coin operated feature. They 
launch the first jukeboxes in 
1897.  
BLUE OCEAN 
Exapted from 
dictation 
phonograph.  
Incumbent: 
discovery (H1) 
Challenger: 
alertness (H5) 
SMALL MODULAR 
REACTORS 
From heavy 
nuclear reactors, 
rivals those 
reactors and other 
power sources 
First nuclear power 
plant at University of 
Chicago: Chicago Pile 1 
(CP-1). Enrico Fermi 
developed a test 
reactor (1942).  
First true small form factor 
nuclear reactor developed- 
EGP-6, in Russia. Although 
some of the reactor’s 
technology was rapidly 
obsolete. (1974) 
Several Small Modular Reactor 
projects have been recently 
funded, in the United States and 
the United Kingdom. Only 
challengers have active projects, 
but incumbents are threatening 
to enter (2020 projected date of 
first commercial reactors).  
REBEL ALLIANCE 
Challenger: 
foresight (H1) 
Challenger: pre-
adaptation (H4)  
Regulatory lag 
past insight (H9) 
SOCIAL MEDIA 
From bulletin 
board systems 
(BBSes) and e-mail 
technology, rivals 
traditional media 
The concept of 
multidirectional 
distribution of semi-
anonymous, semi-
filtered media appears 
in Whole Earth 
‘Lectronic Link, or 
WELL system. This 
avatar-based bulletin 
board system was 
conceived by Stewart 
Brand and Larry 
Brilliant. (1984) 
A very limited number of 
expert users can tolerate 
the bulletin board systems. 
But once the graphical 
version of the World Wide 
Web launches, 
entrepreneurs blend the 
concept of the “home 
page” with a social  
messaging board. The first 
commercial product is 
called Six Degrees (1997).  
It begins to pull customers 
away from platforms like 
America Online.  
After several short-lived 
experiments, the first truly 
commercially successful social 
media website, Myspace, 
integrates the RSS feed (2003). 
The RSS feed is the last major 
technology bottleneck to a 
smooth social media experience. 
Facebook and Twitter enters 
soon thereafter. A large number 
of media and software 
companies miss the opportunity- 
such as America Online, 
Microsoft, etc.  
REBEL ALLIANCE 
Exapted from 
Bulletin Board 
Systems 
Challenger: 
foresight (H2) 
Challenger: pre-
adaptation (H4) 
3D DESKTOP 
PRINTING 
From industrial  3D 
printers, rivals 
The first additive tools 
for heavy industry, 
stereolithography, are 
prototyped in 1984 by 
In 2005, University of Bath 
professor Adrien Bowyer 
develops an open source 
project for a small printer 
In 2009, Bre Pettis and his 
partners launch the Makerbot 
cupcake, the world’s first 
commercial desktop extruder. 
REBEL ALLIANCE 
Exapted from 
Additive 
Manufacturing 
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some alternative 
methods of 
prototyping and 
small lot 
manufacturing 
Charles Hull. However, 
3d printing is treated 
as a niche industrial 
technology, so there is 
no attempt to make a 
mass market for low 
cost prototyping or 
home manufacturing.  
than can make itself, and  
is ideal for rapid 
prototyping. The first style 
to be improved on by an 
engineering graduate 
student is called the Prusa, 
and becomes the most 
popular form factor. Most 
importantly, Bowyer 
makes the plastic extruder 
technology open source.  
They complete the bottleneck by 
making an online hub for sharing 
digital designs and work loads. 
have continually improved the 
design, and have spawned an 
entire industry of copycats and 
rivals. Adrien Bowyer helps the 
company and invests in it.  A 
wave of other challengers enter 
the market in 2010-2012.  
Challenger: 
foresight (H2) 
Challenger: pre-
adaptation (H4) 
 
The twelve cases are: Automobiles, Crypto-Currency, LEDs, Medical Marijuana, Microwave Oven, 
Motorcycles, Phonograph Jukeboxes, Personal Computers, Wireless Radio Communication, Small 
Modular Reactors, Social Media, and 3D Desktop Printers. Since the reader is burdened with appreciating 
each case, Table 4 provides minimum sufficient evidence. Table 5 contains qualitative evidence of strong 
lags. Most of the lags here also appear in Agarwal and Gort (2002).   
2.6 Confirmatory Case Results  
All hypotheses match at least one confirmed case in Table 5. Every case reviewed provides some 
distinguishing characteristic from other cases, but none contradict the presented ICD model.  Thus, this 
basic model presented here seems valid for integration into the Exaptation-Adaptation Cycle, and the ICD 
literature. However, the number of lags and scenarios is not analytically exhaustive, and could be expanded 
at multiple levels of analysis. In fact, a great number of the paradigmatic technologies addressed in the 
literature on techno-economic paradigms are radical exaptations, not discontinuous (Freeman and Perez, 
1988).  Future literature could examine how exaptations might form a series of rival and nonrival cascades 
(Lane, 2016); or family trees of and branches of exaptation tactics (Garud and Nayyar, 1994).   
Economies of Scope and Exaptation Strategy. Let us consider how exaptation flows from economies of 
scope (Teece, 1980; Helfat and Eisenhardt, 2004; Faems et al, 2010). I contend that exaptation opportunities 
of scope provide a powerful mechanism for related diversification. But it is a mistake for a firm to only 
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consider a safe quadrant –say, Blue Oceans – when any possible Rebel Alliance that might employ the 
technology will inevitably be found out. Thus, firms must always be prepared to displace its own installed 
base as well as its own technical standards and form factors – in the long run, nothing is sacred. Simply 
having scenario planning can help incumbents find the ideal moment to execute a “plan B, C, or D”.  
2.7 Limitations and Future Directions 
We shall touch on some of the ways this model can be expanded in future research. First, I must 
clarify two historical idiosyncrasies in this study that don’t alter the hypotheses but are important to 
consider. 1) Cryptocurrency and small modular reactors are cases in progress, so it may be possible that 
new variants of these technologies employ breakthroughs that prove to be disruptive. 2) War, and other 
such political externalities, often favor incumbents in an already incumbent-favored environment, such as 
for microwaves and one-way radio. In other words, such regulations could incidentally favor incumbents. 
The biggest limitation of this study is a lack of conclusion about the case frequency, or true 
quantitative impact, of the Four Challenge Types or the Ten Hypotheses. For example, most of the sampled 
cases explored fell into rival, challenger winning scenarios. While it may be tempting scenarios like H:2 
and H:4 more common that nonrival ones, the sampling method used does not permit such a conclusion to 
be drawn. This small case study methodology is insufficient for a frequency or breadth study, only for 
theoretical validation and saturation. Measuring relative frequencies of each case in history would require 
an extensive database – an excellent next step for future research.  
Future work should consider how innovation challenges differ at different levels of the design 
hierarchy (Clark, 1985; Andriani and Carignani, 2014) might be different. Many additional scenarios could 
subdivide the detailed innovation tactics specific to stages of exaptation. Finer grained analyses could 
explore how open innovation and curation (Laursen and Salter, 2006; Mitnick and Ryan, 2015) positively 
accelerates radical innovation.  
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This paper assumes that user base rivalry is an exogenously determined phenomenon. But 
alternative methods, such as simulation models, can use endogenous mechanisms to generate rivalry. 
Industry convergence, whereby user bases of multiple industries converge, is a common phenomenon for 
both exaptation and non-exaptation innovation scenarios – and, convergence appears to be increasingly 
common over time (Kim et al, 2015). Indeed, the biological concept of structural degeneracy is analogous 
to the way exapted technology can evolve to also meet the requirements of the old user base (Bonifati and 
Villani, 2013; Geels, 2005). 
Conclusion. This new matrix of Challenge Types clears up confusion about which historical industries 
were born of what strategic process; and, how two of the four quadrants evolve in a multi-phase, time-
lagged, Exaptation-Adaption cycle. In both rivalrous and nonrivalrous cases, incumbents might miss 
opportunities for reasons of attention (Ocasio, 1997).  If any true advantage comes from the first access to 
the debut technology, then incumbents clearly have it in exaptation situations; but, if any true advantage 
can come from dissatisfied users, then challengers are likely to satisfy their wants with a new user base. 
Moonshots are up for grabs for consortium members.  
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3.0 Promethean Cliques, Mercurian Communities: A Configuration Approach to Industry 
Emergence 
One of the classic elusive problems in the strategy literature is the identification of a consistent 
configuration of strategic behaviors (Miller, 1986; Ordanini, Parasuraman, and Rubera, 2014) by which 
firms attain market leadership in emerging industries. We know that successful early entrants find and 
capture first-mover advantages (Lieberman and Montgomery, 1998; Agarwal and Bayus, 2004; Agarwal 
and Gort, 2001; Romanelli, E., 1989) – herein referred to as FMAs, for short. This extensive literature has 
focused how entry timing correlates to firm survival. Scholars are in broad agreement that FMAs can be 
established, and are closing in on a timing model of when to enter an industry to maximize chances of 
locking in market leadership. But, the literature has not settled on a strategic theory and/or practical method 
of how. 
Founder capabilities are not enough. The interest in entry timing was an attempt to expand beyond the 
capabilities-based view of founding team success. Many recent studies looked at firm founder’s personal 
capabilities prior to market entry (Colombo and Grilli, 2005; Davidsson and Honig, 2003). They found that 
founder capabilities, including social ties and talent, have a weak relationship to firm success, and the 
interaction variables are often the strongest. Exceptional personal capabilities are not necessarily translated 
into market-leading firm capabilities in some ceteris paribus fashion, just as a talented driver cannot race 
an automobile missing one wheel.  
Theorizing proofpoints as necessary conditions. New firms must seek venture capital to produce a 
resource base, and the founders must convince investors of their total preparedness for capturing value 
(Brush, Greene, and Hart, 2001). Managers must produce social proof (Petkova, Rindova, and Gupta, 2013; 
Pollock and Rindova, 2003; Rao, Greve, and Davis, 2001; Rao, 1994) of their readiness for sales takeoff in 
an emerging industry – they need to win product/quality awards, win relationships, and win the overall 
industry narrative. Hallen and Eisenhardt (2012 p. 46) called these conjoint sets of social certifications: 
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“…proofpoints [emphasis added] as positive signals of substantial venture accomplishment of a critical 
milestone that is confirmed by key external (not internal) actors.” While no two venture capital firms agree 
on the specific proofpoints a firm must satisfy to secure venturing, this essay argues that some set of 
conditions may, in fact, be overwhelmingly necessary for attaining a leading market share. Obviously, some 
proofpoints signal technical success, and others signal social legitimacy (Plummer, Allison, and Connelly, 
2016), but theory should predict the best set of signals to use.  
Why Processor Technology failed and Apple succeeded. Consider the unlikely success of Apple as 
compared to 1976’s other “golden child” of microcomputing, Processor Technology. While they each had 
“good enough”, or satisficing proofpoints to commercialize 8-bit computers for the lead user market, Apple 
showed the proofpoints for sales takeoff.   
On the technical side of the business: Apple’s genius product designer, Steve Wozniak, contributed 
several groundbreaking innovations to the product; and, Wozniak’s connections to Homebrew Computing 
Club put them in an elite club of insider community knowledge about the future of microcomputing 
technology (Freiberger and Swaine, 2000; Furnari, 2014). But consider that Processor Technology’s design 
guru, Lee Felsenstein, was the leader of the club, and every bit as talented as a designer. Overall, Felsenstein 
could bring at least as many capabilities necessary for founding a leading microcomputer firm, if not more. 
 On the market-facing, “social” side of the business:  Apple had the young but fanatical Steve Jobs 
driving the company strategy. Jobs’ relentless drive to convert the microcomputer into a personal computer 
led him to fearlessly build necessary relationships. He drew on youthful experiences with the incumbent 
and the startup side of the computer industry, respectively at Hewlett-Packard and Atari. Jobs also had a 
good understanding of the wants of the early majority consumer across “the chasm” (Moore, 1999; Rogers, 
2010). Jobs honed-in on a category-defining design for the Apple II by imitating design aspects of the 
blockbuster appliance, the Cuisinart. However, most experts of the moment predicted that Felsenstein, Gary 
Ingram, and Bob Marsh had all the same advantages for extending Processor Technology’s sales leadership 
of late 1976 (Freiberger and Swaine, 2000; Issacson, 2014). They had enviable social connections, elite 
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design, and access to lead users. In short, both firms had all capabilities necessary to launch a pioneering 
product for the first customers.  
Apple’s scalability. But Apple stood above the earliest entrants because they put together the next set of 
necessary capabilities to scale the business for early adopters. Apple pulled every string in Silicon Valley 
to leapfrog Processor Technology’s production capabilities in 1977. Their benefactor, Mike Makkula, 
staffed the company with experienced directors and executives (Veit, 1993). Meanwhile, Felsenstein and 
company struggled to establish a suitable supply chain, resulting in disastrous product recalls, and a failed 
attempt at quality leadership. No customer felt safe ordering a second-generation Sol computer because of 
high disk drive and motherboard failures. Interestingly, Felsenstein continued his own illustrious product 
development career after the Sol’s demise: he designed the highly celebrated Osborne 1 (1981), the #1 
portable computer during sales takeoff. According to Felsenstein’s boss, Adam Osborne: 
“Technology had nothing to do with Apple Computer Corporation's success; nor was the company 
an aggressive price leader. Rather, this company was the first to offer real customer support and to behave 
like a genuine business back in 1976 when other manufacturers were amateur shoe-string 
operations."(Osborne and Dvorak, 1984, pg. 11). 
 
The necessary conditions approach. As demonstrated in this example, first mover firms cannot ride out 
a single competitive advantage: they must complete a full set of necessary conditions. Shane and 
Venkatraman (2000) pointed out that discovering a timely opportunity is, of course, necessary; but, 
knowing is only half the battle, at best. A few studies have used a “necessary condition” approach to 
industry evolution (Bol and Luppi, 2013; for dominant designs, see Lee, O'Neal, Pruett, and Thomas, 1995; 
for international business startups, see Phelan, Dalgic, Li, and Sethi, 2006). However, prior work has neither 
tested for a “necessary conditions” model of market leadership, nor has used proofpoints as their necessary 
conditions.  
Explaining the first two leadership cohorts. Literature has identified four early waves of participation in 
emerging durable goods industries: pre-commercialization, pioneering commercialization, firm takeoff, and 
sales takeoff (Golder and Tellis, 1993; 1997; 2004; Chandy and Tellis, 1998; 2000; Agarwal and Bayus, 
2002; 2004).  Most timing papers focus on how pioneers and firm takeoff participants impact market 
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leadership across the longer, and extremely profitable, sales takeoff wave. This paper takes the historical 
perspective of Langlois’s (1992) classic breakdown of all the successive product waves for a new industry 
– i.e., microcomputers. The industry founders must develop the institutions and relationships that a mere 
product category innovator does not, including making the new industry cluster. Evidence suggests firms 
entering during firm takeoff are more likely to sustain category dominance than the earliest wave of 
pioneers, or later entrants (Markides and Sosa, 2013; Suarez et al., 2015); and, that the pioneering wave has 
a very high fatality rate.  
Pioneering commercialization: the Promethean Phase.  During pioneering – what I call the Promethean 
Phase – a startup must complete a full configuration of six Promethean proofpoints to launch an early 
leading product. I argue that a Promethean Clique – PQ for short – is a cohort of socially connected firms 
responsible for collective invention (Cowan and Jonard, 2003; Allen, 1983) of the new industry. I propose 
that clique members must have six minimum necessary conditions to be among the leaders in market share 
during the Promethean Phase.  Firms lacking any of the six Promethean proofpoints will not have a 
significant share of the dominant product category sales and must use a niche strategy instead. Furthermore, 
PQ firms usually fail to create leading second-generation products because early focus on lead users is an 
identity trap (Bouchikhi and Kimberly, 2003).   
Firm Takeoff: the Mercurian Phase. I refer to the firm takeoff window for sustainable FMAs as the 
Mercurian Phase. The name of the Mercurian Phase reflects the fleet-footed race among entrepreneurs to 
build a firm worthy of producing a multi-generational product line, and perhaps a future dominant design 
(Suarez and Utterback, 1995). I call this period’s market leaders a Mercurian Community – or, MC for 
short. This cohort of firms locks in FMAs by achieving a full configuration of Mercurian Proofpoints.  
Thesis: Two sequential configurations. In summary: the task of this essay is to theoretically and 
empirically distinguish the Promethean from Mercurian market leaders. I confirm two propositions: 1) 
Promethean leaders typically are stuck meeting the conditions for lead user market leadership; 2) 
Mercurians meet the conditions necessary to lead at a mass scale – and they are usually different firms but 
contain actors with Promethean experience.  
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Methods. This essay employs Crisp-Set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (CQ-QCA) to test a recurring 
pattern of demarcation between two cohorts. I draw boundaries on this initial model by focusing on a subset 
of Schumpeter Type I industries – particularly, those formed by commercialized new consumer durable 
versions of incumbent technology. I do not generalize this strategy to Mark II industries or 
nondurables/cultural goods. To show that the strategic sequence is not a historically specific occurrence, I 
test across three different eras of paradigmatic innovation: automobiles, microcomputers, and 3d desktop 
printers.   
The paper proceeds as follows: Section One covers key definitions for Promethean and Mercurian Phase 
analysis, derived from prior literature. Section Two is a synthesis of six three-stage emergence models in 
the literature, pointing to Six Promethean and Six Mercurian proofpoints that certify market leadership. In 
Section Three I discuss each of the proofpoints, using examples from the three industries. Section Four 
covers the CS-QCA methodology and sampling method. Section Five reports the results of a confirmatory 
test for the necessary configurations of Promethean and Mercurian market leadership. I confirm this Rebel 
Alliance Model fits for the three Schumpeter Type I industries. Finally, in Section Six discusses limitations 
to the model, and directions for future research, such as “sufficient” proofpoints for equifinal strategic paths 
(Fiss, 2007; 2011; Rihoux and Ragin, 2008).  
3.1 Definitions and Boundary Conditions  
This section covers key definitions, boundary conditions, and illustrative examples of how some industries 
evolve according to a canonical sequence of phases. Refer to Table 6 for how the proposed proofpoints line 
up with classic literature on first mover advantages and network externalities. Refer to Figure 5 on page 77 
for the list of leadership cohorts used in this study.  
Four Emergence Phases. The entry timing literature has placed emphasis on four successive waves of 
actor participation during emergence (Agarwal and Bayus, 2002;2004; Chandy and Tellis, 1998; 2000). 
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First, entrepreneurs begin their inventive search during pre-commercialization. Research on this period can 
help explain how individual entrepreneurs find the initial starting conditions for enabling Promethean entry. 
Second, scholars have repeatedly identified pioneering commercialization (Agarwal and Bayus, 2002) as  
Table 6: First Mover Advantages and Proofpoints 
THEORY “TRIPARTITE 
INVESTMENTS” 
IN PIONEERING 
CAPABILITIES 
(Chandler, 1992; 
Mowery and 
Nelson, 1999) 
FIRST-MOVER 
ADVANTAGES  
(Lieberman and 
Montgomery, 1988; 
Kerin, Varadarajan, 
and Peterson, 1992) 
CONSUMPTION AND 
PRODUCTION NETWORK 
EXTERNALITIES 
(Katz and Shapiro, 1985; 1994; 
Farrell and Saloner, 1985; 
Economides, 1996; Arthur, 
1989) 
PROOFPOINTS 
(based on the prior columns 
and a fuller review of the 
literature in this essay) 
MECHANISM (Social) 
management 
Reputational 
Advantages  
Path dependent imprint of 
brand and industry practices 
Institutional leadership 
MECHANISM (Technical) 
management 
Switching cost 
advantages  
Installed user bases and loyalty 
advantages in business models 
Business model leadership 
MECHANISM (Social) marketing  Preemptive 
locations and factor 
market 
relationships 
Network economies, especially 
spillovers from cluster location 
Network leadership 
MECHANISM (Technical) 
marketing 
Product 
differentiation 
Superior bundles of features 
backed with clever sourcing 
Product category leadership 
MECHANISM (Social) 
manufacturing 
Process 
management and 
learning curve 
Lower manufacturing costs and 
higher product reliability 
Process quality leadership  
MECHANISM (Technical) 
manufacturing 
Technical 
standardization 
Industry lock-in to intellectual 
property and expertise 
Standards leadership 
UNIT OF 
ANALYSIS 
 
INVESTMENT 
 
Entrepreneurs 
invest in 
capabilities in the 
hopes of FMAs 
FIRST MOVER 
ECONOMIC BENEFIT 
 
If investments are 
successful, they 
result in early FMAs 
NETWORK ECONOMIC BENEFIT 
 
FMAs are a special case of 
generic network externalities; 
some followers attempt to 
imitate first mover advantages  
CERTIFIED STATUS 
  
Firms who can achieve a full 
configuration of statuses at 
sales takeoff can “lock in” 
leadership for the long run. 
Proofpoints are “Social 
proof” of capabilities.  
 
the phase when an initial wave of “barely functional” products are targeted and sold to the most fanatical 
and risk-taking lead technology users. Some industries form a Promethean Clique (PQ) of market leaders 
in this Promethean Phase. Third, scholars define firm takeoff as the window when a wave of firms 
aggressively compete for lock-in advantages and proprietary standard setting (Lieberman and Montgomery, 
1998; Langlois and Robertson, 1992). The fourth wave, sales takeoff, has been identified as the beginning 
of a product standards battle between top firms, and usually ends with one or more dominant designs. 
Alternatively, some models identify this period as the early growth phase which competes for the early 
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majority, and the dominant design period as the late growth phase that attracts the late majority into the 
industry (Langlois, 1992). Mature competition thus deals with managing the interests of all users, including 
drawing in the remaining resistors, and reaching full global penetration into developing markets. Evidence 
suggests that market share remains very stable after sales takeoff, with only a couple of later large 
challengers upsetting the balance of power (Chandler, 1992); therefore, the primary research question for 
emergence has been to identify how early entrants sustain advantages throughout sales takeoff (early 
growth) when category standards are set (Suarez et al., 2015) – and even perhaps into the dominant design, 
which frequently incurs a firm shakeout and a last-minute shift towards a cost war that decimates the 
“middle” (late growth). This essay surveys the literature on the structural break between the Promethean 
Clique (PQ) and the Mercurian Community (MC), and checks evidence.  
Boundary conditions: Rebel Alliance Strategy (RAS). The three cases herein focus on one typical 
sequence for Schumpeter Mark I industry birth (Malerba and Orsenigo, 1995). In Mark I, industry birth is 
frequently driven by individuals working for incumbents. These entrepreneurs see an opportunity to 
commercialize technology. The incumbents themselves resist rather than encourage these markets. For 
example, nearly all microcomputer founders began as young, disgruntled employees of major tech firms, 
or entrepreneurs from elite university settings (Freiburger and Swaine, 2000). The industries used to 
illustrate the RAS are all consumer durable goods. Future work can check if other sectors (media, software, 
etc.) imitate the RAS.  
Radical Exaptation and the RAS. In the industries addressed herein, leading startups captured an 
opportunity for radical exaptation of underapplied technology to a new purpose (Andriani and Carignani, 
2014). Andriani and Carignani defined radical exaptation as the lateral adaptation of an existing technology 
to the purpose of creating a new industry of products. A popular example is the magnetron, a device that 
began as a radar component but became the heating element of microwave ovens. Their Three-Phase model 
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of radical exaptation aligns exactly with this author’s proposed Athenian, Promethean, and Mercurian 
phases.7 
Radical exaptation as a group practice. Radical exaptation has also been described by Henderson and 
Clark as (1990) architectural innovation – an industry-defining innovation driven by market opportunities 
underserved by all the existing technical possibilities. The combined result is both an architectural 
product/process innovation – i.e., the new dominant product category – and a new industry value chain 
(Henderson, 1993; Levinthal, 1998). 
Of course, needs are underserved when incumbents resist serving them. So, the RAS model doesn’t quite 
work for incumbent-driven industries like the microwave. Raytheon, a military contractor, practiced 
Schumpeter Mark II invention by pioneering the microwave itself and building the market for it. The 
necessary conditions presented in this paper thus can only apply where a wave of Promethean new entrants 
cooperate and practice some extent of collective invention (Allen, 1983) to jointly set industry standards 
and institutions.  
Value creation versus value capture. Promethean strategies focus on value creation to bypass the 
conservative forces of large organizations; but open sharing is not an ideal strategy for value capture (Amit 
and Zott, 2012). Mercurian startups “cross the chasm” (Moore, 1999) by developing a value capture 
strategy. I refer to this emergence sequence as the Rebel Alliance Strategy, or RAS for short. The name of 
the strategy is in reference to D’Aveni’s (2002) article about incumbent defense strategies, entitled “The 
Empire Strikes Back”. The RAS is a strategy for overcoming incumbent resistance to the very existence of 
the new industry.  
                                                 
7 Athena and Prometheus were Greek gods, but Mercury is a Romanization of Apollo. This changeover in 
myths is on purpose: the first two periods were motivated by knowledge and innovation for its own sake, and are 
primal fields of activity. But from that point forward, all business activities across the lifecycle are directed towards 
capitalist competition; thus, I recommend using Romanized terms from Mercury onward. I would also suggest using 
the term Marsian for firm takeoff, as it is a period characterized by aggressive “battles” for standards and stakeholders. 
For the later growth period associated with the struggle against one firm’s dominance, I would label the period, 
Jupiterian; for oligarchic maturity, Ceresian; and, for decline, Plutonian. This nomenclature encourages a proliferation 
of mythic Greco-Roman terms for the convenience of educators and practitioners of capitalism, but I encourage 
scholars to adapt these concepts into any world system of mythology desirable for local audiences.  
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RAS industries. Personal computers were based on components from the existing calculator and 
mainframe computer markets (Issacson, 2014). Experienced entrepreneurs created the automobile industry 
with architectural innovations derived from many existing technologies: carriages, bicycles, machine tools, 
mechanical engineering theory, and engine niche markets for small locomotives, boats, and custom 
industrial devices (Carrol, Bigelow, Seidel, and Tsai, 1996). 3D desktop printer tinkers employed off-patent 
additive manufacturing parts and simple mechanical parts (West and Kuk, 2016). Automobiles, personal 
computers, and desktop 3D printers were thus all exapted from other industries by ambitious “hackers” 
(Issacson, 2014) – the most inventive lead users of incumbent technology.  
The challenger’s motive in radical exaptation. The literature sometimes assumes a challenger is a wholly 
new venture in direct contrast with an incumbent; however, this is an inaccurate assessment of the dynamic. 
Most challengers who succeed at a sales takeoff rely on employees, investors, and/or board members with 
powerful incumbent experience with managing large scale operations (Klepper, 2003; 2007; Agarwal et al, 
2016; Echambadi, Bayus, and Agarwal, 2008; Baum and Silverman, 2004). Such managerial knowledge is 
developed in secretive settings. So the legal firm entity may be new, but if it is sizeable (a large startup) in 
a short period of time, the capabilities driving it must be old. This paradox helps explain Mercurian market 
leaders.  
Buick: a story of several starts. For example, in the United States, all the leading Mercurian automotive 
startups, such as Buick, made use of knowledge, resources, and talent from related incumbent industries. 
David Dunbar Buick first ran an industrial engineering company, Buick Auto-Vim and Power Company. 
One of his engineers, Walter Marr, created his first automobile prototype in 1899. D.D. Buick resisted 
entering the new market at first. After a few false starts, D.D. Buick finally started the new Buick Motor 
Company in 1904. He used elite engineering talent from machine tools and carriage industries to create 
high quality vehicle designs (Dunham, 1987). Still, his first version of the firm wasn’t competent to scale 
up. Buick’s fortune really took off when they went into business with the wealthy William Durant (Miller, 
2015; Flink, 1990). 
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 The world’s largest carriage maker at the time, Durant saw that the carriage market was likely to 
permanently crash. Believing the “horseless age” was nigh, Durant redeployed his old carriage-making 
facilities to convert Buick from a fledgling engineering shop to a large-scale automotive operation. By 
combining his manufacturing know-how with Buick’s engineering talent, they were able to make a superior, 
“instantly large” startup.  
Realizing the huge importance of scale economies, Durant didn’t stop there. In late 1908, he went “all in” 
to the automotive business and abandoned carriages. He formed General Motors by consolidating 20 parts 
and auto assemblers, including three of the five leaders: Olds, Buick, and Cadillac. In this light, we can see 
that a “defending incumbent” is merely an organization that stays fully committed to the old regime 
(Chandy and Tellis, 1998). An “experienced new entrant” like Buick brings resources and capabilities to a 
Mercurian phase of competition to prepare for a sales takeoff (Klepper, 2007). All the Mercurian firms in 
Figure 5 have similar stories of combining “new” with “old”. 
Pre-emergence: Athena’s Birth. The earliest phase of analysis is when tinkering inventors try out the first 
pre-commercial technologies for a nascent industry – before any product is sold. Agarwal, Moeen, and Shah 
(2017) refer to this period as Athena’s Birth. In many high-tech industries, incumbents develop the first 
technologies for a new industry; thus, they act in accordance with Schumpeter Mark II predictions, and 
largely shut out small challengers from achieving market leadership. Mark II examples of radical exaptation 
include: the microwave; videocassettes (VHS); smartphones; and, light emitting diodes, aka LEDS, which 
sprang from semiconductor diodes, aka printed circuits.  
Schumpeter Mark I conditions occur when incumbents suffer from inertia and/or resist cannibalization 
(Chandy and Tellis, 1998; 2000). Founding teams of small firms overcome barriers by tinkering in the pre-
emergence phase, and participating in lead user innovation (Von Hippel, 2005). This essay shall make no 
new predictions about how pre-emergence impacts the subsequent two phases; but the period shall be 
explained to distinguish it from later periods.  
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Figure 5: Market Leader Cohorts by Phase of Emergence 
 
Moving from Athena to Prometheus. Let us consider how automobiles were commercialized. Nikolaus 
Otto’s 1876 4-stroke cylinder engine was made famous at the Paris World Fair. Otto’s design was intended 
for industrial usage, but proved to be the critical Athenian technology that inspired his former employees 
and associates to attempt a commercial combustion engine that would enable an automobile prototype. 
Gottlieb Daimler and Wilhelm Maybach left his firm to commercialize the first such engine, in 1885; Karl 
Benz and other rivals attempted the same stunt. Furthermore, all would-be entrepreneurs in that time and 
place were impacted by the ideas of Franz Reuleaux, the father of kinematic mechanical engineering theory 
(Moon, 2014). Reuleaux enabled the rapid development of standardized mechanical parts for any industry. 
The Paris-Berlin auto cluster was a hotspot of Reuleaux-inspired engineers. Thus, the race for leadership 
begins with connections to central figures in sociotechnical movements (Hess, 2005).  
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Commercialization is a contest for glory among the lead user market, more than profit. In Schumpeter 
Mark I industries, firms must collaborate to construct the new industrial community (Van de Ven, 1993). 
Many small, resource-poor startups are motivated by their personal interests in the technology. Participants 
rapidly build their own language to describe the technology and exapt meanings, materials, and actors from 
related incumbent industries to construct the new technological frame (Kaplan and Tripsas, 2008). 
Therefore, the first leadership cohort focuses heavily on a cooperative strategy of creating shareable 
institutions – meaning-making activities (Furnari, 2014; Mitnick and Ryan, 2015), technology standards, 
product categories, trade organizations, etc., designed to attract lead users and informal/formal interfirm 
alliances. Pioneers in such a lead-user-oriented environment rely on personal networks and open standard-
setting to establish initial supply chains, rather than attempting vertical integration (Langlois, 1992). The 
first wave products are short-lived and come in small batches; thus, the first product is merely a way to 
organically raise funds (Aldrich and Fiol, 1994; Zimmerman and Zeitz, 2002).  
Promethean horseless carriage makers in Europe took advantage of the first generation of “kinematic 
engineers” –experts of modular and standardization designs in machining – already locally employed by 
machine tool makers, bicycle makers, and engine makers (Moon, 2014; Carroll et al, 1996). Some scholars 
claimed the later Detroit automobile cluster did not use university networks (Klepper, 2007), and instead 
drew on the expertise of many private engineering firms. But other scholars stress how the earlier Paris-
Berlin cluster sprang from elite tech schools (Flink, 1990; Moon, 2014), and private carriage and bicycle 
makers worldwide improved their skills with kinematic theory. Sociological scholarship has explicated an 
extensive lead user involvement for early automobiles (Franz, K., 2011; Kline and Pinch, 1996).  
The Promethean microcomputer makers took advantage of the first generation of university-trained 
computer engineers interested in personalizing machine-human interface and useful hacking.  Most 
microcomputer engineers initially trained themselves on consumer electronics, telecommunications, 
mainframe computers, and calculators (Freiburger and Swaine, 2000; Levy, 1984; Frenken, Saviotti, and 
Trommetter, 1999). Promethean firms had an extensive lead user market they could target with their initial 
designs, such as the Homebrew Computer Club.  
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Promethean 3D desktop printer makers took advantage of the first generation of university-trained 
additive manufacturing engineers with interest in open source and peer-to-peer innovation ideas, on the 
heel of digital CNCs, industrial lithography, and laser printer technology (Kostakis and Papachristou, 2014; 
Rifkin, 2014). The epicenter of the action was Adrien Bowyer, engineering professor at University of Bath. 
Bowyer created an open source project and community, reprap.org, for developing the world’s first desktop 
sized 3D printers. The documentation of that activity is preserved online at reprap.org. As much today as 
in the 19th century, universities are key interorganizational networks (Kauffeld-Monz and Fritsch, 2013). 
A Promethean Clique (PQ) is defined herein as a Small World (Watts, 2004) network of leading 
challengers who co-create the institutions necessary to complete a pioneering wave of commercialization. 
In other words, only those firms who make it into this PQ will be the (short-lived) Promethean market 
leaders. These pioneering actors dominate the social certification process of each other and any would-be 
pioneering entrants. They are called Prometheans because, as aforementioned, they use radical exaptation 
(Andriani and Carignani, 2014) to “steal fire” from the incumbent “gods”; but, they do so in a sacrificial 
manner, since their firms are unlikely to survive. The commercialization wave is predominantly a matter of 
creating the opportunity for Mercurians to exist (Alvarez, Young, and Wooley, 2015; Alvarez and Barney, 
2007; Durand and Khaire, 2017). Ultimately, nearly all Promethean firms are among those “first to fail” 
(Tellis and Golder, 1996) from the emerging dominant category. 
Prometheans surviving as niches or rebirths. Prometheans may survive in small niches even though they 
lose the contest for market leadership. Consider how early auto firms like Panhard & Levassor survived by 
focusing on luxury and racing vehicles (Flink, 1990). In the United States, the pioneering Promethean, 
Charles Duryea, was forced to start new firms three times and never captured a significant market share. 
However, Henry Ford dabbled with two Promethean firm failures. Like Duryea, Ford’s first two firms failed 
quite rapidly. But, his third (Mercurian) firm, Ford Motor Company, developed a car that was to become 
the dominant design, the Model T.   
Failed Promethean Cliques. Some cliques fail for committing to the wrong technology. For example, 
Albert Pope was central to an 1890s attempt at a New England electric car clique. Pope focused on 
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promoting his electric cars as ideal for short-distance leisure travel. But dominant status emanated from the 
Paris-Berlin gas combustion clique, dating back further to 1885 (Geels, 2005). Some early American 
tinkerers, such as Charles Duryea (1896), re-imagined American cars as a long-distance technology and 
began importing Daimler-Maybach combustion engines for that purpose. As the center of action shifted 
from Europe to the United States, the imported combustion clique rapidly overtook the early New England 
electric car clique. By 1909, the global market leaders were all American Mercurian firms producing 
combustion vehicles.  
Firm takeoff: The Mercurian Period. Firm takeoff is a competition to attract resources and overall 
dominance (D'Aveni, 1999). In stark contrast to the cooperative spirit of the Prometheans, the second wave 
of product introductions is competitive and takes place in a very compressed amount of time. Firms jockey 
for top position by defining the competitive strategy and truly wowing skeptical audiences, just in time to 
raise funding for exponential growth and more extreme economies of scale/scope (Chandler, 1992). Since 
sales takeoff is a mass production phase, firm takeoff is the dress rehearsal for mass production. In 
preparation firms attempt to establish all the necessary institutional statuses for lock-in (Aldrich and Fiol, 
1994; Lieberman and Montgomery, 1998) and platform leadership (Gawer and Cusumano, 2002).  
A Mercurian Community (MC) is a group of leading firms embedded in the expanding network of 
dedicated trade and media institutions, seeking all market proofpoints for winning firm takeoff. Nearly the 
instant the PQ constructs industry institutions and open technology standards, the MC converts these 
advances into proprietary advantages, for profit and revenue. This dynamic of Mercurian “piracy” of the 
publicly accessible PQ knowledge was the topic of the film: “The Pirates of Silicon Valley” (1993). 
Candidate leaders of an MC attempt to establish proprietary industry standards and practices for FMAs 
(Aldrich and Fiol, 1994). Byrd (1992) encouraged the use of Mercury as a metaphor for the growth 
entrepreneur. According to Byrd (1992, Abstract):“…[A Mercurian] focuses on appetite, vision, 
changeableness, fast action, and networks at the individual level and on economic chaos at the social level.” 
It is also noteworthy that niche entrants during the Mercurian period do well on the high end of the market 
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– such as H.H. Franklin’s line of Franklin luxury cars (Early, 1956). The luxury/high-end market often 
sustains regional niches for years, such as Franklin at Syracuse, NY and surrounding cities.  
A note on dominant designs and sales takeoff. The IBM PC, debuted in 1982. The PC architecture is 
usually used as the example of the dominant design for personal computers, and the inflection point for 
sales takeoff into the mainstream. Langlois (1992) discussed how Apple, Tandy, and Commodore 
established their personal computer leadership of the dominant category in 1977, five years prior to sales 
takeoff. Interestingly, these three MC firms subsequently held on to leading positions for some years after 
IBM introduced its dominant PC architecture. Not only that, but the PC architecture borrowed so heavily 
from the MC firms, helping to legitimate them as rivals. Thus, even though sometimes the dominant design 
is created by a firm that enters after the Mercurian Period, the MC is expected to stay among the oligarchs.   
Why enter early? Some scholars have fretted to explain why anyone bothers to start a Promethean firm. 
Simple: people don’t die when companies do. While firms might not survive, individual pioneering 
participants have strong personal incentives to participate as entrepreneurial lead users (Lakhani and Wolf, 
2003; Von Hippel and Von Krogh, 2003). Inventive lead users benefit greatly by participating in shaping 
the first rules, technologies, and relationships (Von Hippel, 2005; Lettl, 2007; Lettl, Herstatt, and 
Gemuenden, 2006; Srinivasan, Lillien, and Rangaswamy, 2004). First wave firms tend to lack business 
acumen for large-scale operations and make many severe business mistakes; but individuals gain invaluable 
experience. Incumbents with greater business acumen tend to wait, preferring to use a “fast second” 
business model (Markides and Geroski, 2004; Markides and Sosa, 2013).  
3.2 Building the Rebel Alliance Model  
This section will present a synthesis of prior work on FMAs and the temporal sequencing of industry 
emergence. To build the Rebel Alliance Model – a model for testing the theory of the RAS – Table Seven 
(p. 90) presents a literature review for the six parallel certification processes of the firm leadership cohorts 
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from Figure 5 (p .75). I then propose six leadership proofpoints for the PQ, and six leadership proofpoints 
for the MC.   
Alfred Chandler and early market leadership. Alfred Chandler (1992) has, perhaps, the most succinct 
explanation of why and how early market leadership has always been a goal to establish the right 
configurations ahead of competitors. From page 82: 
 
“ The first firms to make the three-pronged investments in manufacturing, marketing, and management 
essential to exploit fully the economies of scale and scope quickly dominated their industries. Most 
continued to do so for decades. The tripartite investment by the "first movers," as I term them, provided a 
base upon which managers and workers learned the potential of the new technologies and the ways of 
improving processes of production and distribution. Challengers had to construct plants of comparable size 
and do so after the first movers had already begun to work out the bugs in the new production processes. 
The challengers had to create distribution and selling organizations to capture markets where first movers 
were already established. They had to recruit management teams to compete with those already well down 
the learning curve in their specialized activities of production, distribution, and (in technologically 
advanced industries) research and development. Such challengers did appear, but only a few of them.” 
 
However succinct Chandler’s explanation, it does not provide for a set of measures for the subsequent 
attainment of market leadership. Since then, a great deal of work has explained each FMA independently. 
Therefore, I focus on summarizing the literature that fits with Chandlers’ insights (1992). But next, I address 
alternative models that are close but not quite fitting.  
Alternative model #1: Five trust factors. Scarbrough et al. (2013) found a somewhat similar list of “trust 
factors” for early venture relationship. They argued for five dimensions: Institutional signals, position in 
social networks, credible (technical) competence, actor relationships, and information exchange. The 
terminology of this list is best suited for studies on the individual level of analysis, and thus is not best to 
explain the firm level of proofpoints. The list also misses out on the importance of separating product 
design, process quality, and technical standards. Other work can examine if a multifactor model on the 
individual level explains firm formation.  
Alternative model #2: Four breakthroughs. Buisson and Silberzahn (2010) proposed a model of “four 
breakthroughs” for achieving market dominance: technical, business model, design, and process 
breakthroughs. However, this model neglects the network and cognitive leadership dimensions, and  
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Table 7: Literature Support for the Rebel Alliance Model 
LITERATURE: ATHENA’S BIRTH 
(Agarwal et al. 
2017) 
 
“Pre-Commercial” 
Prototyping 
PROMETHEAN PHASE 
 
 
 
“Commercialization”    
 First Entry Window 
MERCURIAN PHASE 
 
 
 
“Firm Takeoff” 
Second Entry Window 
ENTRY TIMING THEORIES  Literature supports Mercurian entry for future market leadership in durable goods, and 
Promethean entry for individuals seeking long term notoriety and free expression.  
CONFIGURATION 
PROPOSITIONS 
 SET PROPOSITION 1: A full 
PQ configuration confers a 
short-term leadership for 
the Mercurian Phase 
SET PROPOSITION 2: A full MC 
configuration confers Mercurian 
leadership, but also sustained 
FMAs throughout sales takeoff 
SOURCES 
Lilien and Yoon, 1990; 
Agarwal and Bayus, 2002; 
Rao, 1994;2004; Santos and 
Eisenhardt, 2009; Suarez, 
Ghodal, and Gotsopoulos, 
2015; Zachary et al. 2015; 
Golder and Tellis, 2001; 
Bayus, Jain, and Rao, 1997; 
Audia and Rider, 2005; Reid 
and De Brentani, 2010; 
Eckhardt and Shane, 2003 
Invention: “Having the 
Dream”  
 
Actors invent 
technologies that 
enable a path towards 
a commercial product, 
thereby drawing the 
attention of other 
would-be 
entrepreneurs 
Pioneering 
Commercialization: “Having 
the Vision”  
 
Firms cooperate to share 
ideas and set standards for 
the first product designs. A 
clique forms around the 
world’s most engaged and 
talented inventors. Those 
projects “certified” as 
attractive by the small-
world leaders are most 
trusted by lead users.  
Firm Takeoff: “Having the Will” 
 
Several products explode into 
mass production, as frontrunners 
claim, demarcate, and control a 
“certified” dominant category by 
trade media; demand coalesces 
around a few superstar 
companies. Firms compete in 
certification contests.   
SOCIAL EXAPTATION 
THEORIES 
Social sequences for exaptation are specific to the Rebel Alliance Strategy; business model 
leaders capture public attention, becoming industry role models in social events.  
BUSINESS MODEL 
LEADERSHIP PROPOSITIONS  
 
 PQ1: Promethean Leaders 
create industrywide 
events, stoking 
conversations with early 
stakeholders about best 
business model practices.  
MC1: Mercurian Leaders 
dominate in trade show 
presence. These forums are ideal 
for conversing with all 
stakeholders about business 
models for capturing early 
adopters.  
SOURCES 
Zott and Amit, 2010; Garud, 
Gehman, and Guiliani, 2016; 
2018; Jacobides, M.G., 
Knudsen, T. and Augier, M., 
2006; Rinallo and Golfetto, 
2011; Andriani and Carignani, 
2014; Dew, Sarasvathy, and 
Venkatraman, 2004; Downes 
and Mui, 1998; Lawton, 
Rajwani, and Minto, A., 2017. 
 
Exaptive Pools and 
Feature Emergence 
 
A core technology 
emerges from pools of 
knowledge in a related 
industry, showing 
necessary features for a 
new product. Business 
model is not yet known.  
Exaptive Events and 
Deliberate Selection: 
Creating Paths 
 
Leading Prometheans 
create situations where 
lead users work across 
organizations to explore 
business models. They 
harvest best practices and 
identify key features for 
commercial design by 
steering the conversation. 
Exaptive Forums and Secondary 
Adaptation: Capturing 
Bottlenecks 
 
A leader’s ability to articulate the 
nature of the emerging industry, 
and draw all the attention, 
certifies their leadership for the 
early adopter business model. 
They use their social presence to 
capture and iteratively improve 
the value chain. 
TECHNICAL EXAPTATION 
THEORIES 
Technical sequences for exaptation are specific to the Rebel Alliance Strategy; Prometheans 
prefer open technology standards, whereas Mercurians “close the box”.   
STANDARDS LEADERSHIP 
PROPOSITIONS  
 
 PQ2: Promethean Leaders 
create open technical 
standards convenient for 
lead users. 
MC2: Mercurian leaders create 
proprietary standards that 
outperform the open market.    
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SOURCES 
 
Rindova and Petkova, 2007; 
Saviotti and Metcalfe, 1984. 
Christiansen, 1997; Adner and 
Levinthal, 2001; Arthur, 1989; 
Sydow et al, 2009; 
Stinchcombe, 1965; 
Chesbrough and Rosenbloom, 
2002;; Pinch and Bijker, 1984) 
Pre-Formation 
 
The first standards are 
shaped by idiosyncratic 
personal histories, 
chance encounters, and 
serendipity; personal 
circumstances might 
impact technical 
evolution. 
Formation (AKA Closure) 
 
Community members hunt 
for open standards. Firms 
who attempt closed 
standards will deter lead 
users, and thus fail.   
The selection process 
begins, reducing options to 
a handful of paths, favoring 
path-dependent business 
models. 
  Lock-In  
 
Savvy market leaders attempt to 
make proprietary variants of 
popular standards, and lock in 
consumers to these superior 
versions. Niche strategies consist  
in a sustained fight for remaining 
users disgruntled by the 
prevailing order. 
EGO NETWORK THEORY Scholarship shows that industry networks begin as heavily overlapping personal networks 
but evolve into distinctive social clusters anchored around each leading firm.  
NETWORK LEADERSHIP 
PROPOSITIONS 
 PQ3: Leading Promethean 
firms will have social ties 
to the star inventor, and 
thus also ties to other star 
firms 
MC3: Leading Mercurian Firms 
will have presence at the center 
of the technical community 
cluster.  
SOURCES 
(Klepper, 2002;2007; Aldrich 
and Kim, 2007; Moon, 2014; 
Van Wijk et al, 2013; Gulati, 
Sytch, and Tatarynowicz, 
2012; Baum, Shipilov, and 
Rowley, 2003; Furnari, 2014; 
Audretsch and Feldman, 
1996).  
Pre-Small World with 
Serendipitous Invention 
 
A few isolated 
instigators begin the 
process of 
technologically 
challenging incumbents 
Small World Community  
 
A few brokers each unify a 
critical cultural pattern to 
create a complete clique of 
challenger firms and elite 
lead users. Star Networks 
need at least one “star 
creator” who provides 
assistance. 
Post-Small World: Industry 
Clusters  
 
 As homogenous standards and 
formal institutions replace 
informal bridging actors, social 
networks become organizational 
rather than interpersonal. 
Supporting firms are related to 
leaders by personal ties.  
COMMUNITY KNOWLEDGE Technological and social sequences for the development of community knowledge. Early 
communities center around tech enthusiasts, whereas later communities are brand-loyal. 
INSTITUTIONAL LEADERSHIP 
PROPOSITIONS 
 PQ4: Leading Promethean 
Firms will have social ties 
to the “star curator” who 
fosters community 
knowledge basis for lead 
users.  
MC4: Leading Mercurian Firms 
will maintain supporting 
institutions for their brand 
community, such as tech 
societies and aftermarkets.  
SOURCES 
 
(Aldrich and Fiol, 1994; Allen, 
1983; Agarwal, Moeen, and 
Shah, 2017; Moon, 2014; 
Cool, 2008; Fjeldstad et al, 
2012; McCray, 2013; Lakhani 
and Von Hippel, 2003; Muñiz 
Jr. and O'Guinn. 2001; 
Mitnick and Ryan, 2015).   
Athenian Triggers 
 
Early waves of elite 
researchers and 
inventors solve major 
problems that posed by 
futurists. They describe 
the science future in a 
new linguistic terms. 
Open Community 
Knowledge  
 
The first clique is 
dependent on periodicals 
and clubs that support 
existing community 
knowledge. Post-internet, 
cliques also communicate 
through leading virtual 
communities.  
Knowledge Corporatization 
 
The early cliques break down as a 
few market leader firms create 
their own permanent industry 
institutions for promoting 
technical support and 
aftermarket activities. Product 
development now focuses on 
supporting a proprietary 
platform.  
PRODUCT THEORIES Literature supports expandable “minimum viable products” for lead users, and a switch 
towards reliability, attractiveness, and ease of use to “cross the chasm”.   
PRODUCT CATEGORY 
PROPOSITIONS 
 
 PQ5: Leading Promethean 
firms win design 
recognition for product 
categories based on lead 
user priorities.  
MC5: Leading Mercurian firms 
win awards for product category 
features targeting the 
mainstream early adopter.  
SOURCES 
Suarez’s (2004) Five Phases, 
where Phase Five is sales 
Phase One and Two: 
R&D Race / Feasibility 
 
Phase Three: 
Creating the Market 
 
Phase Four: 
Decisive Battle 
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overstates the “singularity” of each breakthrough as happening but once. Indeed, Apple, Tandy, and 
Commodore all achieved recognition for their proprietary standards, business model, category design, and 
quality leadership; but moreover, achieved network and cognitive proofpoints. Niche strategies might focus 
on as little as one leadership dimension.  
Deriving the Rebel Alliance Strategy. RAS shall be derived by synthesizing existing literature on 
emergent dynamics, but interpreted in terms of radical exaptation and lead user innovation paradigms. The 
three phases of Andriani and Carignani’s (2014) radical exaptation model are: feature emergence, deliberate  
selection, and secondary adaptation. Note this sequence aligns with pre-emergence, commercialization, and 
sales takeoff. Interestingly, the fitting process aligns with sequences proposed for each of the sub-literatures. 
In other words, scholars already have largely worked out the theories associated with each proofpoint and 
with the proposed innovation sequence. For example, the three-stage model of industry path dependence 
(Sydow, Schreyögg, and Koch, 2009; David, 1985; Arthur, 1989) indicates that multiple successive steps 
may be necessary to discourage followers from challenging arbitrary aspects of Promethean standards. 
Early cognitive and institutional advantages are locked-in by social construction – such as the famous case 
takeoff and dominant design. 
Anderson and Zeithaml, 1984; 
Ries, 2011; Markides and 
Geroski, 2004; Rogers, 2010. 
Actors begin the search 
for a working 
technology, and end 
with a first prototype. 
Much of the essential 
knowledge is created 
by elite technical talent 
at incumbents.  
Actors launch the first 
minimum viable products 
and communicate carefully 
to pick sufficient 
price/feature 
combinations. Firms try to 
prove themselves on lean 
budgets and “eat what you 
catch” employee mentality. 
Market Leaders all show clear 
first-mover advantages and 
“Frontrunner” status, by fully 
establishing category price points 
and demand trajectories. Firms 
often go public (IPO) and seek 
maximum funds for scaling up. 
PATH DEPENDENCY Technological and social sequences for establishing reliable, affordable manufacturing 
processes. The first products are built to order, the second must be made continuously. 
QUALITY LEADERSHIP 
PROPOSITIONS 
 
 PQ6: Promethean leaders 
must develop a reputation 
of delivering on preorders. 
Orders can ship late but 
must work as promised.  
MC6: Mercurian leaders must 
win awards for on-time and 
working shipments to secure 
investors for mass scaling of 
production.   
SOURCES  
Bayus, Jain, and Rao, 2001; 
Chandler, 1992; Mowery and 
Nelson, 1999; Hendricks and 
Singhal, 1997;  Fawcett,  
Jones, and Fawcett, 2012.) 
“Vapor Market” 
 
Successful firm 
founders must develop 
an awareness of how all 
relevant parts are 
made.   
“Vapor Product” 
 
Leading firms overcome 
resource problems by 
garnering advance 
commitments. Leaders 
must be able to deliver on 
“white papers” and 
“vaporware” on demand.  
“Vapor Process” 
 
Successful market leaders must 
establish “Supply chain trust” to 
attract funds for new facilities to 
compete for market leadership. 
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of the locked-in, but technically inferior, QWERTY keyboard. The third stage, as described by the authors, 
neatly aligns with the goals of the Mercurians: to innovate for the general consumer, avoiding perfection. 
Consider the famous lock-in case of the Model-T Fords’ reverse gear being more powerful than both 
forward gears. Savvy drivers would exploit this feature to overcome the “Thin Lizzy’s” weak engine, 
driving backwards on the steepest hills. Locking in advantage includes understanding which sacrifices can 
be made in design: most Ford drivers lived on “flat-ish” land, anyhow.  
3.3 Explaining the Set Propositions  
Six Statuses, Twelve Market Conditions. For this section, I cover the propositions in the table using 
examples. Instead of merely repeating the referenced literature on FMAs, this section focuses on case-based 
explanations. At the end of the section, Table 3 provides an automobiles illustration of the measures chosen 
for testing proofpoints with CS-QCA.  
Set Proposition 1: A full PQ configuration confers short-term market leadership at the start of the 
Mercurian Period, but it is insufficient to sustain market leadership forward. A Promethean entrant 
competing in a dominant category must attain the full configuration of six PQ proofpoints to survive intact 
into the Mercurian Period. Firms who do not will fail. Success will grant the PQ leader enough status to 
launch a second generation of products during the Mercurian Period. Their strategy is likely too focused on 
lead user interests to appeal to the mass market, and therefore will not “cross the chasm” (Moore, 1999) 
into sales takeoff. Most PQ individuals and some niches do well, but this model does not track those units. 
Set Proposition 2: A full MC configuration confers a firm a long-term market leadership advantage, 
lasting throughout the sales takeoff period. Firms must attain a full configuration of six MC proofpoints 
to sustain market leadership past the inflection point of sales takeoff. A Firm who falls shy of the full 
configuration might survive via a niche strategy, but will not maintain a top market share in the dominant 
category. Again, niche firm survival is not tracked in this study, although the data is available for future 
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work. Surviving niche firms must always lack MC5: Mass category leadership as they purposefully 
abandon that product category.   
Proofpoint #1: Business model leadership. Would-be leaders must demonstrate a superior command of 
the value creation and value capture challenges associated with a phase of competition (Morris, 
Schindehutte, and Allen, 2005; Amit, and Zott, 2012). Leadership involves selling the business model 
narrative to stakeholders, and getting buy-in. Bre Pettis’s 3D desktop printer firm, Makerbot, was the only 
firm in this study who successfully transitioned from Promethean to Mercurian business model leadership 
role – so I use this example to cover both periods. Originally, the firm used open hardware and open 
software, and made strong promises to maintain both practices (West and Kuk, 2016). But by 2013, the 
firm was transitioning into a closed hardware design. They did leave their consumer design community, 
Thingiverse, free and open. However, this transition led to the loss of most original employees, including 
two of the three co-founders. A similar exodus happened at Apple when Steve Wozniak, the lead designer, 
protested the Macintosh computers becoming a desk appliance instead of an open system (Hertzfeld, 2004; 
Langlois, 1992). Automobile companies also initially were lax about patenting, until leading firms got tired 
of seeing their best design elements reappear in competitor’s cars – often after employees were poached or 
left to start their own imitator firms.  
Crossing the Chasm. A few firms make the transition to MC meanings and categories, but most abruptly 
perish due to inability to cross the chasm. MC firms curate meanings, such that consumers directly identify 
product value with proprietary designs – they become brand leaders that embody the specific new meanings 
of product categories (Aaker and Joachimsthaler, 2012).  
Proofpoint #2: Standards leadership. Radical exaptation (Andriani and Carignani, 2016) and open lead 
user innovation (Hienerth and Lettl, 2011; Von Hippel and Von Krogh, 2003; Stieglitz and Heine, 2007; 
Bogers, Afuah, and Bastien, 2010) jointly constitute a collective approach to industry formation. PQ 
participants disrupt incumbents who overlook possible uses for existing technology. Small, new challengers 
struggle to amass the resources to unseat large, old firms, yet many industries are pioneered by a wave of 
new entrants – such as automobiles, personal computers, and 3D desktop printing.  
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Collective invention for RAS. Prometheans can pool efforts for the collective invention of new technology 
standards – a way to cheaply and quickly improve the technology to the point that it rapidly overtakes 
incumbents (Cowen and Jonard, 2003). For example, Nikolaus Otto’s 4-Stroke engine patent was abruptly 
rejected by Germany as being too broad, opening up a floodgate of open engine innovation in Paris and 
Berlin. Gottlieb Daimler and Wilhelm Maybach left Otto’s company to commercialize their vastly 
improved version of the open standard. In the 1890s, nearly everyone either used Daimler-Maybach engines 
or created rival variants of them. Being technically close to Daimler and Maybach, therefore, became a key 
determinant of early success. For microcomputers, MITS and Southwest Technical Products Corporation 
created alternative standard busses: the S-100 and SS-50. Firms who followed either of these standards sold 
well until 1978, but firms who neglected either standard failed to capture a large early market share. For 
3D desktop printing, Adrien Bowyer set the first open standard for nozzles: Fused Filament Fabrication 
(FFF). This standard dominated until the Mercurian Period.  
Closing the Box. Mercurians are tasked with making proprietary standards that stabilize platforms (Hill, 
1997). To compete with trains, carriages, and steamboats, fledgling automobile firms first needed to 
collectively construct standards. Thus, standards innovation connects the knowledge of a host of experts to 
central leadership nodes. Many of the failed firms in this study focused on what they considered to be 
technically superior features, but violated the standards. Stan Veit (1993) explained that several 
microcomputer firms tried and failed in standard-setting, such as The Digital Group and Ohio Scientific. 
Some early 3D printer firms tried to use pellet plastics rather than filament plastics but didn’t overturn the 
filament as the industry standard. 
Proofpoint #3: Network leadership. Leading firms must forge superior ego networks and fight to preserve 
them as an advantage (Rosenkopf and Tushman, 1998; Tellis, 2010). Cool (2008) documented the birth of 
e-publishing as being one of close social ties. The firms who sprang forth from the Cyborganic community 
of San Francisco were early leaders: Wired magazine and ZDnet, for example. Being out of the central 
clique can be a serious detriment. Tim Berners-Lee, creator of the World Wide Web, documented a similar 
social effect (Berners-Lee and Fischetti, 2001), explaining just how hard it was to create the “installed base” 
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of users, producers, and consumers. Opera was a documented browser of the Promethean wave that could 
have technically surpassed Netscape, but didn’t have the right installed base. Thus, many other cases exist 
to explain why early entrepreneurs must “connect the dots” with budding technical communities (Baron, 
2006). My chosen measurement method is to connect the leading firms to a single actor: a star curator who 
manages meaning-making (Mitnick and Ryan, 2015) for a clique. Francis Moon’s (2014) book on inventor 
networks and kinematics is an excellent resource.   
Promethean social networks. Prometheans must work with “star curators” that stir up public interest and 
encourage clubs to form. The Count de Dion-Bouton created a series of automobile events and contests in 
France to promote his own designs and those of his friends (Flink, 1990). Other Prometheans also did their 
best to hype up products; but social connection to De Deion-Bouton was not optional – everyone, including 
his most isolated rival, Karl Benz, eventually participated in his racing events (Moon, 2014). For 
microcomputers, the star curator was Lester Solomon, editor of Popular Electronics magazine. Everyone 
from Ed Roberts of MITS to Lee Felsenstein of Processor Technology was reading his magazine, and most 
of the leading firms either submitted projects to it or created proprietary upgrades to those published 
projects. Thus MITS’s own events, and the Homebrew Computer Club, were both offshoot tendrils of 
Solomon’s influence. Firms who operated with no awareness of the tastes of this budding clique produced 
weird designs and were quickly forgotten. In 3D printing, the first firms were personally tied to Adrien 
Bowyer, and subsequently participated in Maker Faire events. For 3D printing, Josef Prusa, creator of the 
most-cloned Prusa printer, worked with Bowyer – Makerbot also received his investment and support. All 
the top Promethean printers were of his lineage.    
Becoming the heart of the industry. As the market begins to widen, connections to a star curator are no 
longer important (Baum, Shipilov, and Rowley, 2003). This is because firms are no longer dependent on 
the social interactions facilitated by the star curator. Instead, the industry develops permanent institutions 
such as trade organizations and trade shows where any potential firm can easily find another. Now the 
bigger limitation to social centrality is location: firms must find a location in a cluster where all the talent 
can be found, the small vendor firms congeal, and where industry spillovers are highest (Klepper, 2009; 
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Audretsch and Feldman, 1996) This shift form interpersonal ties to firm-level ties is dramatic, and 
Mercurians must claim, demarcate, and control their position in categories by being actively involved 
(Santos and Eisenhardt, 2009).  
Proofpoint #4: Cognitive institutional leadership. The Promethean radical exaptation entrepreneur 
launches a social movement narrative for the new industry (Hess, 2005; Soule, 2012; Garud, Gehman, and 
Guiliani, 2014). Thus, it is not enough to be a business model leader or to be in the focal clique/community: 
a leading firm must also actively construct supporting institutions to proliferate communities of designers, 
consumers, aftermarket support, and so on. 
The RAS Promethean narrative. Indeed, automobile, microcomputer, and 3d desktop leaders all 
masterfully told a story about revolutionary “Access to tools” – as Stewart Brand put it in his 1970s Whole 
Earth Catalog (Turner, 2010). Each of these birthing events involved making ideas fashionable in a very 
willful manner. Automobile enthusiasts resented railroad tracks, speed limits, and unreliable collective 
transportation conditions; and, following several speculative and corrupt railroad booms in every 
industrializing nation, they had enough of robber barons and monopolies. They were eager to share, 
experiment on uses and upgrades, and liberate each other to travel (Flink, 1972; Kline and Pinch, 1996). 
Microcomputer prophets like Ted Nelson wanted “computer power to the people” (Turner, 2010; Levy, 
1984). Computer enthusiasts experimented with how to hack televisions, radios, phone lines, and 
mainframe computers. The 3D desktop printer was born of the “maker” movement (Rivkin, 2014), a global 
cosmopolitan enthusiasm for makerspaces that provide open access to manufacturing equipment. Adrien 
Bowyer at the University of Bath had started an open online project, reprap.org, in 2005. The goal was 
inspired by the von Neumann self-replicator theory, popular in the 1950s: to produce an open source “self-
replicator” machine with the goal of printing near-copies of itself. Bowyer’s belief was any machine capable 
of complex self-replication would be a globally liberating technology. Promethean leaders must sell an 
open-source narrative to the public, and contribute to events that support open institutions.  
Mercurian institutions. MC leaders separate themselves from the star curators. They become their own 
“managers of meaning” (Mitnick and Ryan, 2015) and design brand identities that can support brand 
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communities. As institutions congeal, Mercurians create cultural silos for their own proprietary technology. 
Automotive leaders created their own aftermarket industries, trained their own workers and revolutionized 
human resources processes, and established institutions such as the Society for Automotive Engineers. 
Microcomputer companies created their own periodicals and clubs to support their products and created 
social networks and tooolkits for software designers. 3D desktop printer companies competed to create their 
own exclusive online communities, such as Makerbot’s Thingiverse design sharing community. These 
supporting institutions became channels whereby users become enculturated to one philosophy. 
 Proofpoint #5: category-defining product innovations. Early leaders must define the product categories 
for the industry (Suarez, Ghodal, and Gotsopoulos, 2015). Initial products please lead users and divide the 
industry in terms of only a couple of main production functions.  
Promethean contests. For example, automobile makers quickly realized the tradeoff between lightweight 
urban leisure vehicles for conspicuous consumption, initially called runabouts; vehicles designed for speed 
and long distance, known as touring vehicles; and middle-of-the-road vehicles built for ease of modification 
and for suburban travel, known as sedans. The dominant Promethean categories are designed to win simple 
contests (Rao, 1994). Other niches focused on rural markets (high-wheelers), small business (trucks), luxury 
(limousines), and so forth; but the first three categories were much larger in sales. See Table 8 on page 93 
for a more detailed explanation of these categories.  
The design chasm. But the category sequence must change focus over time as a new, broader class of users 
enters the industry [see Table 8 again]. Runabouts gave way to phaetons, which dropped some of the old 
carriage parts and added such practical innovations as modern tires, hoods, and suspensions. Early touring 
models were designed to endure dirt-road conditions, but these gave way to modern touring and roadster 
designs for cruising at high speeds down paved highways and racetracks. The classic open sedan evolved 
into the coupe-sedan dominant design of the Ford Model T, after adding a closed body, safety features, and 
extremely easy operating controls.  
Proofpoint #6: delivering quality. The best entrepreneurs seem to already know the power of institutions 
for certifying their firms and products (Rao, 1994), and the ultimate power of attaining a top status. Thus, 
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to become an early quality leader, a firm must have a scalable process and not be buried by product recalls. 
Not just customers, but all stakeholders, need evidence of quality for supply chain trust (Fawcett, Jones, 
and Fawcett, 2012). 
Promethean pre-order markets. For example, Stan Veit (1993), the owner-operator of the first computer 
store in New York City, explains in his memoirs on microcomputers that Ohio Scientific, an “almost leader” 
in personal computers, simply fell short of the whole recipe. History should recognize that their owner-
operator, Mike Cheiky, was every bit the talent of Steve Wozniak, except he also made his own peripherals: 
the first printers, large hard disk drives, and even smoke detectors and security systems designed to ship 
with the Ohio Scientific computer system, all hardware innovations ahead of what Apple had! Cheiky and 
his wife Charity put together the best price/performance personal computer combinations in the industry, 
and were ahead of the competition with its range of features, upgrades, and peripherals. However, Veit 
noted they routinely failed to keep delivery promises, strayed from industry standards and institutions, and 
often changed product specifications on an ad hoc basis, thereby totally confusing and frustrating the user 
base. Lead users were willing to wait 60 days to have their computers built – additional short delays were 
shrugged off if the product worked.  
Mercurian sales: on-time and working. A Mercurian firm cannot be saddled with recalls, as was the case 
with Processor Technology. However, customers begin to expect rapid delivery, and will no longer wait 60 
days. It is difficult to maintain promises without social integration into a supply chain. Ohio Scientific’s 
lack of social integration into the industry certainly doomed their chances to take on Apple, Radio Shack, 
and Commodore. As Zimmerman and Zeitz (2002) have noted, legitimacy is the key resource that leads to 
other resources, and there is no faster way to ruin your legitimacy than a product failure.  
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3.4 Defining the Sample and Crisp Set Hypotheses.   
Using mostly historical sources, I identified 28 cases of leadership (firms) across 3 industries (automobiles, 
personal computers, 3d desktop printers) and across two phases (Promethean and Mercurian). For 
automobiles, I leaned heavily on the work of Klepper (2002;2007) and Flink (1990); but I double-checked 
their claims using Frank Leslie’s Popular Monthly (Unknown Author, 1904), Georgano’s (1973) 
Encyclopaedia of Motorcars, and some independent internet sources. For microcomputers, I used the works 
of Veit (1993), Langlois (1992), and Freiberger and Swaine (2000), Byte, and Computer Shopper to identify 
leaders and near-misses. For 3D desktop printers, I used online sources (3ders.org and reprap.org), Make: 
Magazine, the movie Print: The Legend (2014), Wohlers industry reports, and 20 semi-structured 
interviews in 2014 at Maker Faire and the 3D Print Show in London. Data appears in Appendix A.  
Market Leadership Sets. Each predictor set (Table 5) includes six proofpoints, and the predicted set is the 
predefined group of sales leaders (Figure 4). I test all 28 firms against both the Promethean and Mercurian 
proofpoints, to demonstrate a structural break between the PQ and MC cohorts. Crisp sets are thus measured 
by the presence of all set-specific proofpoints.  
Crisp Set QCA Method. The Crisp set method, or CS-QCA, (Rihoux and Ragin, 2008; Kan et al., 2016) 
was designed to confirm a specific relationship between cases in a social environment that has no fuzziness, 
no stochastic character, and no internal variability across the time period. Thus, I present only a raw table 
of all cases within the leadership cohort, and for the purposes of this study, I ignore the variability among 
all the non-leading firms who failed to make the cut.  
Fuzzy Set QCA Method. In contrast, a fuzzy set QCA (FS-QCA) approach would accept some 
combination of sufficient conditions for multiple equifinal paths to sales leadership (Fiss, 2011). This 
method would be appropriate if only some of the proofpoints were necessary for market leadership- indeed, 
if I were to find counter-examples among the PQ and MC cohorts, it would force me to test the entire set 
of early entrants to the dominant categories for all three industries, which would exceed 300 total cases. 
Therefore, I prepared for this possibility and gathered extensive data on all early entrants. Note FS-QCA 
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approach is more complex and requires a more formal approach, the analysis of variance, and the 
presentation of a full matrix of all cases.  
Aligning Measures to Theory. To translate the RAS theory into a QCA table, I selected an industry-
specific measure for each of the hypothesized proofpoints. To conserve space, I have only provided a 
detailed explanation of the measures used for automobiles. Additional details about the measures selected 
of the other two industries are largely covered in the examples given in the previous section, and full tables 
can also be obtained from the author.  
Table 8: Aligning Automobile Measures to the Proofpoint Model 
1) Dominant 
Categories 
2) (society of 
Automotive 
Engineers, 1916; 
Hyde, 1989; Carroll 
et al, 1996) 
3) Athena’s Birth 
4) (France and Germany) 
5) 1876-1893 
6)  
7) Until the Maybach 
Carburetor 
8)  Promethean Clique Combustion  
9) (France and Germany) 
10) 1893-1900 
11)  
12) Until Gas Engine Standard 
13)  
14) Mercurian Community 
15) Combustion (USA) 
16) 1901-1909  
17)  
18) Until the Model T Ford reaches 
full production 
19)  Tri-wheel, 
Runabouts and 
Phaetons 
20) (urban-only, 
lightweight horseless 
carriages)  
21) Karl Benz Patent 
Motorwagen (1885 
Germany); Daimler and 
Maybach 4 form factor 
models (1885); De Dion-
Bouton Steam  Quadricycle 
(1889 France)  
22) Karl Benz Velo (1889 Germany); De 
Deion-Bouton Runabouts (1893 France); 
Peugeot First Series (1892 France). This is 
the first category to become “Standard” 
in design 
23) Thomas B. Jeffery and Co.’s Rambler 
(1901); Oldsmobile Curved Dash 
(1901); Ford Model A (1903); Buick 
Model B (1904) 
24) Roadsters and 
Touring 
25) (long distance, 
rugged, fast, 
suspension for rural 
roads) 
26) Duryea (1893 United 
States); Panhard & Levassor 
(1891 France), creators of 
“Systeme Panhard”, the first 
body design standard. 
27) DMG Mercedes 35hp (1900 Germany); 
De Dion-Bouton Series vehicles (1892 
France). These two companies were the 
most notorious engineering enthusiasts 
in their respective countries. They 
collaborated to stage many events, 
breaking many “firsts”.  
28) Buick Model 10 (1908); Engine 
Leadership; Cadillac Model F (1906). 
This category received all the media 
coverage for long distance road races. 
Large, rugged, and reliable. 
29) Sedans and 
Coupes 
30) (closed body, safe, 
easy to use, slow) 
31) Early mass transit buses:  
Amédée Bollée’s steam 
busses (1875-1883) 
32) Renault Voiturette Type B (1899 France); 
Automobile’s first child prodigy. The 
world’s first sedans and coupes were 
rare custom vehicles. Renault filled a 
small niche for decades, until partnering 
with rivals.  
33) Cadillac Model M (1906); Ford Model 
T (1908); After being imitated by 
competitors for years, a little bit of 
everyone else’s wisdom poured back 
into his megahit car. 
34)  
35) DOMINANT DESIGN: FORD MODEL T 
36) Star Evangelist / 
Forum Leader 
37)  
38)  
39) Armand Peugeot  
40) (France’s Leading Bicycle 
manufacturer, 1886, was 
the critical curious 
incumbent for P&L); 
Gottleib Daimler  
41) De Dion-Bouton (France). The French 
count was the biggest financial and social 
supporter of the Parisian auto industry. 
Failed clique: Arthur Pope, Early Electric 
clique, bicycle industry titan, USA.  
42) 1900 First New York Auto Show; other 
cities follow, and auto clubs exist in 
every major metro area. All leaders 
held center stage in these events and 
were skilled at making sales with 
dealers at auto shows. 
43) Star Inventor / 
Cluster Leader 
44) Nikolaus Otto, Inventor of 
the internal combustion 
engine, 1876, Germany) 
45) Daimler-Maybach (Germany), and 
Panhard&Levasseur (France). All early 
road contests were won by cars using 
Daimler-Maybach engines 
46) The best supply chains for parts and 
machine tool supply emerges in the 
greater Detroit area. Ford, Cadillac, 
Buick, Oldsmobile, and Thomas B. 
Jeffery take the lead by concentrating 
on this cluster, whereas luxury brands 
remain scattered throughout the 
country. 
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47) Quality leadership 
48)  
49)  
50) Bertha Benz’s first solo 
demonstration run of Karl 
Benz’s prototype, 1888.  
51) 1894 First Paris-Rouen Race (1894, P&L). 
52) First American Chicago- Tribune Road 
Race (1895; Henry Ford was present; 
Duryea had only car that finished 
without disqualification) 
53) The market leaders all won awards for 
quality based on superior production 
processes, thereby attracting capital 
investment for world’s largest 
manufacturing facilities (1908-1909) 
54) Community 
Knowledge 
55)  
56)  
57) Berlin Technical School, 
Germany, and Ecole 
Centrale des Arts et 
Manufactures, France: 
Franz Reuleaux; Bicycle, 
engine, and carriage trade 
organizations.  
58) Automobile Club of France: De Dion-
Bouton (1895); The Horseless Age 
magazine (1895, USA). These periodicals 
and clubs created an auto user culture of 
lead users.  
59) All market leaders create institutions, 
such as the Society of Automotive 
Engineers (1905), where Henry Ford 
was the first Vice- President. Ford 
wanted to be America’s automotive 
version of Reuleaux and created 
“Fordism” for the Detroit community. 
60) Engine Technical 
61) Standard 
62)  
63) Otto 4-Stroke Engine  
64) (1976-1889); Daimler and 
Maybach first engine, pre-
carburetor (1889-1893, 
inherited through marriage 
by Levasseur) 
65) Daimler, Maybach, and P&L collaborated 
to make the Phenix Engine the global 
standard. Tens of thousands sold; Some 
patent protection, OEM licenses granted 
in most countries. Americans like Ford 
and Buick made their own Otto 4-stroke 
variants of the Phenix. (1894-1900) 
66) De Dion-Bouton Engine – Full Patent 
Protection, Europe’s most used engine 
lines, with over 200,000 sold 
worldwide, leapfrogging Daimler-
Maybach. All American leaders make 
proprietary engines by 1909, but niche 
players still use standard engines.  
 
Triangulating “market leadership”. This study cannot directly analyze raw quantitative data on market 
share because it is famously unreliable during industry emergence: for example, the figures for 2013 factory 
assembled (non-kit form) 3d desktop printer global sales range from as low as 60,000 to as high as 100,000, 
and they don’t take into consideration many firms who aren’t big enough to bother reporting data to 
consultants. I simplify our task by being inclusive within a range of annual top 3 in sales: confirming any 
firm was mentioned among the top three in sales at least once for PQ or twice for MC across the stated time 
windows, numerically or qualitatively. I arrive at a range of up to six firms for each phase, discarding firms 
in sales takeoff who are one-hit wonders (for example, Texas Instruments I microcomputers, circa 1980; 
and, the 1981 Sinclair desktop as Sinclair’s major subsequent successes came in niche products).  
3.5 Results and Interpretation 
Results: PQ and MC sets confirmed. Refer to Appendix A. The reader can clearly see that the PQ sales 
leaders all shared proofpoints that are mutually exclusive from those shared by all MC sales leaders. Only 
one PQ leader achieved crossover (Makerbot) although most Mercurians had some sort of firm experience 
during the Promethean period. The explanation as to why they achieved crossover is that they deliberately 
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repeated the strategic case of microcomputers. Indeed, Bre Pettis makes clear in the movie, Print the Legend 
(2014), that Makerbot modeled itself on the rise of Apple. Paraphrased: “everyone wanted to be Wozniak 
but I had to be Steve Jobs because I was the only one who could do it”. Based on direct interviews with 
other companies in the industry at that time, this author found widespread awareness of the historical 
patterns associated with microcomputer strategy and a conscious attempt to do the same thing only better. 
In one particularly telling interview, Ethan Dicks, leader of Columbus Ohio’s 3D printing club, CORMUG 
emphasized that the social imitation of the microcomputer industry was quite deliberate. Not only were the 
lead user participants motivated by similar principles as aforementioned, but many of the organizers had 
experience in the microcomputer lead user groups. Dicks himself was at one time the teenaged ”alpha geek” 
of the Commodore Amiga user group – if anyone had a question about how to hack or improve the Amiga 
hardware, Dicks was the guy to ask. Dicks hoped to aid a generation of inspired young lead users.  
Proofpoints, RAS, and the Chasm. Therefore, the model cleanly predicts both distinctive sets of leaders, 
and illustrates the strategic transition of the infamous “market chasm” for RAS industries. Furthermore, 
overall leaders entered early and sold very few of their PQ products, but successfully transitioned to an MC 
firm and proofpoints during MC period, while also retaining the most credit from the press for leading “the 
revolution” by the end of the MC period.  
The geographic caveat. However, USA’s 3D desktop printer leader, Makerbot, is barely grasping onto 
leadership status as of 2018, for a non-hypothesized reason: because the geographic cluster for sales takeoff 
did not materialize in USA or Europe, but in East Asia – the highest demand market for the product! In 
fact, the only true difference between the three industry patterns seems to be due to global patterns of trade. 
The center of action for Automobiles shifted from Europe to USA because of the USA’s emerging 
proofpoints as the global automotive manufacturing powerhouse, because it had the greatest market demand 
(by 1910, American consumer sales and production was double that of Europe). For personal computers, 
both PQ and MC action takes place in the USA, with the Asian shift happening shortly after emergence. 
For 3D desktop printers, however, the emergence of the Asian cluster is happening at the tail end of 
emergence. Indeed, Asian firms are expecting to sell several times more printers to Asian households than 
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to the rest of the world combined. Thus, even though Makerbot did everything else right to attain overall 
MC leadership, XYZprinting of Taiwan is taking that top spot in time for the Asian consumer explosion, 
predicted to happen by 2020 (3ders.org, 2017). Such predictions are extremely likely given China’s explicit 
policy to be global leader in all additive manufacturing.    
Interpreting the likelihood of achieving all proofpoints. Traditional Gaussian statistics assumes an 
inherently random, highly uncertain field of social activity, from whence emerges coorelative relationships. 
However, Claude Shannon’s work on information theory assumes the opposite: a highly determined set of 
outcomes but a “scrambled” condition. Shannon developed his theory for use with cryptography to analyze 
the pure “signal” in a field of “noise. This same method has been famously applied to games of chance such 
as poker, where the winning hands are understood but the path to a winning hand is a scrambled, random 
dealing of resources, i.e. cards. The agents playing the game know the payoff structure, and that is what 
proofpoint theories do – they provide an accurate payoff structure (short term goals) to which players can 
aspire for locking in long term goals. Individual entrepreneurs are essentially trying to see through the 
scrambled conditions of initial resource allocations and find the clear signal in the noise –just like 
cryptologists and poker players. Thus, the configurational approach to industry emergence uses the 
underlying Boolean algebra of CS-QCA in the statistical family of information theory, and involves 
analyzing the likelihood of obtaining winning conditions.  
The probability of leadership. When interpreting configuration proofpoints, one might make the error of 
assuming a 6-condition configuration as 6 times less likely than 1-condition condition; in fact, it is n6  = 64 
times less likely, in the most simple allocation conditions. Proofpoints are assumed to be uniformly 
distributed because somebody MUST win leadership in each dimension, and so we can assume leadership 
to be a fixed condition that is necessarily distributed to a few firms. In a random, uniformly distributed field 
of, say, 256 new entrants, you would statistically expect 6 firms to have a complete market leadership 
configuration. In comparison, a resource-based approach would require lucky and Gaussian (normal) 
distributions of resources – the odds would be severely against any firm ever achieving six lucky 
allocations, each of which are at least 2 standard deviations from the norm. 
 97 
Choosing to play the game. Suppose it is possible to believe you have some competitive advantage in any 
dimension, based on the other firms you have encountered. The firm with the most knowledge of other 
firms’ capabilities has the surest ability to know if it is a leader in a nascent market. Firms who submit to 
social certification processes, and engage in the community, reduce their own uncertainty as well as that 
for the entire field. Leading firms show some ex ante knowledge of the RAS strategy, and can beat mere 
random odds. Increased firm visibility through trade shows, contests, etc. can resolve ambiguities to 
disavow false notions.  
3.6 Limitations and Future Directions 
Is six configurations enough? All three industries examined had an average annual pool of competitors 
aiming for a dominant category in the range of 100-300 worldwide players. Interestingly, if configurations 
are assumed to be uniformly and randomly distributed, between 3-6 market leaders would be best estimated 
by n5 =32 to n7=128 configurations, of between 5 and 7 leadership conditions. Thus the use of 6 leadership 
conditions per window could predict a sales leader for RAS industries with high certainty, but still cannot 
uncover which actor has the best odds in advance of social proof. This institutional measure of PQ and MC 
leaders is therefore accurate for picking sales takeoff leaders, but not precise. Future work should detail the 
mathematics of configurational analysis, especially for losing and niche strategies.  
The role of agency and microprocesses. Institutional agency theory (Mitnick, 1975) rears its head here: 
the principal (investor) sees uniform randomness and looks for signals (Shepherd, 1999), whereas the agent 
(venture) sees the true information, but doesn’t know the investors’ preferred signals. Future work on 
proofpoints is thus a way to resolve agency problems of certification (Hallen and Eisenhardt, 2012; Graffin 
and Ward, 2010) and to help close the principal-agent gap that exists in the venture capital industry.  
 Imitating prior RAS leaders. For example, according to West and Kuk (2016), the Netflix documentary 
Print the Legend, and expert interviews, Bre Pettis of Makerbot constantly compared himself and his 
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enterprise to Steve Jobs and Apple. Pettis studied the facts of that scenario to walk in Job’s shoes in only 
the necessary ways. The increased speed of identifying and funding early leaders also implies professional 
early stage investors pull the trigger faster. 
The East Asian cluster leaders – XYZprinting and Monoprice – are currently winning the cost war. In a 
sense, they are copying “Fordism”; and are also the rightful heirs to Jack Tramiel’s legendary price-war-
winning product, the Commodore 64 – to this date, the best-selling single computer model of all time. 
Makerbot is still playing the role of Apple and betting that it can survive price wars with design and 
community in the long run. We shall see how this plays out. 
Other industries, other strategies = other configurations. This study sets a baseline approach for future 
configuration studies in industry emergence. The next steps are: to study more emergence scenarios, such 
as intrapreneurship; to broaden the study of RAS configurations to market business models such as 
ridesharing and cryptocurrency industries; to deepen the study of equifinal strategies, possibly by drawing 
on Athena’s Birth; to analyze the longitudinal affects; to simulate alternative outcomes; and to create 
multilevel models of the ideal actions, actors, and resources for attaining proofpoints. We need to examine 
the types of firms and whether they are truly determined by the industry technology or by broader forces 
(Langlois 2007). One final problem raised is the essential nature of information stewardship, and the unique 
community role of the lead users in creating and curating the future. There may be policy measures that can 
be employed to facilitate Promethean activity and accelerate new industry formation. The literature has 
identified very sizeable lags from pre-emergence to firm takeoff (Agarwal and Bayus, 2002).  
Summary Conclusion.  
I have demonstrated that leadership cohorts operate under a different logic than the rest of the firms in their 
period of entry, because of greater responsibility for creating market institutions; and, that the logic of a 
Promethean leader is quite distinctive from a Mercurian. Only a rare firm can reconfigure itself rapidly 
from the first logic to the second. Due to the extreme difficulty of reconfiguration, it is questionable that 
early Promethean leadership contributes to Mercurian success. Also, it has been demonstrated that 
proofpoints can be used to anticipate future leadership cohorts, via necessary condition analysis.  
 99 
Appendix A : Truth Tables for Promethean and Mercurian Proofpoints  
MERCURIAN MARKET LEADERS: AMERICAN AUTOMOBILES 
MERCURIAN  
(sustained sales 
leadership) 
1901-1909 
All major 
trade 
shows 
MC1 
Proprietary 
Standard 
Leadership  
MC2 
Supporting 
proprietary tech 
with institutions 
MC3 
Geographic 
Cluster (Great 
Lakes) 
MC4 
Mass 
Category 
Leadership  
MC5 
Quality Execution 
(on-time, working 
shipments) 
MC6 
Ford***^^ YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Olds YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Buick YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Cadillac YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Nash YES YES YES YES YES YES 
PROMETHEAN 
(existed in some 
legal form) 
1893-1900 
Exaptation 
Event Host 
 
PQ1 
Open 
Standards 
(Otto) 
PQ2 
Ties to Detroit 
Clique (Olds) 
 
PQ3 
Ties to Detroit 
Clique (Ford) 
 
PQ4 
Lead User 
Category 
Leadership  
PQ5 
Quality Execution 
(working 
shipments) 
PQ6 
Ford 0 YES YES YES YES YES 
Olds YES 0 YES YES YES YES 
Buick 0 0 YES YES 0 0 
Cadillac 0 YES YES YES YES YES 
Nash 0 0 0 0 YES 0 
 
MERCURIAN MARKET LEADERS: AMERICAN MICROCOMPUTERS 
MERCURIAN  
(sustained sales 
leadership) 
1977-1980 
All major 
trade 
shows 
MC1 
Proprietary 
Standard 
Leadership  
MC2 
Supporting 
proprietary tech 
with institutions 
MC3 
Geographic 
Cluster 
(California) 
MC4 
Mass 
Category 
Leadership  
MC5 
Quality Execution 
(on-time, working 
shipments) 
MC6 
Apple YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Tandy*** YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Commodore YES YES YES YES YES YES 
PROMETHEAN 
(existed in some 
legal form) 
1974-1977 
Exaptati
on Event 
Host 
PQ1 
Open 
Standards 
(S100/SS-50)  
PQ2 
Ties to Popular 
science: Les 
Solomon 
PQ3 
Ties to MITS 
Altair Computer 
clubs  
PQ4 
Lead User 
Category 
Leadership  
PQ5 
Quality Execution 
(working 
shipments) 
PQ6 
Apple  YES 0 YES 0 YES YES 
Tandy 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Commodore 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
         MERCURIAN MARKET LEADERS: ASIAN MANUFACTURED 3D DESKTOP PRINTERS 
MERCURIAN 
(sustained sales 
leadership) 
2013-2020 
All major 
trade 
shows 
MC1 
Proprietary 
Standard 
Leadership 
MC2 
Supporting 
proprietary tech 
with institutions 
MC3 
Geographic 
Cluster (East Asia) 
MC4 
Mass 
Category 
Leadership  
MC5 
Quality Execution 
(on-time, working 
shipments) 
MC6 
XYZPrinting*** YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Monoprice YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Makerbot YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Formlabs YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Ultimaker YES YES YES 0 YES YES 
Prusa3^^ YES 0 YES 0 YES YES 
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PROMETHEAN 
(existed in some 
legal form) 
2009-2013 
Exaptation 
Event Host 
 
PQ1 
Open 
Standards 
(FFF) 
PQ2 
Ties to Major 
Hackerspaces, 
Maker Faire 
PQ3 
Ties to Adrian 
Bowyer 
 
PQ4 
Lead User 
Category 
Leadership  
PQ5 
Quality Execution 
(working 
shipments) 
PQ6 
XYZPrinting 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Monoprice 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Makerbot ^^ YES 0 YES YES YES YES 
Formlabs 0 0 YES 0 0 YES 
Ultimaker YES 0 YES YES 0 YES 
Prusa3 YES YES YES YES YES YES 
 
 PROMETHEAN MARKET LEADERS: AMERICAN MICROCOMPUTERS 
MERCURIAN 
(existed in some 
legal form) 
1977-1980 
All major 
trade 
shows 
MC1 
Proprietary 
Standard 
Leadership  
MC2 
Supporting 
proprietary tech 
with institutions 
MC3 
Geographic 
Cluster 
(California) 
MC4 
Mass 
Category 
Leadership  
MC5 
Quality Execution 
(on-time, working 
shipments) 
MC6 
MITS^^ YES 0 YES 0 0 0 
IMSAI YES 0 YES YES 0 0 
SWTPC YES 0 YES YES 0 0 
Processor 
Technology 
YES 0 YES YES 0 0 
Cromemco YES YES YES YES 0 YES 
PROMETHEAN 
(top 3 in overall 
sales for a year) 
1974-1977   
Exaptation 
Event 
Host 
PQ1 
Open 
Standards (S-
100 or SS-50)  
PQ2 
Ties to Popular 
science: Les 
Solomon 
PQ3 
Ties to MITS 
Altair 
computer clubs 
PQ4 
Lead User 
Category 
Leadership  
PQ5 
Quality Execution 
(working 
shipments) 
PQ6 
MITS^^ YES YES YES YES YES YES 
IMSAI YES YES YES YES YES YES 
SWTPC YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Processor 
Technology*** 
YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Cromemco YES YES YES YES YES YES 
 
                  PROMETHEAN MARKET LEADERS: AMERICAN 3D DESKTOP PRINTERS 
PROMETHEAN 
(existed in some 
legal form)  
2013-2020 
All major 
trade 
shows 
MC1 
Proprietary 
Standard 
Leadership 
MC2 
Supporting 
proprietary tech 
with institutions 
MC3 
Geographic 
Cluster (East 
Asia) 
MC4 
Mass 
Category 
Leadership  
MC5 
Quality 
Execution (on-time, 
working shipments) 
MC6 
Prusa^^  YES YES YES 0 YES YES 
Makerbot 
Cupcake  
0 0 0 0 0 0 
Deltabot 0 0 0 0 0 0 
PROMETHEAN 
(top 3 in overall 
sales for a year) 
2009-2013 
Exaptation 
Event Host 
PQ1 
Open 
Standards 
(FFF) 
PQ2 
Ties to Major 
Hackerspaces, 
Maker Faire 
PQ3 
Ties to Adrian 
Bowyer  
PQ4 
Lead User 
Category 
Leadership  
PQ5 
Quality Execution 
(working 
shipments) 
PQ6 
Prusa*** YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Makerbot 
Cupcake 
YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Deltabot^^ YES YES YES YES YES YES 
             PROMETHEAN MARKET LEADERS: FRENCH/GERMAN CLUSTER AUTOMOBILES 
 MERCURIAN 
(existed in some 
legal form) 
1901-1909 
All major 
trade 
shows 
MC1 
Proprietary 
Standard 
Leadership  
MC2 
Supporting 
proprietary tech 
with institutions 
MC3 
Geographic 
Cluster (Great 
Lakes) 
MC4 
Mass 
Category 
Leadership  
MC5 
Quality Execution 
(on-time, working 
shipments) 
MC6 
 101 
DMG  YES YES YES 0 0 YES 
De Dion-Bouton YES YES YES 0 0 YES 
Peugeot YES YES YES 0 YES YES 
Panhard & 
Levassor ^^ 
YES YES YES 0 0 YES 
Karl Benz YES 0 YES 0 0 YES 
Renault YES YES YES 0 YES YES 
PROMETHEAN 
(top 3 in overall 
sales for a year) 
1889-1900 
Exaptation 
Event Host 
 
PQ1 
Open 
Standards 
(Otto) 
PQ2 
Ties to Paris-
Berlin Clique (De 
Dion) 
PQ3 
Ties to Paris-
Berlin Clique 
(Daimler) 
PQ4 
Lead User 
Category 
Leadership 
PQ5 
Quality Execution 
(working 
shipments) 
PQ6 
DMG (Daimler-
Maybach)^^ *** 
YES YES YES YES YES YES 
De Dion-Bouton YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Peugeot  YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Panhard & 
Levassor  
YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Karl Benz YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Renault  YES YES YES YES YES YES 
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